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CASE LAW ON AMERICAN INDIANS:  
AUGUST 2015—AUGUST 2016 
 
By Thomas P. Schlosser* 
 
I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
 
A. 2016 Cases 
 
1. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States 
 
No. 14-510, 136 S. Ct. 750, 193 L. Ed. 2d 652, 2016 U.S. 
LEXIS 971, 84 U.S.L.W. 4081, 25 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 604 
(U.S. 2016). Decided: Jan 25, 2016. Case below: Menominee 
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. U.S. 765 F.3d 1010. Holdings: 
Equitable tolling does not apply to the presentment of petitioner’s 
claims. (a) To be entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of 
limitations, a litigant must establish “(1) that he has been pursuing 
his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 
stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 
560 U. S. 631, 649.   
The Tribe argued that diligence and extraordinary 
circumstances should be considered together as factors in a unitary 
test, and it faults the Court of Appeals for declining to consider the 
Tribe’s diligence in connection with its finding that no 
                                                                                                             
* THOMAS P. SCHLOSSER. Mr. Schlosser represents Tribes in fisheries, 
timber, water, energy, cultural resources, contracting, tax and federal breach of 
trust. He is a director of Morisset, Schlosser, Jozwiak & Somerville, where he 
specializes in federal litigation, natural resources, and Indian tribal property 
issues. He is also frequently involved in tribal economic development and 
environmental regulation. In 1970s, Tom represented tribes in the Stevens’ 
Treaty Puget Sound fishing rights proceedings. Tom has a B.A. from the 
University of Washington and a J.D. from the University of Virginia Law 
School. Tom is a founding member of the Indian Law Section of the 
Washington State Bar Association and also served on the WSBA Bar Examiners 
Committee. Tom is a frequent CLE speaker and moderates an American Indian 
Law discussion group for lawyers at 
http://forums.delphiforums.com/IndianLaw/messages. He is a part-time lecturer 
at the University of Washington School of Law.  
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extraordinary circumstances existed. But this Court has expressly 
characterized these two components as “elements,” not merely 
factors of indeterminate or commensurable weight, Pace v. 
DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. 408, 418, and has treated them as such in 
practice, see Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U. S. 327, 336–337. The 
Tribe also objects to the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the 
“extraordinary circumstances” prong as requiring the showing of 
an “external obstacle” to timely filing.   
This Court reaffirmed that this prong is met only where the 
circumstances that caused a litigant’s delay are both extraordinary 
and beyond its control. None of the Tribe’s excuses satisfy the 
“extraordinary circumstances” prong of the test. The Tribe had 
unilateral authority to present its claims in a timely manner. Its 
claimed obstacles, namely, a mistaken reliance on a putative class 
action and a belief that presentment was futile, were not outside the 
Tribe’s control. And the significant risk and expense associated 
with presenting and litigating its claims are far from extraordinary. 
Finally, the special relationship between the United States and 
Indian tribes, as articulated in the ISDA, does not override clear 
statutory language. 764 F. 3d 51, affirmed. Alito, J., delivered the 
opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 
2. Nebraska v. Parker 
 
No. 14-1406, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 2132 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2016). An 
1882 Act opening Indian reservation land to settlement by non-
Indians did not diminish the reservation to preclude application of 
the Indian tribe’s liquor laws to non-tribal retailers in the opened 
land, since the language of the Act only opening the land for 
settlement did not establish a clear intent of Congress to diminish 
the reservation. Neither conflicting legislative history nor changed 
demographic history based on the tribe’s absence from the opened 
land for a substantial period could overcome the conclusion that 
Congress did not intend to diminish the reservation. Judgment 
affirmed. Unanimous decision. 
 
3. Sturgeon v. Frost 
 
No. 14-1209, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 2135 (U.S. 
Mar. 22, 2016). Issues: Does Section 103(c) of the 1980 Alaska 
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National Interest Lands Conservation Act prohibit the National 
Park Service from exercising regulatory control over state, native 
corporation and private Alaska land physically located within the 
boundaries of the National Park System?   
Holdings: The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 103(c) is 
inconsistent with both the text and context of ANILCA.  
(a) The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 103(c) violates 
“a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a 
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place 
in the overall statutory scheme,” Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, 
Inc., 566 U. S. ___, (2012).  ANILCA repeatedly recognized that 
Alaska is different, and ANILCA itself accordingly carves out 
numerous Alaska-specific exceptions to the Park Service’s general 
authority over federally managed preservation areas. Those 
Alaska-specific provisions reflect the simple truth that Alaska is 
often the exception, not the rule. Yet the reading below would 
prevent the Park Service from recognizing Alaska’s unique 
conditions. Under that reading, the Park Service could regulate 
“non-public” lands in Alaska only through rules applicable outside 
Alaska as well. The Court concluded that, whatever the reach of 
the Park Service’s authority under ANILCA, Section 103(c) did 
not adopt such a “topsy-turvy” approach. Pp. 12–14.   
(b) Moreover, it is clear that Section 103(c) draws a distinction 
between “public” and “non-public” lands within the boundaries of 
conservation system units in Alaska. And yet, according to the 
court below, if the Park Service wanted to differentiate between 
that “public” and “non-public” land in an Alaska-specific way, it 
would have to regulate the “non-public” land pursuant to rules 
applicable outside Alaska, and the “public” land pursuant 
to Alaska-specific provisions. Assuming the Park Service has 
authority over “non-public” land in Alaska (an issue the Court does 
not decide), the Court concludes that this is an implausible reading 
of the statute.  The Court therefore rejects the interpretation of 
Section 103(c) adopted by the court below. Pp. 14–15.  
(c) The Court does not reach the remainder of the parties’ 
arguments. In particular, it does not decide whether the Nation 
River qualifies as “public land” for purposes of ANILCA. It also 
does not decide whether the Park Service has authority under 
Section 100751(b) to regulate Sturgeon’s activities on the Nation 
River, even if the river is not “public” land, or whether—as 
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Sturgeon argues—any such authority is limited by ANILCA. 
Finally, the Court does not consider whether the Park Service has 
authority under ANILCA over both “public” and “non-public” 
lands within the boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska, 
to the extent a regulation is written to apply specifically to both 
types of land. 768 F. 3d 1066, vacated and remanded.  
 
4. United States v. Bryant 
 
No. 15-420, 195 L. Ed. 2d 317, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3775 (U.S. 
Jun. 13, 2016). Respondent Michael Bryant, Jr., has multiple 
tribal-court convictions for domestic assault. When convicted, 
Bryant was indigent and was not appointed counsel. For most of 
his convictions, he was sentenced to terms of imprisonment not 
exceeding one year’s duration. Because of his short prison terms, 
the prior tribal-court proceedings complied with ICRA, and his 
convictions were therefore valid when entered. Based on domestic 
assaults he committed in 2011, Bryant was indicted on two counts 
of domestic assault by a habitual offender, in violation of § 117(a). 
Represented in federal court by appointed counsel, he 
contended that the Sixth Amendment precluded use of his prior, 
uncounseled, tribal-court misdemeanor convictions to satisfy 
§ 117(a)’s predicate-offense element and moved to dismiss the 
indictment. The District Court denied the motion; Bryant pleaded 
guilty, reserving the right to appeal. The Ninth Circuit reversed the 
conviction and directed dismissal of the indictment. 
It comprehended that Bryant’s uncounseled tribal-court 
convictions were valid when entered because the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel does not apply in tribal-court 
proceedings. It held, however, that Bryant’s tribal court 
convictions could not be used as predicate convictions within 
§ 117(a)’s compass because they would have violated the Sixth 
Amendment had they been rendered in state or federal court. 
Holdings: (1) Indian tribal court convictions for domestic 
assault were sufficient to convict a defendant of the federal felony 
offense of domestic assault in Indian country by an habitual 
offender, even though the defendant had no right to the assistance 
of counsel in the tribal court based on his limited terms of 
imprisonment, since the convictions were valid under tribal law 
and remained valid when invoked to convict and sentence the 
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defendant as an habitual offender in the subsequent proceeding. 
(2) Invoking the tribal court convictions did not constitute a denial 
of due process since the tribal court accorded the defendant 
specific procedural safeguards, and proceedings in compliance 
with tribal civil rights sufficiently ensured reliability of tribal court 
convictions. Judgment reversed. 
 
5. Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians 
 
No. 13-1496, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 4056 (U.S. Jun. 26, 2016). The 
judgment was affirmed by an equally divided Court on June 26, 
2016. Issues: Do Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate 
civil tort claims against non-members, including as a means of 
regulating the conduct of non-members who enter into consensual 
relationships with a tribe or its members? Holding Below: 
Dolgencorp, Inc. v. the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 
F.3d 167.   
The court affirmed the district court’s judgment that the 
corporation’s consensual relationship with John Doe gives rise to 
tribal court jurisdiction over Doe’s tort claims under Montana v. 
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). In Montana, the United States 
Supreme Court recognized that a tribe may regulate the activities 
of nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with the 
tribe or its members through commercial dealing, contracts, leases 
or other arrangements. It is surely within the tribe’s regulatory 
authority to insist that a child working for a local business not be 
sexually assaulted by the employees of the business. The fact that 
the regulation takes the form of a tort duty that may be vindicated 
by individual tribe members in tribal court makes no difference.  
 
II. OTHER COURTS 
 
A. Administrative Law 
 
1. County of Amador v. United States Dept. of the Interior, et 
al. 
 
No. 2:12-01710, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133482 (E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 29, 2015). The matter was before the Court on Cross Motions 
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for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff County of Amador 
(“Plaintiff”); Defendants the United States Department of the 
Interior (the “Department”), S.M.R. Jewell, and Kevin Washburn; 
and the Ione Band of Miwok Indians (“Defendant Intervenors”). 
This lawsuit presented a challenge to the Record of Decision 
(“ROD”), issued on May 24, 2012, by Donald Laverdure, Acting 
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, 
concerning the acquisition of the Plymouth Parcels property in 
trust for the Ione Band of Miwok Indians, in anticipation of the 
construction of a gaming-resort complex.   
Plaintiff challenged: the Department’s determination to take 
the Plymouth Parcels into trust; the determination that the Ione 
Band is a “recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,” 
25 U.S.C. § 479; and the determination that the trust acquisition 
constitutes the “restoration of lands for an Indian tribe that is 
restored to Federal recognition,” 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B), such 
that the property is gaming-eligible. Defendants and Defendant 
Intervenors responded that the ROD is procedurally and 
substantively valid. The complaint contained four causes of action. 
Claims one and two sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 
the Indian Reorganization Act that the Department’s determination 
– that the Ione Band was “under federal jurisdiction” in June 1934 
– constitutes an abuse of discretion and is arbitrary, capricious, and 
contrary to law. Claims three and four sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that the 
Department’s “Indians Lands” determination – including that the 
“restored lands for a restored tribe provision” is met – constitutes 
an abuse of discretion and is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to 
law.   
The court found that the ROD demonstrates consideration was 
given to the applicable statutory and regulatory framework, and to 
the Ione Band’s relationship with the federal government 
throughout the 20th century, in reaching the determination that the 
restored lands provision is met. The Court did not find the 
Department’s conclusion – that the acquisition constitutes the 
“restoration of lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to Federal 
recognition,” 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(iii) – was arbitrary, 
capricious, unlawful, or an abuse of discretion. The court denied 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and granted both 
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Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant 
Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 
 
2. Alto, et al. v. Jewell 
 
No. 11-cv-2276, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133540 (S.D. Cal. 
Sept. 30, 2015). This action arose from the approval of a 
recommendation from the Enrollment Committee of the San 
Pasqual Band of Diegueño Mission Indians (“San Pasqual Band” 
or “Band”) to disenroll the named plaintiffs from the Band’s 
membership roll. Pending before the Court were the parties’ cross-
motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed a complaint 
seeking, among other things, judicial review of the Assistant 
Secretary’s 2011 Decision under the APA and the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard.  
Shortly after the action began, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction, restraining and enjoining 
Defendants from removing Plaintiffs from the San Pasqual Band’s 
membership roll and from taking any further action to implement 
the Assistant Secretary’s 2011 Decision for the duration of this 
lawsuit. The Court also enjoined the Assistant Secretary from 
issuing certain interim orders. In the First Amended Complaint 
(“FAC”), Plaintiffs asserted five claims to set aside the Assistant 
Secretary’s 2011 Decision: (1) declaratory relief based upon the 
doctrine of res judicata; (2) declaratory relief on the basis that 
Defendant Echo Hawk violated the enrolled Plaintiffs’ right to 
procedural due process; (3) declaratory relief and reversal of the 
2011 Decision based upon the arbitrary-and-capricious standard; 
(4) “federal agency action unlawfully withheld and request for 
preliminary injunctive relief”; and (5) “declaratory and injunctive 
relief by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants[.]”   
After the Court granted the San Pasqual Band the limited right 
to intervene, the Band pursued an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court’s determination that 
it had jurisdiction to review the Assistant Secretary’s disenrollment 
decision and that the San Pasqual Band is not an indispensable 
party. Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111, 1131 (9th Cir. 2013). The 
Ninth Circuit also remanded to “allow the district court formally to 
clarify the original injunction to conform with the [Ninth Circuit’s] 
understanding of the injunction,” which was eventually resolved 
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by the parties. The court found that the record strongly suggests 
that the San Pasqual Band has engaged in a relentless battle to 
disenroll Marcus Alto, Sr. and his descendants from the very 
beginning. For the most part, that battle appeared to be one that 
Plaintiffs were winning all the way up to the Regional Director’s 
November 2008 decision. Then suddenly, in a complete about face, 
the Assistant Secretary reversed the Regional Director’s decision, 
found in favor of the Band, and followed the recommendation to 
disenroll Marcus Alto, Sr.’s descendants. However, the Court’s 
role in this situation is “not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency,” but rather to examine whether there is a “rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made” by the 
agency. Bonneville Power, 477 F.3d at 687 (quoting State Farm, 
463 U.S. at 43).   
Plaintiffs expended considerable effort to identify facts in the 
record either unmentioned, potentially ignored, or devalued, but as 
the Court has repeatedly stated, it “must defer to a reasonable 
agency action ‘even if the administrative record contains evidence 
for and against its decision.’” Modesto Irrigation, 619 F.3d at 1036 
(quoting Trout Unlimited, 559 F.3d at 958). The failure to address 
the substantial deference afforded to agency decisions, particularly 
for factual determinations, was a recurring flaw in Plaintiffs’ 
reasoning. See Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 112; Melkonian, 320 F.3d at 
1065. Under the standard prescribed by 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), 
which is highly deferential to the agency, Plaintiffs failed to meet 
their burden to demonstrate that the Assistant Secretary’s decision 
is in any way “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.” See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); 
San Luis & Delta-Mendota, 747 F.3d at 601.   
Plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate that the Assistant 
Secretary’s decision is not supported by “substantial evidence.” 
See Love Korean Church, 549 F.3d at 754; Bear Lake Watch, 324 
F.3d at 1076. Upon the Court’s review of the 2011 Decision, the 
Court found that the Assistant Secretary articulated a rational 
relationship between his factual findings and conclusions. See 
Fence Creek Cattle, 602 F.3d at 1132.   
In light of the foregoing, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion 
for summary judgment, and granted Defendants’ cross-motion for 
summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Assistant 
Secretary’s 2011 Decision “revers[ing] the decision made by the 
385 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 5:308 
 
 
Pacific Regional Director on November 26, 2008” and concluding 
that “the enrollment of the Marcus Alto Sr.[] descendants was 
based on information subsequently determined to be inaccurate 
and, as a result, their names must be deleted from the Band’s roll.”  
 
3. No Casino in Plymouth v. Jewell 
 
No. 2:12-cv-01748, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134375 (E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 30, 2015). The matter was before the Court on cross motions 
for summary judgment brought by Plaintiffs No Casino in 
Plymouth and Citizens Equal Rights Alliance’s (“Plaintiffs”); 
Federal Defendants John Rydzik, the United States Department of 
Interior, Amy Dutschke, Tracie Stevens, Kevin Washburn, the 
National Indian Gaming Commission, Paula Hart, and Sally Jewell 
(“Defendants”); and Defendant Intervenors the Ione Band of 
Miwok Indians (“Defendant Intervenors”).  
This lawsuit presents a challenge to the Record of Decision 
(“ROD”), issued by Donald Laverdure, Acting Assistant Secretary 
of Indian Affairs, concerning the acquisition of the Plymouth 
Parcels property in trust for the Ione Band of Miwok Indians, in 
anticipation of the construction of a gaming-resort complex.  
Claim 1 in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleged that 
the Secretary of the Interior lacks the authority to take land into 
trust for the Ione Band because it was not a “recognized tribe now 
under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934 when the IRA was enacted. 25 
U.S.C. § 479. Claim 2 in the FAC alleged that the Department 
failed to comply with its regulations, 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10, 151.11, 
and 151.13, when it reviewed and approved the ROD. Claim 4 
stated that: Lands taken in trust acquired after October 17, 1988, 
are not gaming eligible, 25 U.S.C. § 2719, unless an enumerated 
exception applies. Here, the exception relied upon by the 
Department is § 2719(b)(1)(B)(iii): “the restoration of lands for an 
Indian tribe that is restored to Federal recognition.” Plaintiffs argue 
simply that this exception is not applicable in this case. The Court 
has considered this issue in its Order on the cross motions for 
summary judgment, Case No. 1710 — particularly the “restored 
tribe” part of section 2719(b)(1)(B)(iii) — and incorporates by 
reference its analysis from that Order. Claim 5 in the FAC alleged 
that the Department failed to comply with NEPA when it reviewed 
and approved the fee-to-trust transfer and the casino project. 
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Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged the Department did not adequately 
consider the traffic, water quality, and air quality of the proposed 
project. These negative impacts include: increases in traffic 
congestion and safety concerns on rural road in the area, increases 
in air pollution, increases in water pollution, the overuse of limited 
water resources, and potential increase in crime. Plaintiff also 
alleged the Final Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) 
wrongfully assumed that non-Indian interests did not require equal 
consideration against the interests of the Ione Band when 
considering the environmental impacts of the proposed project. 
 The Court found: With respect to the First Amended 
Complaint, Claim 1, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is 
denied; Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; 
and Defendant Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. With respect to the First Amended Complaint, Claims 2 
through 5, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; 
and Defendant Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. 
 
4. Hammond v. Jewell 
 
No. 1:15-00391, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137141 (E.D. Cal. 
Oct. 7, 2015). Plaintiff alleged he was ousted from the leadership 
of the Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians Tribe in 
violation of tribal law, and brought this suit against numerous 
federal defendants seeking reinstatement to the Tribal Council. 
Before the court was defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6).  
Plaintiff was elected to the Tribal Council of the Picayune 
Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians Tribe in December 2008. After 
initially suspending plaintiff from the Tribal Council for alleged 
violations of the tribal Ethics Ordinance, the Tribal Council 
permanently removed him on June 17, 2011 after a hearing.   
Following the December 3, 2011 election, three factions were 
embroiled in a power struggle over tribal leadership, resulting in 
legal disputes in the Tribal Court and even violence. Plaintiff was 
not a member of any of the factions and it does not appear that 
their leadership disputes were related to plaintiff’s removal from 
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the Tribal Council. Asserting conflicting claims of leadership, all 
three factions submitted contracts under the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (“ISDEAA”) to the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”).  
The BIA Superintendent returned the contract requests from all 
three factions and concluded it would recognize the results of the 
disputed December 1, 2012 election. All three factions appealed 
the Superintendent’s decision and the BIA Regional Director 
affirmed the decision to return all three contract requests, but 
vacated the decision to recognize the results of the disputed 
election because the BIA did not have “the authority to determine 
which of the opposing factions[‘] interpretation of the Tribe’s law 
is correct.” The Regional Director determined that “recognition of 
a government is essential for the purpose of contracting under the 
ISDEAA and that the BIA “will conduct business, on an interim 
basis, with the last uncontested Tribal Council elected December 
2010.” The Regional Director did not identify plaintiff as a 
member of that Tribal Council because “[t]he record reflects that 
Nokomis Hernandez was appointed by the Tribal Council to 
replace Patrick Hammond, III.”   
Two factions and plaintiff appealed that decision to the BIA 
Office of Hearings and Appeals and a two-judge panel concluded 
that exigent circumstances justified making the Regional 
Director’s decision to recognize the 2010 Tribal Council “for 
government-to-government purposes” effective immediately. 
Although plaintiff had appealed “the Regional Director’s 
acceptance of his subsequent removal from the Council and 
replacement,” the panel did not address the merits of that dispute in 
its decision.   
The court found that a plaintiff cannot simply sue the federal 
government in an attempt to avoid tribal immunity with respect to 
intra-tribal affairs; and that the Tribal Council removed plaintiff 
from his leadership position and plaintiff’s avenue to challenge 
that action remains with the Tribe. Since the court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s § 1983 and ICRA claims, and 
plaintiff failed to allege a cognizable claim under the APA over 
which the court could exercise jurisdiction, the court granted 
defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
 
 





5. Tohono O’odham Nation v. City of Glendale 
 
No. 11-16811, No. 11-16833, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19407 
(9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2015). This appeal involved a dispute concerning 
135 acres of unincorporated land within Maricopa County, Arizona 
that was purchased by Plaintiff, the Tohono O’odham Nation (the 
Nation). The Nation filed suit against the City of Glendale and the 
State of Arizona (collectively, Defendants), challenging the 
constitutionality of H.B. 2534, a law passed by the Arizona 
legislature that allows a city or town within populous counties to 
annex certain surrounding, unincorporated lands.  
The Nation alleged that H.B. 2534 was enacted to block the 
federal government from taking the 135 acres it purchased into 
trust on behalf of the Nation—a process that would render the land 
part of the Nation’s reservation pursuant to the Gila Bend Indian 
Reservation Lands Replacement Act, Pub. L. No. 99-503, 100 Stat. 
1798 (1986) (the Act). The Nation asserted that H.B. 2534 is 
preempted by the Act, violates the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the United States and Arizona Constitutions, 
and violates the Arizona Constitution’s prohibition against special 
legislation. The parties filed cross summary judgment motions. 
The district court ruled in favor of the Nation as to the federal 
preemption claim, and ruled in favor of Defendants as to the 
remaining claims. The appellate court found that the district court 
properly concluded that H.B. 2534, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-471.04 was 
preempted by the Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands 
Replacement Act (Act). At the very moment the Tohono O’odham 
Nation filed an application with the Secretary of the Interior to take 
any of the Replacement Lands into trust, the city was permitted, 
pursuant to H.B. 2534, to annex the same land by either a majority 
vote of the governing body or by two-thirds vote of the governing 
body, in which case the annexation became immediately operative. 
The city had the authority, at the point when the Nation filed a trust 
application, to preemptively annex unincorporated land and 
effectively block the trust application, and this barred the Nation’s 
effort to incorporate purchased land into tribal land. Judgment 
affirmed. 
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6. Tuttle v. Jewell 
 
No. 13-365, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31398 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 
2016). Plaintiff William Tuttle leased restricted Indian land in 
Riverside County, California, for a term of 50 years. The land is 
owned by the United States in trust for the Colorado River Indian 
Tribes. In 2010, the Bureau of Indian Affairs terminated the lease, 
finding that Mr. Tuttle had violated several of its provisions. The 
termination decision was affirmed by the Interior Board of Indian 
Appeals. The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Interior Board of 
Indian Appeals are constituent agencies of the Department of 
Interior. Plaintiff sued the Secretary of the Interior, in her official 
capacity, complaining that the agency’s decision to terminate was 
arbitrary and capricious, in violation of both the Indian Long-Term 
Leasing Act and the terms of the Lease itself. The Court concluded 
that the agency acted reasonably on the record before it and within 
its authority. The Secretary’s motion for summary judgment was 
granted. 
 
7. Bruette v. Jewell 
 
No. 15-2897, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5827 (7th Cir. Mar. 30, 
2016). Felix Bruette appealed from a dismissal of his suit for lack 
of jurisdiction. Bruette’s complaint alleged that as a great-great-
grandson of Gardner, he was entitled to his share of benefits that 
Congress promised to Gardner in the 1893 statute. The Department 
is disregarding that Act, the complaint continues, and is thereby 
breaching its fiduciary duties by not establishing an official list of 
tribe beneficiaries. At a hearing Bruette expanded these 
allegations. He explained that he represents descendants of those 
who signed the 1856 Treaty, but whom Congress excluded from its 
benefits under a law enacted 15 years later. Congress, Bruette 
continued, recognized that it had wrongly excluded many who 
signed the 1856 Treaty from receiving tribal benefits required by 
the Treaty. It therefore passed in 1893 an act to remedy that 
situation. But, Bruette concluded, the Department never completed 
the required tribal membership “roll” that would have treated 
Gardner’s descendants as members of the tribe contemplated by 
the 1856 Treaty.   
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Bruette sought an order requiring that the Department of the 
Interior follow an 1893 law involving the Stockbridge and Munsee 
Indians. At a hearing Bruette clarified his principal demand: He 
wants the Department to recognize that descendants (including 
him) of Stephen Gardner, a signor of an 1856 Treaty between the 
Stockbridge and Munsee Indians and the United States, belong to 
the tribe recognized in the Treaty. The district court dismissed the 
suit based on several incurable defects. Because Bruette had not 
developed an argument to disturb the district court’s decision, we 
dismiss his appeal. 
 
8. Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. United States DOI 
 
No. 13-16182, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9713 (9th Cir. May 27, 
2016). An appeal of decisions made by the Department of the 
Interior regarding a leadership dispute among factions of the 
Timbisha Shoshone Tribe was mooted by the Tribe’s adoption of a 
new constitution. There was no possibility that the agency would 
change its decision that certain members were improperly excluded 
from the Tribe, as the disenrolled members clearly qualified for 
membership under the new constitution. Appeal dismissed. 
 
9. Caddo Nation of Okla. v. Wichita & Affiliated Tribes 
 
No. CIV-16-0559, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70554 (W.D. Okla. 
May 31, 2016). Plaintiff Caddo Nation of Oklahoma (“Caddo 
Nation”) filed this action against defendants Wichita and Affiliated 
Tribes (“Wichita Tribe), Terri Parton, President of the Wichita 
Tribe, and other elected officials of the Wichita Tribe, seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiff’s claims are based on its 
concerns that defendant is building a history center on a site that 
Caddo elders believe may hold the remains of Caddo ancestors and 
cultural artifacts. Plaintiff asserted the land on which the center is 
being built is held jointly in trust by the United States for the 
Caddo Nation, the Wichita Tribe and the Delaware Nation. It 
contended defendants have violated the Administrative Procedures 
Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and the 
National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”). A hearing on the 
motion was held on May 27, 2016, at which plaintiff argued that 
defendants failed to comply with obligations under NEPA and 
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NHPA. Plaintiff also asserted that defendants had begun to pour 
the concrete floor for the history center and claimed that, once 
completed, the concrete would prevent it from being able to 
conduct the ground-penetrating radar tests required to determine 
whether any human remains, funerary objects or cultural items are 
located at the building site.   
The court concluded at the end of the hearing that, due to the 
unusual circumstances presented by the case, a short TRO was 
warranted to maintain the status quo for a brief period. The parties 
were directed to file a statement regarding the status of the 
construction site. Because the pouring of the floor has not been 
completed, it appears the testing plaintiff sought to perform is still 
possible. Based on the record before it, the court concluded that the 
Wichita Tribe fulfilled its consultation responsibilities under 
NHPA. Plaintiff did not meet its burden of showing a violation of 
the Act. Having concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate it is 
likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that defendants violated 
the APA by their noncompliance with NEPA or NHPA, the court 
vacated the TRO previously entered and denied plaintiff’s motion 
for TRO.  
 
10. Cayuga Nation v. Tanner 
 
Nos. 15-1667 and 15-1937, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10007 (2d 
Cir. Jun. 2, 2016). Plaintiffs-Appellants, the Cayuga Nation, a 
federally recognized Indian tribe, and individual officers, 
employees, and representatives of the Cayuga Nation, filed this 
action in the District Court against the Village of Union Springs, 
the Board of Trustees of the Village, and individual Village 
officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs 
contend that the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 2701-2721, preempts the defendants’ efforts to enforce a local 
anti-gambling ordinance against a gaming facility located on land 
owned by Cayuga Nation.  
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because it could 
not determine, in light of an ongoing leadership dispute within 
Cayuga Nation, whether the lawsuit was authorized as a matter of 
tribal law. Following a motion for reconsideration, the district 
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court additionally held that the individual plaintiffs lacked 
Article III standing to sue in their own right.  
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court had 
jurisdiction because the Bureau of Indian Affairs had recognized 
Clint Halftown, who initiated this suit, as the Cayuga Nation’s 
“federal representative,” thereby relieving the court of the need to 
resolve questions of tribal law, and because the individual 
plaintiffs had standing to challenge the anti-gaming ordinance. We 
agree and therefore vacate the district court’s order dismissing the 
complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
 
11. Akiachak Native Cmty. v. United States DOI 
 
No. 13-5360, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12121 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 1, 
2016). Holdings: (1) Where several Indian Tribes sued the United 
States Department of Interior challenging a regulation 
implementing certain settled land claims staked by descendants of 
Alaskan aboriginal Tribes, and where after a district court held that 
the Department’s interpretation was contrary to law, the 
Department, following notice and comment, revised its regulations 
and dismissed its appeal, the appeal of the State of Alaska, which 
had intervened in the district court as a party defendant but brought 
no independent claim for relief, was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction because the controversy between the Tribes and the 
Department was moot. (2) The underlying controversy was moot 
under U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 because the Department’s new 
regulation resolved the underlying claim by removing the Alaska 
exception from its land-into-trust regulations and there was no 
longer a live controversy. Decision vacated; appeal dismissed. 
 
12. Aguayo v. Jewell 
 
No. 14-56909, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12587 (9th Cir. Jul. 8, 
2016). The Pala Band is a federally-recognized Indian tribe located 
in northern San Diego County. The Secretary of the Interior 
created the Pala Reservation in the late nineteenth century, 
pursuant to the Mission Indian Relief Act of 1891.   
Notwithstanding its decision to vote against the Indian 
Reorganization Act in 1934, the Pala Band chose to organize its 
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government. In 1960, it adopted Articles of Association as the 
Band’s governing document. The Articles created an Executive 
Committee, comprised of six elected officers, and a General 
Council, which included all adult members of the tribe. The 
Articles granted the General Council the power “[t]o enact 
ordinances . . . governing future membership, loss of membership 
and adoption of members into the Band.”  
Shortly thereafter, the General Council enacted a membership 
ordinance (the 1961 Ordinance), pursuant to the authority granted 
to it in the Articles. Under the 1961 Ordinance, a person seeking 
membership in the Band would apply to the Executive Committee, 
which would make a report and recommendation to the Regional 
Director of the BIA. In other words, pursuant to the Articles of 
Association and the 1961 Ordinance, the Executive Committee 
made recommendations, but the BIA was granted ultimate 
authority over whether an applicant was enrolled.  
Plaintiffs are descendants of Margarita Britten (Margarita), a 
Pala Indian who was born in 1856. Their eligibility to be enrolled 
as members of the Pala Band depends on whether Margarita was a 
full- or half-blooded Pala Indian. Margarita was originally 
considered to be one-half Pala Indian, and thus her great-great-
grandchildren did not have the minimum 1/16 blood quantum to be 
eligible for membership in the Band.  
The first eligibility dispute regarding Margarita’s descendants 
proceeded pursuant to the 1961 Ordinance. In 1984, the General 
Council concluded that the evidence suggesting that Margarita was 
actually a full-blooded Pala Indian was more accurate, and voted to 
change her status accordingly. The General Council’s 
recommendation was sent to a BIA Regional Director, Tom 
Dowell, who recommended against enrolling her descendants 
because there was insufficient evidence to establish Margarita’s 
blood quantum. Director Dowell’s decision was appealed to the 
Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs in 1989, who reversed that 
finding and concluded that Margarita should be considered a full-
blooded Pala Indian. Pursuant to the 1961 Ordinance, the 
Executive Committee was then compelled to add Margarita’s 
great-great-grandchildren, with the requisite 1/16 blood quantum, 
to the Band’s membership rolls.   
In subsequent proceedings, based on new evidence, the 
Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs concluded that Margarita was 
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one-half Pala, leading to disenrollment. But the AS-IA aptly noted 
that “in the exercise of sovereignty and self-governance, tribes 
have the right, like other governments, to make good decisions, 
bad decisions, and decisions with which others may disagree.” The 
federal government does not interfere in those decisions in the 
absence of specific authority to do so. The district court’s grant of 





13. Patchak v. Jewell 
 
No. 15-5200, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12984 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 15, 
2016). David Patchak brought this suit under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 705, challenging the authority of 
the Department of the Interior to take title to a particular tract of 
land under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 465. 
The land, called the Bradley Property, had been put into trust for 
the use of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi 
Indians in Michigan, otherwise known as the Gun Lake Band or 
the Gun Lake Tribe.  
Following the Supreme Court’s determination in 2012 that Mr. 
Patchak had prudential standing to bring this lawsuit, see Match-E-
Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 
S. Ct. 2199, 2212, 183 L. Ed. 2d 211 (2012), Congress passed the 
Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (the Gun Lake Act), Pub. 
L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014), a stand-alone statute 
reaffirming the Department of the Interior’s decision to take the 
land in question into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe, and removing 
jurisdiction from the federal courts over any actions relating to that 
property. Taking into account this new legal landscape, the District 
Court determined on summary judgment that it was stripped of its 
jurisdiction to consider Mr. Patchak’s claim. Holding additionally 
that the Act was not constitutionally infirm, as Mr. Patchak 
contended, the District Court dismissed the case.  
Mr. Patchak now appeals the dismissal of his suit. The court 
held that: (1) Appellant landowner’s suit contesting appellee 
Department of the Interior’s (Department) taking of land in trust 
for appellee tribe failed because the Gun Lake Trust Land 
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Reaffirmation Act (Act), Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 
(2014), permissibly removed federal jurisdiction, as the Act 
constitutionally exercised Congress’s power to legislate as to 
Indian tribes; (2) The Act did not violate the landowner’s right to 
petition because Congress could withhold federal jurisdiction; 
(3) The Act did not violate his due process rights because the 
legislation provided all process that was due; (4) The Act was not a 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 bill of attainder because its means were 
rationally designed to meet its legitimate nonpunitive goals. The 
Court granted the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings and denied the motions for preliminary injunctive 
relief. Judgment affirmed. 
 
14. Mackinac Tribe v. Jewell 
 
No. 15-5118, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13140 (D.D.C. Jul. 19, 
2016). Plaintiff-Appellant Mackinac Tribe brought an action in 
federal district court to compel the Secretary of the Interior to 
convene an election allowing the Tribe to organize under the 
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 476(a). Although 
the Mackinac Tribe does not appear on the Secretary’s list of 
federally acknowledged tribes and has not been acknowledged 
through the Secretary’s Part 83 process, the group alleges it is 
federally recognized for IRA purposes because it is the historical 
successor to a tribe the federal government previously recognized 
via treaty. The district court reserved the question of whether 
acknowledgment through Part 83 is a necessary prerequisite for 
tribal organization under the IRA, finding instead that the 
Mackinac Tribe failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by 
first seeking acknowledgment through the Part 83 process. The 
appellate court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment. 
 
15. Littlefield v. United States DOI 
 
No. 16-10184, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98732 (D. Mass. Jul. 28, 
2016). This case arises out of a decision of the Secretary of the 
Department of the Interior (the “Secretary”) to acquire land in trust 
for the benefit of the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe (the 
“Mashpees”) under Section 465 of the Indian Reorganization Act 
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(“IRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 465. The Plaintiffs are residents of Taunton 
who claim they are injured by the acquisition and planned 
development of the land at issue. They have filed suit against the 
Department of the Interior (the “Department”), the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (the “BIA”), Acting Assistant Secretary of Indian 
Affairs Lawrence Roberts, and the United States (together, the 
“government”), challenging the Secretary’s decision pursuant to 
Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 
5 U.S.C. § 702. The parties make cross-motions for summary 
judgment on the Plaintiffs’ first cause of action which involves the 
Mashpees’ eligibility as beneficiaries under the IRA, and 
correspondingly, the authority of the Secretary to take land into 
trust for the Mashpees’ benefit.   
The Mashpees are a federally recognized tribe that obtained 
official acknowledgement from the BIA in 2007. Upon receiving 
federal acknowledgement, the Mashpees filed a “fee-to-trust” 
application with the BIA requesting that the Department acquire 
tracts of land for the Mashpees’ use as a tribal reservation in 
Mashpee and Taunton, Massachusetts. Of concern to the Plaintiffs 
here is the Taunton site, which Taunton had designated for 
economic development purposes. The Mashpees intend to 
construct and operate a gaming resort on the Taunton site.  On 
September 18, 2015, the Secretary issued a written decision (the 
“Secretary’s Decision” or “Record of Decision”) granting the 
Mashpees’ fee-to-trust application. The Secretary specifically 
found that “the Mashpee Tribe qualifies” – i.e., is “eligible to 
receive land into trust under the IRA” – pursuant to the second 
definition of “Indian” set forth in Section 479 of the IRA. The land 
was subsequently taken into trust on November 10, 2015. The 
Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Secretary’s Decision and later 
amended their complaint to include additional claims. 
The Court rules that the second definition of “Indian” in 
Section 479 of the IRA unambiguously incorporates the entire 
antecedent phrase – that is, “such members” refers to “members of 
any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” Thus, 
no deference is due the Secretary’s interpretation. In light of the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of “now under Federal jurisdiction” 
to mean under Federal jurisdiction in June 1934, the Secretary 
lacked the authority to acquire land in trust for the Mashpees, as 
they were not then under Federal jurisdiction. The matter is 
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remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  
16. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. v. 
Jewell 
 
No. 14-5326 Consolidated with 15-5033, 2016 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 13779 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 29, 2016). Holdings: Where 
appellants brought challenges under Administrative Procedure Act 
to Interior Secretary’s decision to take certain land into trust for 
Cowlitz Indian Tribe, Secretary reasonably interpreted and applied 
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) to conclude that Cowlitz was 
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction because 
tribe only had to be recognized as of time Department acquired 
land into trust. Secretary reasonably determined that Cowlitz met 
“initial-reservation” exception to Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA) because substantial evidence amply showing that Interior 
found Cowlitz parcel to be within broader area of historical 
significance to Tribe. Appellants’ remaining claims of error under 
the IRA and NEPA based on Secretary’s alleged failure to 
independently verify Tribe’s business plan and membership figures 
were without merit. Judgment affirmed. 
 
B. Child Welfare Law and ICWA 
 
1. Jennifer L. v. State Department of Health and Social 
Services 
 
No. S –15646, 357 P.3d 110, 2015 WL 5062023 (Alaska 
Aug. 28, 2015). After Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took 
three minor children into emergency custody, a standing master 
determined that no probable cause existed and recommended that 
children be returned to mother’s custody. Following remand from 
the Supreme Court, 2014 WL 1888190, the Superior Court rejected 
recommendation and determined that probable cause existed. 
Mother appealed and Superior Court dismissed underlying case 
before State could file brief. The Supreme Court held that: 
(1) public interest exception to mootness doctrine applied, and 
(2) standing master’s order that children should be returned to 
parents was not effective until judicially reviewed.  
 
2. K.P. v. Michelle T. 




No. D067797, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8073 (Cal. App. 
4th Dist. Nov. 10, 2015). Michelle T., a member of the Pala Band 
of Mission Indians, contended that the juvenile court violated the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. and § 
66.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code under by terminating 
her parental rights to her children, K.P. and Kristopher P.   
Throughout most of their dependency cases, K.P. and 
Kristopher were eligible for membership, or were enrolled, in the 
Pala Band of Mission Indians (Pala Band). At the children’s first § 
366.26 hearing, the Pala Band did not consent to the children’s 
adoption and the juvenile court ordered a plan of guardianship. 
Several years later, when the children’s cases proceeded to a 
second § 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court learned that the Pala 
Band of Mission Indians had disenrolled K.P. and Kristopher, and 
others, on the ground that they lacked the blood quantum necessary 
for membership.   
Michelle argued that in view of a pending appeal in the Ninth 
Circuit challenging the validity of the Pala Band’s enrollment 
ordinance that resulted in the disenrollment of K.P. and Kristopher 
and the others, the juvenile court erred when it found that K.P. and 
Kristopher were not Indian children within the meaning of the 
ICWA and declined to apply ICWA’s substantive and procedural 
protections at the children’s second § 366.26 hearings. Michelle 
also argued that enrollment in a tribe is not required to be 
considered an Indian child, and that the Pala Band did not provide 
written confirmation that enrollment is a prerequisite for Pala Band 
membership. 
The appellate court concluded that the juvenile court correctly 
ruled that the Indian tribe has the sole authority to determine its 
own membership and that the juvenile court must defer to the 
membership decisions of an Indian tribe. Under federal and state 
law, the Indian tribe’s membership determination is conclusive. 
The record shows that enrollment is a prerequisite for Pala Band 
membership, and that the Pala Band determined that K.P. and 
Kristopher are not members of its tribe and that the juvenile court 
did not err when it determined that K.P. and Kristopher are not 
Indian children within the meaning of the ICWA and terminated 
parental rights without applying ICWA’s heightened substantive 
and procedural protections. The appellate court affirmed. 




3. In re K.M. 
 
No. G051656, 2015 WL 7352048 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 
2015). In a dependency proceeding, the Superior Court, No. 
DP024561, terminated parental rights to child. Mother and father 
appealed. While the matter was still pending on appeal, the 
Superior Court issued a post-judgment order finding that the 
county child welfare agency complied with the Indian Child 
Welfare Act (ICWA). The appellate court held that juvenile court 
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the ICWA issue following its 
termination of parental rights. 
 
4. Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Dep’t of Child Safety 
  
No. 1 CA-JV 15-0178, 2015 Ariz. App. LEXIS 294, 727 Ariz. 
Adv. Rep. 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2015). The Gila River Indian 
Community (the Community) appealed the denial of its motion to 
change physical custody of a dependent Indian child in foster care. 
The Community challenged the juvenile court’s determination that 
good cause exists to deviate from placement preferences set forth 
in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Community argued 
the juvenile court erred by refusing to move the child to an 
available ICWA-preferred placement. The Community further 
contended the good cause determination is not supported by 
sufficient evidence.  
The appellate court held that good cause to deviate from the 
Indian Child Welfare Act placement preferences must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence. While the trial court 
cited the child’s bond with her foster family and expert opinions in 
ordering a deviation from the Act, remand was required because it 
was not apparent that the trial court applied the clear and 
convincing standard to its good cause determination that deviation 
from the Act’s placement preferences was appropriate. Vacated 
and remanded. 
 
5. In re Amy J. 
 
No. A145782, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1243 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Feb. 18, 2016). Amy J., an Indian child and dependent of the 
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Humboldt County juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 300, appeals from that court’s order 
authorizing respondent Humboldt County Department of Health & 
Human Services (Department) to place her as requested by her 
Indian tribe with a Butte County family that was caring for, and in 
the process of adopting, her sister. Amy, one year old when the 
court issued its order, was bonded and thriving with Humboldt 
County foster parents who had cared for her since she was two 
days old and wanted to adopt her. Amy argues the order must be 
reversed for three reasons: (1) regardless of the court’s 
characterization of it as a foster care placement order, it was in fact 
an order for her adoptive placement and, as such, violated the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) adoptive placement preferences; 
(2) even if construed as a foster care placement order, it should not 
have issued because there was no tribal resolution and because 
Amy showed good cause to deviate from the ICWA foster care 
placement preferences; and (3) the order violated Amy’s 
constitutional liberty interest in her family relationship with her 
Humboldt County foster parents.  
We conclude the court’s order was not for adoptive placement, 
but instead authorized a change in Amy’s foster care placement, 
and that Amy does not establish the court erred in issuing it. 
Therefore, we affirm the order.  
 
6. State v. Joseph B. (In re Tavian B.) 
 
No. S-15-129, 292 Neb. 804, 2016 Neb. LEXIS 24 (Neb. 
Feb 19, 2016). Tavian B. was found to be a child who lacks proper 
parental care by reason of the fault or habits of his parents and to 
be in a situation dangerous to life or limb or injurious to his health 
or morals. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2008). 
Approximately 16 months later, the State of Nebraska moved to 
terminate the parental rights of both parents. The father then filed a 
motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Oglala Sioux Tribal Juvenile 
Court (Tribal Court) pursuant to the federal Indian Child Welfare 
Act of 1978 (ICWA). See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (2012).  
Prior to the juvenile court’s ruling on the father’s motion 
to transfer, the State withdrew its motion to terminate parental 
rights. The court found that good cause existed to deny the request 
to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court, because the proceedings 
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were in “an advanced stage.” The father appeals the juvenile 
court’s order overruling his motion to transfer.  
For the reasons stated below, we reverse the judgment of the 
juvenile court and remand the cause with directions. 
 
7. State v. Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes 
of Alaska 
 
No. S-14935, 2016 WL 1168202 (Alaska Mar. 25, 2016). 
Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes filed action 
against state, seeking declaratory judgment that its tribal court 
system had subject matter jurisdiction over child support matters 
and seeking an injunction requiring the state’s child support 
enforcement agency to recognize tribal courts’ child support 
orders. The Superior Court entered judgment in favor of the tribes. 
State appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) tribal courts have 
inherent, non-territorial subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate 
parents’ child support obligations, and (2) the power to set 
nonmember parents’ child support obligations is within the 
retained powers of membership-based inherent tribal sovereignty. 
Affirmed. 
 
8. State v. Anthony S. (In re Abbie L.) 
 
No. A-15-996, 2016 Neb. App. LEXIS 89 (Neb. Ct. App. 
Apr. 26, 2016). In a case in which a father appealed from an order 
of the juvenile court granting the continued temporary custody of 
his child to the Nebraska Department of Health and Human 
Services, the appellate court concluded that there was clearly 
reason to believe the child was Indian. Accordingly, the Nebraska 
Indian Child Welfare Act and the federal Indian Child Welfare Act 
were applicable. Even if active efforts had been made to prevent or 
eliminate the need for removal, there was still a deficiency under 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1505(5) (Reissue 2008 & Supp. 2015). 
Because the evidence at the protective custody hearing did not 
include testimony of a qualified expert as required by § 43-
1505(5), the juvenile court erred in continuing the child’s out-of-
home placement. Reversed and vacated. 
 
 





9. In re Alexandria P. 
 
No. B270775, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 555 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 8, 
2016). For the third time this case comes before us on the issue of 
whether the lower court has correctly ordered an Indian child, 
Alexandria P., to be placed with her extended family, Ken R. and 
Ginger R. in Utah, after concluding that Alexandria’s foster 
parents, de facto parents, Russell P. and Summer P., failed to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that there was good cause to 
depart from the adoptive placement preferences set forth in the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).   
We have twice remanded the matter because the lower court 
used an incorrect standard in assessing good cause. The 
dependency court has now correctly applied the law governing 
good cause, considering the bond Alexandria has developed over 
time with the P.s, as well as a number of other factors related to her 
best interests. Those other factors include Alexandria’s relationship 
with her extended family and half-siblings; the capacity of her 
extended family to maintain and develop her sense of self-identity, 
including her cultural identity and connection to the Choctaw tribal 
culture; and the P.s’ relative reluctance or resistance to foster 
Alexandria’s relationship with her extended family or encourage 
exploration of and exposure to her Choctaw cultural identity.   
Because substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that 
the P.s did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that there 
was good cause to depart from the ICWA’s placement preferences, 
we affirm. 
 
10. Renteria v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians 
 
No. 2:16-cv-1685, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97608 (E.D. Cal. Jul 
26, 2016). Through this lawsuit, Plaintiffs Efrim and Talisha 
Renteria (“Plaintiffs”) seek to overturn Shingle Springs Band of 
Miwok Indians Tribal Court’s ruling which appoints Defendant 
Regina Cuellar as the legal guardian of Plaintiffs’ three nieces. 
Their Complaint attacks the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction over the 
custody proceedings in the first instance, and further alleges that 
the Tribal Court custody proceedings violated Plaintiffs’ right to 
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due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs are the 
maternal great aunt and uncle of three young girls (“AC (older),” 
“AC (younger),” and “NC,” collectively, “Minors”). The Minors’ 
parents were killed in a car accident on December 17, 2015. Their 
late father was a member of the Shingle Springs Band of Miwok 
Indians (“Tribe”), a federally recognized Indian tribe, but the 
Minors resided and were domiciled with their parents in Visalia, 
California. They have never resided or been domiciled on tribal 
lands. 
Plaintiffs cared for the Minors in the weeks following the 
accident. On January 5, 2016, members of the children’s paternal 
family appeared at Plaintiffs’ house in Visalia, thrust a copy of an 
emergency order issued by the Tribal Court of the Shingle Springs 
Band of Miwok Indians (“Tribal Court”) into Plaintiffs’ hands, and 
forcibly removed AC (younger) and NC. On January 22, 2016, the 
Tribal Court held a review hearing regarding guardianship, 
appointed Plaintiffs as temporary guardians for the Minors, and 
established a schedule of visitations for the paternal family.  
Beginning in February 2016, the two older children repeatedly 
reported that their paternal step-grandfather (“Joseph”) was 
sexually abusing them during their visits. Plaintiffs reported the 
abuse to the Visalia Police Department and the Tulare County 
Health & Human Services Agency. The two older children 
continued to report instances of sexual abuse by Joseph to these 
social workers. After Plaintiffs made these reports, the Tribal 
Court modified the visitation order such that Joseph was not to 
have access to the minors.   
On June 3, 2016, the Tribal Court appointed Defendant Regina 
Cuellar as the Minors’ guardian effective June 12, 2016. At the 
same time, the Tribal Court issued a visitation order that failed to 
restrict Joseph’s access to the Minors.   
The failure to restrict Joseph’s access to the Minors resulted in 
yet another instance of alleged sexual abuse. Plaintiffs are 
currently proceeding with a Petition Re Good Cause under 
California Penal Code section 278.7 and California Family Code 
section 3041 to retain temporary guardianship of the three minor 
children in Tulare County Superior Court.   
Plaintiffs’ Application for a Temporary Restraining Order is 
granted. Defendants are enjoined from enforcing the Tribal Court’s 
June 3, 2016 Order Appointing Guardian of Minors, and Plaintiffs 
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are appointed temporary guardians of the three minor children who 
are the subject of this action.  
 
11. Villarreal v. Villarreal 
 
No. 04-15-00551-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 8272 (Tex. App. 
Aug. 3, 2016). Richard Matthew Villarreal appeals the trial court’s 
order dismissing the underlying cause. The trial court dismissed 
the cause after finding a final divorce decree entered by a tribal 
court divested the trial court of jurisdiction. We reverse the trial 
court’s order and remand the cause for further proceedings.  
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in concluding 
the final divorce decree entered by the tribal court divested the trial 
court of jurisdiction to determine custody because the wife filed 
the original divorce petition in Texas, the Texas proceeding had 
not been terminated and was not stayed, and, as such, the tribal 
court could not exercise jurisdiction. The ICWA did not apply to 
the Texas divorce proceeding because the definition of child 
custody proceeding in the ICWA did not include divorce 
proceedings, 25 U.S.C.S. § 1903(1), and, as such, Texas was the 
children’s home state, and the trial court had jurisdiction to make 
the initial child custody determination. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 
152.201(a). Order reversed; matter remanded. 
 
12. Gila River Indian Cmty. v Dep’t of Child Safety 
 
No. 1 CA-JV 16-0038, 2016 Ariz. App. LEXIS 187 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. Aug. 11, 2016). Following termination of the parental rights 
of the biological parents of A.D., an Indian child and eligible 
member of the Gila River Indian Community (“the Community”), 
the Community moved for an order transferring jurisdiction of the 
matter to its Children’s Court. The Maricopa County Juvenile 
Court denied the motion, and the Community appealed. The 
appellate court held that 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) of the Indian Child 
Welfare Act (“ICWA”), which the Community argued requires 
transfer, does not allow jurisdiction to be transferred after parental 
rights have been terminated. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of 
the motion to transfer jurisdiction.  
 
13. In re Nicholas E. 




No. A146946, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6132 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Aug. 19, 2016). L.E. (mother) appeals from an order after 
dispositional hearing removing her son from her custody and 
adjudging him a dependent of the court. Mother contends the 
Solano County Department of Health and Social Services 
(Department) failed to comply with the notice requirements of the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) 
because its notice to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) omitted 
available family history information.  
The dispositional order is affirmed, and the matter is remanded 
to the juvenile court with directions to order the Department to 
comply with the notice and inquiry provisions of ICWA. After 
proper notice under ICWA, if it is determined that this child is an 
Indian child and ICWA applies to these proceedings, mother is 
entitled to petition the juvenile court to invalidate orders that 
violated ICWA. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1914; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
5.486 (petition to invalidate orders).) Should any of the identified 
tribes determine that the child is an Indian child, or other 
information show the child to be an Indian child as defined by 
ICWA, the juvenile court shall conduct new jurisdiction and 
disposition hearings in conformity with ICWA.  
 
14. M.C. v. Superior Court of Cal. for L.A. 
 
No. B272083, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6175 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Aug. 23, 2016). In this juvenile dependency writ proceeding 
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452), M.C. (mother) challenges an 
order terminating reunification services and scheduling a hearing 
for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan for her 
daughter, J.S. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26). Mother’s sole 
contention is that the juvenile court erred in terminating 
reunification services because the Los Angeles County Department 
of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to satisfy the 
notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 
(ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).   
At the September 2014 detention hearing, mother declared she 
may have Cherokee Indian ancestry and the court ordered the 
Department to investigate the claim and provide the court with a 
supplemental report.   
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In a November 2014 jurisdiction/disposition report, the 
Department stated that ICWA “does or may apply.” The 
Department also provided a response it received from the 
Cherokee Nation, stating that the information the Department 
provided was incomplete and requesting that the Department 
provide the middle names and dates of birth of both of J.S.’s 
parents. The letter stated that “[i]t is impossible to validate or 
invalidate this claim without [the requested] information.”  
However, there is nothing in the record to confirm what 
information, if any, was provided to the Cherokee Nation. The 
Department concedes it failed to satisfy ICWA’s notice 
requirements, and agrees the matter should be remanded to the 
juvenile court to ensure compliance. Accordingly, we grant the 
petition and remand with directions to effectuate proper notice 
under the ICWA. 
15. In re A.B. 
 
No. D069257, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 714 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Aug. 24, 2015). Scott R. appeals from an order terminating his 
parental rights to his biological daughter, A.B., under Family Code 
section 7822 which authorizes the termination of rights of a parent 
who “has left the child in the care and custody of the other parent 
for a period of one year without any provision for the child’s 
support, or without communication . . . with the intent . . . to 
abandon the child.” (§ 7822, subd. (a)(3).) He contends that the 
one-year statutory period refers only to the year immediately 
preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental 
rights, which precludes its application to him. Alternatively, Scott 
asserts that reversal is warranted in any event because (1) he 
rebutted the presumption that he intended to abandon A.B., (2) the 
termination of his rights was not in A.B.’s best interests and (3) the 
juvenile court erred in determining that the Indian Child Welfare 
Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) did not apply absent proof 
that a tribe he identified actually received notice as required under 
that statutory scheme.  
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During the course of the proceeding, Scott submitted an 
ICWA-030 form identifying four separate tribes with which A.B. 
might be affiliated. Respondents mailed a copy of the form and 
notice of the termination hearing to each of the tribes and filed a 
copy of the notice, proof of service and counsel’s declaration with 
the court. By the time of the hearing in August 2015, three of the 
four tribes had responded, indicating that A.B. was not affiliated 
with them.   
At the continued hearing, the court was informed that no 
response had been received from the United Keetoowah Band and, 
with the assent of Scott and A.B., it made a finding that ICWA did 
not apply. On appeal, Scott contends the court failed to comply 
with ICWA’s notice provisions because there is no evidence the 
United Keetoowah Band received actual notice of the proceeding 
as the result of an error in the zip code used in sending the notice. 
Scott is correct that the date of receipt of an ICWA notice, rather 
than the date of its service, is the critical time for determining 
whether ICWA applies in the absence of any tribal response.   
However, this court has taken judicial notice of evidence that 
the United Keetoowah Band actually received notice of these 
proceedings several months prior to the termination hearing and 
decided not to intervene. Although this evidence was not before 
the juvenile court at the time of the continued hearing on the 
termination petition and thus the court erred in finding ICWA 
inapplicable, it nonetheless establishes that there is no reasonable 
probability that Scott would have obtained a more favorable result 
in the absence of error, as required to establish reversible error. 




1. Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev., LLC v. Cieslak 
  
Nos.2:15-01189 and 2:13-00596, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
107457 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2015). This matter was before the Court 
on Gallagher & Kennedy, P.A. and The Hualapai Indian Tribe’s 
(hereinafter “Gallagher & Kennedy”) Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s 
Subpoena to Glen Hallman. This action arose out of a long-running 
dispute relating to the Grand Canyon Skywalk (“Skywalk”) in 
Case No. 2:13-cv-00596. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants David 
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John Cieslak, Nicholas Peter Scutari and Scutari & Cieslak Public 
Relations, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Scutari & 
Cieslak”), together with individual members of the Hualapai Tribal 
Council, conspired to conduct a public relations/news media 
campaign to falsely accuse the Plaintiffs of having breached their 
contracts with the Hualapai Tribe. The alleged purpose of the 
conspiracy was to gain support for the Tribal Council’s enactment 
of an eminent domain ordinance and the subsequent condemnation 
of Plaintiffs’ contractual rights. Plaintiffs alleged that the Tribe 
hired Scutari & Cieslak to formulate the public relations campaign 
against Plaintiffs. As part of this campaign, Scutari & Cieslak, or 
Tribal officials following scripts prepared by Scutari & Cieslak, 
falsely stated that Plaintiffs breached their contract “to complete 
certain critical elements of the Skywalk — including water, sewer 
and electricity” when, in fact, it was the Tribe’s responsibility to 
provide these elements. Defendants also allegedly made other 
statements that impugned the honesty of Plaintiffs. Scutari & 
Cieslak alleged as an affirmative defense that they acted in good 
faith upon advice of counsel in making the allegedly defamatory 
statements.  
This Court previously denied Gallagher & Kennedy’s motion 
to quash a subpoena duces tecum served by Defendants Scutari & 
Cieslak which sought documents relating to communications 
between Gallagher & Kennedy and Scutari & Cieslak. Gallagher & 
Kennedy filed an objection to that order, which is currently 
pending before the District Judge. The instant motion to quash 
involves a deposition subpoena that Plaintiffs served on Glen 
Hallman, an attorney who was formerly employed by Gallagher & 
Kennedy. Plaintiffs stated that they seek only to question Mr. 
Hallman about his communications with Scutari & Cieslak. They 
do not seek to discover privileged communications between the 
Tribe and Mr. Hallman. Gallagher & Kennedy stated that as part of 
its representation of the Tribe, it recommended that the Tribe hire 
Scutari & Cieslak to manage media contacts in connection with the 
litigation. It also stated that Mr. Hallman was “an attorney assisting 
the Tribe in carrying out its fundamental sovereign and legislative 
powers, including the exercise of eminent domain and because this 
role was in the nature of an official function involving matters of 
internal governance, the Tribe’s immunity extends to him and the 
Court has no jurisdiction to compel compliance with the subpoena. 
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Gallagher & Kennedy also argued that Mr. Hallman’s 
communications with Scutari & Cieslak are protected from 
disclosure by the Tribe’s attorney-client privilege and by the 
attorney work-product doctrine. The Court concluded that the 
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity does not preclude the taking 
of the deposition of attorney Glen Hallman in regard to his 
communications with Scutari & Cieslak.   
The Court concluded, however, that confidential 
communications in which Mr. Hallman provided legal advice to 
Scutari & Cieslak regarding the statements that the latter 
subsequently made about Plaintiffs are within the scope of the 
Tribe’s attorney-client privilege. At the time such communications 
occurred, Scutari & Cieslak was the functional equivalent of a 
tribal employee and the legal advice appears to have been provided 
with respect to its actions on behalf of the Tribe or its officers.   
The factual record is insufficient to support a finding that the 
Tribe waived its attorney-client or work-product privileges by 
failing to assert them in a timely manner. Nor has this argument 
been clearly raised by Plaintiffs or Scutari & Cieslak.   
There is no indication that the parties wish to take Mr. 
Hallman’s deposition if they cannot inquire into the legal advice he 
allegedly gave Scutari & Cieslak with respect to the allegedly 
defamatory statements. This order, however, does not preclude the 
taking of Mr. Hallman’s deposition with respect to his knowledge 
of relevant, non-privileged information.  Accordingly, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that Gallagher & Kennedy, P.A. and the 
Hualapai Indian Tribe’s Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Subpoena to 
Glen Hallman (#1) is granted in accordance with the foregoing 
provisions of this order. The granting of this motion is without 
prejudice to the filing of a motion by Plaintiffs or Scutari & 
Cieslak that the Hualapai Tribe waived its privileges by not 
asserting them in a timely manner. 
 
2. Douglas Indian Ass’n v. Cent. Council of Tlingit & Haida 
Indian Tribes 
 
No. 1:15-cv-00004, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107844 (D. Alaska 
Aug. 17, 2015). Plaintiff, Douglas Indian Association, moved to 
remand this case to the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, First 
Judicial District. Plaintiff Douglas Indian Association (“DIA”) and 
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Defendant Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes of 
Alaska (“Central Council”) are federally recognized Indian tribes 
located in Juneau, Alaska. Defendants Richard Peterson and 
William Ware are, respectively, the President and Tribal 
Transportation Manager of Central Council. As federally 
recognized tribes, DIA and Central Council were eligible to 
receive transportation grants (Tribal Transportation Funds) through 
the Indian Reservation Roads (IRR) Program from the United 
States government under 25 U.S.C. 458aa-458hh and 25 C.F.R. 
parts 170 and 1000 between 2005 and 2012. Multiple tribes are 
permitted to form consortia in order to collectively receive and 
administer the Tribal Transportation Funds. 25 U.S.C. 458aa; 25 
C.F.R. 1000.14.   
In a letter dated July 20, 2005, Central Council solicited DIA’s 
membership in a consortium of tribes formed by Central Council 
for the purpose of receiving and administering Tribal 
Transportation Funds. Central Council’s letter specified 
expectations for the operation of the consortium, including how the 
Tribal Transportation Funds of the individual tribes would be 
handled. Central Council went on to form the Southeast Tribal 
Department of Transportation (SETDOT) in 2006 to administer the 
consortium funds and again sought DIA’s membership in the 
consortium in a memorandum of agreement dated May 8, 2006. 
This memorandum from SETDOT further detailed the 
consortium’s operations and management of tribal funds. DIA 
alleged that based on the promises and expectations in this 
SETDOT memorandum, they signed and joined the consortium on 
August 11, 2006. While SETDOT was dissolved in 2007, the 
consortium continued under the direct administration of Central 
Council. However, after joining the consortium, DIA alleged that 
between 2005 and 2012 no transportation projects were undertaken 
or benefit from the funds afforded DIA despite repeated requests to 
SETDOT and Central Council.   
DIA withdrew from the consortium on January 12, 2012, at 
which time they requested Central Council to remit all Tribal 
Transportation Funds the consortium had received on behalf of 
DIA. DIA filed suit in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, 
First Judicial District at Juneau on April 9, 2015, and Central 
Council filed a Notice of Removal to this Court on May 18, 2015, 
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a). Docket 1 
at 2-4.   
Central Council asserted that removal to federal court is 
supported on two bases. First, Central Council asserted that it was 
acting as an agent of the United States by carrying out the IRR 
Program for Alaska Natives and American Indians. Second, 
Central Council asserted that the matter is based on a federal 
question arising under the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act of 1975 (“ISDEAA”), Public Law 93-
638.   
The Court did not find any substantial federal issue contested 
in this matter. DIA’s complaint alleged claims arising under state 
law which do not turn on a question of federal law. The Court also 
finds that removal and jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is 
unsupported. The court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand to 
Alaska Superior Court and denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
as moot. 
 
3. United States v. Aubrey 
 
No. 13–10510, 2015 WL 5201800 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2015). 
Defendant, a general contractor on a tribal construction project, 
was convicted of conversion or misapplication of property 
belonging to Indian tribal organization by the District Court and he 
appealed both his conviction and the sentence imposed. The 
appellate court held that: (1) as matter of first impression, tribal 
funds disbursed to general contractor on project to construct 
housing for members of tribe, even funds that were disbursed for 
completed construction work, continued to be “property belonging 
to any Indian tribal organization,” as long as tribe maintained title 
to, possession of, or control over these funds; (2) evidence was 
sufficient to support defendant’s conviction; (3) forensic auditor 
who was called as witness to establish foundation for charts 
detailing the passage of funds through contractor’s accounts did 
not have to be certified as expert; (4) district court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting summary charts; and (5) defendant 
occupied “position of trust,” as defined by the abuse-of-trust 
Sentencing Guideline. The appellate court affirmed the conviction 
and sentence.  
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4. Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev. v. Steele 
  
No.: 2:13-cv-00596, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160906 (D. Nev. 
Nov. 30, 2015). Scutari & Cieslak Public Relations, Inc. is a 
public-relations firm hired by the Hualapai Indian Tribe of the 
Hualapai Indian Reservation to promote the Grand Canyon 
Skywalk, a tourist attraction built on tribal land in the Grand 
Canyon. When the relationship between the Tribe and the project’s 
developer began to fracture, Scutari & Cieslak launched a public-
relations campaign that, the developer claims, was defamatory and 
designed to disparage the developer. After the developer sued 
Scutari & Cieslak and its principals (collectively S&C) for 
defamation and conspiracy, S&C filed third-party claims against 
the Tribe for indemnity and contribution.  
The Tribe moved to dismiss S&C’s claims, arguing that the 
court lacks jurisdiction over the third-party claims because the 
Tribe has not waived its sovereign immunity from suit in federal 
court. The Court granted the Tribe’s motion to dismiss and denied 
as moot S&C’s motion to sever the third party claims and its two 
requests for oral argument. 
 
5. Walker River Paiute Tribe v. United States HUD 
 
No. 3:08-CV-0627, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166979 (D. Nev. 
Dec. 14, 2015). Before the court were defendants the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Julian 
Castro, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; and 
Jemine A. Bryon’s, General Deputy Assistant for Public and 
Indian Housing, (collectively defendants) motion for partial 
reconsideration of the court’s December 15, 2014 order granting 
in-part and denying in-part plaintiff Walker River Paiute Tribe’s 
(WRPT) motion for summary judgment and defendants’ counter-
motion for summary judgment.   
WRPT filed the underlying declaratory and injunctive relief 
action alleging that defendants improperly offset the amount of 
federal block grant funding WRPT received in fiscal year 2009 in 
violation of the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-
Determination Act (NAHASDA). In particular, WRPT challenged 
HUD’s allocation of annual Indian Housing Block Grants (IHBG) 
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pursuant to the funding allocation formula codified at 24 C.F.R. 
§§ 1000.304 - 1000.340.   
In early 2008, HUD conducted an audit of WRPT’s Indian 
Housing Block Grant (IHBG) funding. In the audit, HUD 
determined that WRPT had been overfunded in fiscal year 2008 in 
the amount of $110,444 due to an inflated Formula Current 
Assisted Stock (FCAS) calculation. HUD then reduced WRPT’s 
grant for fiscal year 2009 by $110,444 in order to recapture the 
overpaid funds.   
WRPT initiated the present action against HUD under the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA), seeking a determination 
that HUD’s promulgation and interpretation of 24 C.F.R. § 
1000.318 was arbitrary and capricious. WRPT filed an amended 
complaint contending that the exclusion of dwelling units from the 
block grant formula pursuant to § 1000.318 was in violation of the 
specific pre-amendment statutory language of NAHASDA. In 
response to WRPT’s amended complaint, both parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.   
The court found that HUD’s promulgation of 24 C.F.R. § 
1000.318 was within NAHASDA’s mandate, and as such, was an 
appropriate exercise of HUD’s funding authority. However, the 
court also found that HUD’s interpretation of § 1000.318 to 
exclude certain housing units from a tribe’s FCAS calculation 
simply because the underlying leases had passed their initial 25-
year term was an arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the 
regulation. Thereafter, defendants filed the present motion for 
reconsideration of the court’s order. The Court denied defendants’ 
motion for reconsideration. 
 
6. Meyer & Associates, Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana 
 
Nos. 14–1109, 14-1114, 2016 WL 385308 (La. Ct. App. Jan. 
27, 2016). Engineering firm hired by Indian tribe in connection 
with capital improvement project at casino facility brought action 
against tribe for breach of contract when newly elected tribal 
council suspended project sanctioned by the former administration. 
The District Court, No. 2006-2683, denied tribe’s exceptions of lis 
pendens and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Tribe filed writ 
application. The appellate court, 965 So. 2d 930, granted writ and 
ordered a stay to allow tribal court to decide whether tribe had 
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waived its sovereign immunity. Granting certiorari, the Supreme 
Court, 992 So. 2d 446, reversed and remanded. On remand, the 
tribe answered and filed reconventional demand, asserting breach 
of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, fraud and failure to provide 
an accounting. The district court entered a number of judgments 
having the ultimate effect of awarding firm $10,998,250.00 in 
contractual damages, $5,585,573.00 in attorney fees, and 
$57,662.34 in court costs. Parties appealed.  
The appellate court held that: (1) the trial court improperly 
granted relief not prayed for when it found that tribe violated 
fiduciary duties it owed to firm; (2) the firm failed to present 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of factual support 
for one or more elements essential to tribe’s fraud and 
misrepresentation claims; and (3) fact questions precluded 
summary judgment in favor of firm on breach of contract claim. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
7. Maniilaq Ass’n v. Burwell 
 
No. 15-152, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36605 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 
2016). For more than twenty years, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services has allocated $30,921 a year in federal funds 
toward renting health clinic space in the Native American village 
of Kivalina, Alaska. Maniilaq Association, a regional health 
corporation that now owns and operates the clinic in Kivalina, 
believes that amount is insufficient to assure adequate healthcare in 
that community. In an attempt to remedy the Kivalina clinic’s 
chronic underfunding, Maniilaq submitted a lease proposal based 
on section 105(l) of the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act. That section, Maniilaq argued, requires the 
Secretary to rent its Kivalina clinic space and pay it compensation, 
based on the clinic’s operating costs, of $249,842 a year. But the 
Secretary declined Maniilaq’s proposal, arguing that it must pay 
Maniilaq no more than the $30,921 it has provided previously. 
Maniilaq sued. The Court granted summary judgment for 
Maniilaq, and directed the parties to enter into discussions 
regarding Maniilaq’s Kivalina lease proposal consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
8. Navajo Nation v. DOI 




No. 14-cv-1909, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42242 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 30, 2016). Plaintiff Navajo Nation (the “Nation”) alleged that 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), an agency within the United 
States Department of the Interior (“DOI”), violated the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et 
seq. (the “ISDEAA”), by failing to disperse calendar year (“CY”) 
2014 funding to the Nation according to the Nation’s proposed CY 
2014 annual funding agreement (the “Proposal”). Specifically, the 
Nation contended that DOI Secretary Sally Jewell (the 
“Secretary”) failed to approve or decline the Proposal within the 
statutorily-mandated 90-day window for doing so and that, as a 
result, the Proposal must be deemed approved as a matter of law.   
The parties have each moved for summary judgment. Upon 
consideration of the parties’ motions and supporting briefs, and for 
the reasons set forth below, the Nation’s motion for summary 
judgment is hereby denied, and DOI’s cross-motion for summary 
judgment is hereby granted. 
 
9. Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co. 
 
No. C15-0543RSL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60547 (W.D. 
Wash. May 6, 2016). This matter came before the Court on “BNSF 
Railway Company’s Motion to Compel Discovery.” BNSF served 
discovery on the Tribe in November 2015 seeking a wide array of 
information, including “[a]ll documents related to BNSF running 
trains across the Tribe’s reservation” and “[a]ll internal 
communications related to the Easement.” To the extent BNSF 
sought documents protected by a privilege and/or documents 
created after this action was filed, the Tribe objected. On March 
10, 2016, the Tribe filed a motion for summary judgment regarding 
BNSF’s contention that this lawsuit is preempted by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”) because 
enforcement of the Easement Agreement negotiated between the 
parties in 1990 would impede BNSF’s ability to satisfy its common 
carrier obligations. The Tribe argues that a railway’s voluntary 
contractual commitments are enforceable, that the terms of the 
Easement Agreement are clear, that the ICCTA cannot preempt the 
Indian Right-of-Way Act (“IRWA”) that governs this case, and 
that BNSF is estopped from asserting a preemption defense. In 
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support of the first and fourth arguments, the Tribe discusses the 
intent of the parties and asserts that it had no reason to suspect that 
BNSF would later claim that the limitations contained in the 
agreement were unenforceable due to its status as a common 
carrier. The Tribe provided details regarding the course of the 
negotiations between the parties and the chronology of events that 
resulted in the Easement Agreement. In addition, it submitted the 
declaration of Allan Olson, its current General Manager and the 
Tribe’s in-house attorney at the time the Easement Agreement was 
executed. Mr. Olson states in relevant part: “The specific terms and 
conditions contained in the Easement Agreement were very 
important to the Tribe. Absent those conditions, the Tribe would 
not have given its consent for a right-of-way grant to BN. Instead, 
the Tribe would have continued with the litigation of its trespass 
claims. Had the Tribe known that BNSF would later take the 
position that the Easement Agreement conditions were 
unenforceable due to BNSF’s common carrier obligations, the 
Tribe never would have consented to the Right-of-Way.”   
BNSF argues that the Tribe has put its otherwise privileged 
communications at issue and should be compelled to turn over any 
and all communications with counsel that analyze or discuss 
BNSF’s common carrier obligations and the impact they could 
have on enforcement of the Easement Agreement. The Court finds 
as follows: Privileged Documents and Communications: If the 
Tribe chooses to withdraw paragraph 6 of the Olson Declaration, 
its attorney-client privileged communications will not be at issue 
and there will be no need for the discovery sought by BNSF. If, 
however, the Tribe continues to rely on the declaration of counsel 
regarding what the Tribe knew regarding the impact of BNSF’s 
common carrier status and the importance of the negotiated 
limitations to the Tribe’s decision making, a waiver will have 
occurred, and the motion to compel will be granted. 
 
10. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. City of Snoqualmie 
 
No. C15-1936, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64350 (W.D. Wash. 
May 16, 2016). Before the court was Defendants City of 
Snoqualmie (“the City”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Snoqualmie 
Indian Tribe’s (“the Tribe”) amended complaint. Defendants 
argued that the court should dismiss the Tribe’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
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claim as not plausibly pleaded and decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the Tribe’s remaining state law 
claims. This case arose out of a dispute regarding municipal 
services that the City provides to the Tribe and, more specifically, 
to the casino that the Tribe operates (“the Casino”). The Casino is 
located outside City limits but within the City’s urban growth area 
(“UGA”). The City provides sewer and other municipal services 
pursuant to the “Agreement Between the City of Snoqualmie and 
the Snoqualmie Tribe for the Provision of Police, Fire and 
Emergency Medical Services to the Snoqualmie Hills Project and 
Sewer Utility Service to the Tribe’s Initial Reservation” (“the 
Agreement”) that the Tribe and the City entered into on April 26, 
2004, with an initial term of seven years after the opening of the 
Casino, after which the Agreement automatically renews for five 
additional periods of seven years unless either the Tribe or the City 
gives written notice of termination at least six months prior to the 
expiration of the initial term or any renewal term.  
Under the Agreement, the City agreed to accept up to 
360 equivalent residential units (“ERU”) of wastewater effluent 
per day. The Tribe paid the City approximately $1,270,440 for 
sewer capacity at the time of connection, and approximately 
$3,000,000 for sewer services from 2008 through 2015.   
In June 2014, the City enacted Ordinance 1133, which raised 
sewer rates for all customers outside City limits to 150% of the 
rates for those inside City limits effective July 1, 2014. Prior to 
that, the City had not established a differential rate for in-and out-
of-City sewer users; rather, the prior City ordinance—Ordinance 
994—had set one rate for in-City users and provided that out-of-
City users’ rates were set by contract. The City’s decision to create 
a different rate for customers outside City limits caused the sewer 
rates for the Casino and other out-of-City users to go up by 
50 percent.   
The Agreement was to reach the end of its first term in 
November 2015, and in July 2015, the City and the Tribe met to 
discuss amending the Agreement before that time. At that meeting, 
the Tribe expressed its desire for a one-year extension to allow the 
parties time to negotiate a long-term solution. In an August 25, 
2015, letter, the City threatened to cease providing services to the 
Casino upon expiration of the Agreement. On October 15, 2015, 
the City signed the Tribe’s proposed amendment, which renewed 
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the Agreement for one year.  Accompanying the City’s October 
15, 2015, acceptance was a letter from Mayor Larson informing 
the Tribe that the City Council had voted to discontinue sewer 
services to the Tribe by November 30, 2016. Further, the City has 
opposed the Tribe taking land into trust for the construction of 
sewer and water facilities.   
The Tribe alleged that the City has likewise interfered with its 
efforts to obtain replacement fire and emergency medical services. 
The Tribe had explored obtaining those services from Eastside Fire 
& Rescue (“EF&R”). The City, however, had told EF&R that the 
Agreement does not permit an alternative arrangement and has 
submitted a public records request to EF&R regarding EF&R’s 
communications with the Tribe. The Tribe alleged that these 
actions may increase the cost of fire and emergency medical 
services as the Tribe must indemnify EF&R in the event the City 
sues EF&R regarding its agreement with the Tribe.   
The Tribe contended that the City has undertaken these actions 
out of racial animus. In support of that contention, the Tribe 
alleged that “Defendants’ decision to refuse services to the 
Plaintiff denies Plaintiff a basic utility service that the City holds 
out and offers to non-Indians within the City of Snoqualmie and 
within its UGA.” The Tribe also alleged that the City “is 
overcharging the Tribe for sewer services,” and that “the City has 
not terminated or threatened termination of sewer utility service of 
any other paying customer within City limits and the City’s UGA.” 
In its amended complaint, the Tribe asserted causes of action for 
racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 
unreasonable refusal to provide sewer services in violation of 
RCW 35.67.31, and tortious interference with contractual relations 
and business expectancies.  
Defendants moved to dismiss the Tribe’s Section 1981 claim 
on the basis that the Tribe has alleged insufficient facts to support 
that claim. Although Defendants moved for dismissal under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), they had already filed an 
answer to the Tribe’s amended complaint, and the Tribe had filed 
an answer to Defendants’ counterclaims. Accordingly, the court 
treated Defendants’ motion as a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). 
Defendants’ motion was before the court.   
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The court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ 
motion. The court dismissed the Tribe’s § 1981 claim but granted 
the Tribe leave to amend its complaint concerning that claim 
within 20 days of the date of this order. The Court denied without 
prejudice Defendants’ request that the court decline supplemental 
jurisdiction over and dismiss the Tribe’s state law claims. 
 
11. Wells Fargo Bank v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indian 
 
No. E060447, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4417 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Jun. 15, 2016). In 2006, plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank loaned 
$56,570,000 to the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (Tribe) to 
build a new parking garage for a casino, which was operated by 
East Valley Tourist Development Authority (EVTDA), an 
instrumentality of the Tribe. The loan agreement included a 
provision that payments would be made to the Bank from a 
custodial bank account, into which EVTDA deposited the Tribe’s 
net income from the casino, resort and golf course, which were 
operated by EVTDA. In August 2007, EVTDA was indebted under 
a bridge loan from Merrill Lynch and others in the amount of more 
than $180 million relating to the improvement and operation of the 
casino, resort and golf course on tribal land. The bridge loan 
included terms limiting amounts payable to the Tribe.   
Due to the recession of 2008, revenues from the casino and 
resort declined, so the Tribe and EVTDA restructured their loans, 
with the Tribe executing a supplemental trust indenture in favor of 
Bank, and EVTDA executed an amended bridge loan agreement 
with its lenders. In April 2012, the Tribe and EVTDA informed 
their respective lenders that they could not continue payments and 
wished to restructure the loans. EVTDA’s lenders agreed to 
restructure its loans, but Bank notified the Tribe it was in default.   
The Bank filed a lawsuit for breach of contract and for 
injunctive relief to compel EVTDA to deposit funds into the 
custodial account. Cross motions for summary adjudication were 
filed by the Bank and the Tribe. The lower court granted Bank’s 
motion for summary adjudication as to the breach of contract 
action, and granted the Tribe’s motion for summary adjudication as 
to the cause of action for injunctive relief. Both parties appealed.   
On appeal, the Tribe argued that the trial court erred in granting 
summary adjudication on the breach of contract cause of action on 
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the ground it violated the Indian Gaming Act and erred in its 
calculation of damages. On cross-appeal, the Bank argued the 
court erred in denying injunctive relief and attorney’s fees. The 
appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in finding that the Bank did not prevail on the breach of contract 
claim, notwithstanding the judgment. The judgment was affirmed. 
Each party was to bear its own costs. 
 
12. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of Mich. 
 
No. 16-10317, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101610 (E.D. Mich. 
Aug. 3, 2016). The Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan 
and its Employee Welfare Plan (collectively, “Plaintiff” or 
“Tribe”) sued Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (“BCBSM”) 
over the manner in which BCBSM has administered Plaintiff’s 
“self-insured employee benefit Plan” and the health-benefit 
portions of that Plan. Plaintiff brought a nine-count complaint 
alleging that BCBSM breached its fiduciary duty to Plaintiff under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) when it 
did not authorize payment of Medicare-like Rates (“MLRs”) for 
certain health services (Count I), that BCBSM engaged in 
prohibited transactions under ERISA when it charged Plaintiff 
hidden fees (Count II), and seven state law claims (Count III-IX).   
BCBSM moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims that it violated its 
fiduciary duty to Plaintiff by not paying MLRs for certain health 
services procured by Plan members. It also moved to dismiss 
Plaintiff’s state law claims.   
Plaintiff and BCBSM entered into Administrative Service 
Contracts which set out the terms of the parties’ relationship. On 
July 5, 2007, the Department of Health and Human Services 
implemented regulations governing the payment amounts that 
health-care providers may accept from Indians for medical services 
rendered. 42 C.F.R. § 136.30. The regulations cap the amount a 
hospital or health-care provider may accept at the same rate that 
would be paid under Medicare for the same service. From the time 
the regulation was enacted, BCBSM did not ensure that it 
processed claims for payment at the MLR for the applicable 
service. Thus, BCBSM often paid healthcare provider’s rates for 
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services that were in excess of what would otherwise have been 
paid under Medicaid.   
Because Plaintiff cannot establish that BCBSM had a fiduciary 
duty under ERISA to ensure payment of MLRs for healthcare 
services obtained by eligible plan participants, Plaintiff’s MLR 
claims will be dismissed. Plaintiff’s state law claims are 
completely preempted by ERISA. Plaintiff’s state law claims will 
be dismissed. The court dismissed with prejudice Counts I & III-
IX of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ECF No. 7 and Count II on 
the extent it alleges any claims related to Defendant BCBSM’s 
obligation to ensure the Plan paid Medicare-like Rates for 
healthcare claims.  
 
13. Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. Crow Creek Sioux 
Tribal Court 
 
No. 4:10-CV-04110, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102257 (D.S.D. 
Aug. 4, 2016). The issue before the court was whether defendant, 
Native American Telecom, LLC. (NAT), is entitled to collect 
access service charges that it billed to plaintiff, Sprint 
Communications Company, L.P. Sprint provides nationwide long-
distance telephone services and is known under the 
telecommunications regulatory framework as an interexchange 
carrier (IXC). Sprint delivers long-distance calls to a local 
exchange carrier (LEC) for termination to end-users. Under the 
FCC’s current regulatory framework, Sprint pays the LEC a 
terminating access charge based on the LEC’s interstate access 
tariff, which is filed with the FCC.   
In October 2008, the Crow Creek Sioux Tribal authority 
authorized NAT to provide telecommunications services on the 
Crow Creek Reservation subject to the tribe’s laws. Pursuant to the 
2008 approval order, NAT began to operate as a LEC. NAT also 
operates a free conference calling system (used for conference 
calling, chat-lines, and similar services) in connection with Free 
Conferencing Corporation. A party using NAT’s services does not 
pay NAT for the conference call, but rather is assessed charges by 
the party’s telecommunications provider. NAT then bills the 
telecommunications provider an access fee as defined in its 
interstate tariff.   
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NAT’s access charges that were billed to Sprint for conference 
calls are at issue here. After paying two of NAT’s bills for charges 
connected to conference calls, Sprint ceased paying NAT’s 
terminating access tariffs because Sprint believed that NAT was 
involved in a traffic-pumping scheme, otherwise known as access 
stimulation, to generate traffic from free conference calls and chat 
services. Sprint filed suit against NAT alleging a breach of the 
Federal Communications Act (FCA) and a state-law unjust 
enrichment claim.   
On November 29, 2011, the FCC released its Connect America 
Fund final rule that addresses access stimulation and traffic 
pumping. See Connect America Fund; A National Broadband Plan 
for Our Future; Establishing Just and Reasonable Rates for Local 
Exchange Carriers; High-Cost Universal Service Support, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 73,830 (Nov. 29, 2011). This court issued an order directing 
the parties to discuss what effect, if any, the FCC’s Connect 
America Fund final rule had on the issues presented in this case. 
The court concluded that NAT’s interstate tariffs numbers 1 and 2 
were unenforceable, and granted summary judgment in Sprint’s 
favor. The court could not, however, determine summarily whether 
NAT’s tariff number 3 was enforceable. The NAT-Free 
Conferencing relationship does not resemble a normal carrier-
customer relationship. Rather, it resembles a relationship between 
business partners attempting to operate in a manner only 
superficially consistent with the FCC’s rules and regulations. 
Consequently, because Free Conferencing was not an “end user” or 
“customer” as defined in NAT’s interstate tariff number 3, NAT 
did not properly bill Sprint for switched access services regarding 
calls delivered to Free Conferencing. Thus, it was ordered that 
judgment will be entered in favor of Sprint and against NAT in 




1. Coppe v. Sac & Fox Casino Healthcare Plan 
 
No. 2:14-cv-02598, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150319 (D. Kan. 
Nov. 5, 2015). In her complaint, Plaintiff claimed benefits under 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (part of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974) (hereinafter “ERISA”). Before the 
Court was Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Pursuant to Fed. R. 
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Civ. P. 12(b)(2), it asserted a defense that the Court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter of this case, because Defendant 
has tribal sovereign immunity and can be sued only in its own 
tribal court. The motion also asserted that ERISA does not waive 
sovereign immunity as a defense for the claims of Plaintiff.  
Plaintiff argued that the Motion to Dismiss should be denied 
for three reasons: First, Congress has indicated that ERISA is 
applicable to the tribal plans at issue in this dispute. Second, 
Defendants waived tribal immunity contractually. Third, the Sac 
and Fox Nation is not the Defendant, only The Sac and Fox Casino 
Healthcare Plan, which does not have the defense of sovereign 
immunity.  
The Court found that because of the unequivocal Congressional 
abrogation of sovereign immunity under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) and 
the Plan’s clear contractual waiver of sovereign immunity, it has 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. The Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss was denied. 
 
2. Sanders v. Anoatubby 
 
No. 15-6116, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 20268 (10th Cir. Nov. 23, 
2015). Sanders, a citizen of the Chickasaw Nation (Nation), was 
employed as a Housing Specialist in the Nation’s Division of 
Housing (Division). While so employed, her supervisors and other 
employees allegedly treated her unfairly, called her names, made 
derogatory comments about her personal life, and failed to follow 
tribal policies and procedures with respect to her employment. She 
also claimed to have been wrongfully discharged because, contrary 
to tribal policy, she was not provided a statement of reasons for her 
termination.   
Sanders also filed applications for housing assistance with the 
Division. Her applications indicated that her daughter and 
grandchildren would be living with her in the home, but they were 
processed as if she was the lone applicant, thereby relegating her to 
the lowest priority. Sanders claimed the reason was retaliation for 
her having filed a grievance against the Executive Director and one 
of her supervisors.   
Sanders’ complaint against the Division, Tribal Governor Bill 
Anoatubby, and various tribal officers was for (1) Wrongful 
Termination, Abuse of Authority, Non-Compliance of Several 
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Chickasaw Policies and Procedures, Hostile Work Environment, 
Homeowner’s Application Discrimination, Non-Compliance of 
NAHASDA (Native American Housing Assistance and Self-
Determination Act of 1996). Defendants moved to dismiss under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) arguing, the Division and the individual 
defendants were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.   
The appellate court held that (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 did not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity so as to 
allow a former employee to bring discrimination claims against 
tribal housing officials; 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e(b) specifically 
exempted Indian tribes from the Title VII definition of “employer.” 
(2) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not permit the 
employee to bring housing discrimination claims, as 25 U.S.C.S. § 
4131(b)(6) exempted tribes and their housing divisions from the 
reach of Title VI. (3) The Ex Parte Young doctrine was 
inapplicable because the employee did not allege an ongoing 
violation of federal law and did not seek injunctive or declaratory 
relief. Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
3. Nawls v. Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Cmty.Gaming 
Enters.-Mystic Lake Casino 
 
No. 15-2769, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17902 (D. Minn. Feb. 12, 
2016). On February 11, 2016, the undersigned United States 
District Judge heard oral argument on Defendant Shakopee 
Mdewakanton Sioux Community Gaming Enterprise’s (“Gaming 
Enterprise”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Plaintiffs 
Annette and Adrian Nawls (the “Nawls”) oppose the Motion. The 
Nawls asserted claims under Title VII against the Gaming 
Enterprise. “It is well-settled that the plaintiff bears the burden of 
establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Nucor Corp v. Neb. Pub. 
Power Dist., 891 F.2d 1343, 1346 (8th Cir. 1989). Here, the Nawls 
have failed to satisfy this burden for two reasons. First, Title VII 
does not apply to Indian tribes, nor their gaming operations. 
Second, the Gaming Enterprise is immune from suit in federal 
court. Accordingly, the Complaint must be dismissed.   
Indian tribes, such as the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux 
Community, are excluded from Title VII’s definition of the term 
“employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). In Ferguson v. SMSC Gaming 
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Enterprise, the court addressed the very question presented here—
whether a Title VII claim can be brought against the Gaming 
Enterprise. 475 F. Supp. 2d 929, 931 (D. Minn. 2007). The court 
concluded that a Title VII claim could not be asserted against the 
Gaming Enterprise because “Title VII claims cannot be brought 
against Indian tribes or their agencies or businesses.” Id. at 931. 
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has recognized that the Gaming 
Enterprise’s predecessor, Little Six Inc., is exempt from Title VII. 
Charland v. Little Six, Inc., 198 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1999). The 
Nawls’ Title VII claims therefore cannot be asserted against the 
Gaming Enterprise and no federal question is presented to this 
Court.   
Additionally, the Gaming Enterprise is immune from suit under 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. “[T]ribal sovereign immunity 
is a threshold jurisdictional question.” Amerind Risk Mgmt. Corp. 
v. Malaterre, 633 F.3d 680, 684 (8th Cir. 2011). The Shakopee 
Mdewakanton Sioux Community is a federally recognized Indian 
tribe and possesses sovereign immunity from suit. Smith v. Babbitt, 
100 F.3d 556 (8th Cir. 1996). The Gaming Enterprise is “a branch 
of the sovereign tribal government.” Prescott v. Little Six, Inc., 387 
F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 2004). As such, because the Gaming 
Enterprise has not waived its right to immunity, it is immune from 
suit. See Charland, 198 F.3d 249; see also Ferguson, 475 F. Supp. 
2d at 931.   
Finally, the Court notes that Mr. Nawls’ Title VII claims fail 
for the additional reason that they were not filed within the 
statutory 90-day timeline. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
Accordingly, Mr. Nawls’ claims are time barred. Williams v. 
Thomson Corp., 383 F.3d 789, 790 (8th Cir. 2004). For all these 
reasons, the Gaming Enterprise’s Motion to Dismiss is granted and 
the Nawls’ Complaint is dismissed. 
 
4. Longo v. Seminole Indian Casino-Immokalee 
 
No. 15–12460, 2016 WL 722526 (11th Cir. Feb. 24, 2016). 
Former employee of tribe-owned casino brought action against 
casino, alleging claims under Title VII and Florida Civil Rights 
Act. In October 2008, Defendant hired Plaintiff to serve as a 
security guard at its casino. Plaintiff enjoyed success in this 
position until January 2013, when a patron of the casino started to 
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sexually harass, stalk, and physically touch him on a continual 
basis. Because these actions created a hostile work environment, 
Plaintiff sought to remedy this situation by reporting the incidents 
to Defendant. But Defendant failed to take any corrective action. 
Instead, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment one month 
later, stating that Plaintiff “was ‘discourteous to team members.” 
Casino moved to dismiss. The district court, 110 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 
granted motion. Former employee appealed. The appellate court of 
Appeals held that: (1) in a matter of first impression, Seminole 
Tribe of Florida, which owned and operated casino, was federally 
recognized Indian tribe, and thus it was entitled to sovereign 
immunity, and (2) sanctions and double costs were not warranted 
against former employee for frivolous appeal. Affirmed. 
 
5. Anderson v. Coushatta Casino Resort 
 
No. 2:15-01203, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49416 (W.D. La. 
Apr. 12, 2016). Before the court was a “Motion for Dismissal of 
Defendant, the Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana” wherein the movant 
sought to have the instant matter dismissed (1) for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, (2) as 
time-barred and (3) because plaintiff did not set forth any factual 
bases or allegations for wrongful or illegal termination under 
federal or state law. Plaintiff, Larry Anderson, worked in the 
Terrace Restaurant at the Coushatta Casino Resort in Kinder, 
Louisiana. In his complaint, Mr. Anderson alleges he was 
terminated on December 18, 2012 for insubordination and failure 
to comply with a supervisor’s request. Plaintiff sought 
compensatory damages, attorney fees and court costs. Plaintiff has 
not provided this court with any authority for the Tribe’s waiver of 
this sovereign immunity which would allow him to bring his 
claims in this court. The court found that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over this suit and therefore will grant the defendant’s 
motion because the defendant has not waived its sovereign 
immunity. 
 
6. Paskenta Band of Nomlaki Indians v. Crosby 
 
No. 2:15-cv-00538, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53145 (E.D. Cal. 
Apr. 20, 2016). Defendants sought dismissal of claims alleged in 
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Plaintiffs Paskenta Band of Nomlaki Indians and Paskenta 
Enterprises Corporation’s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) Second 
Amended Complaint (“SAC”) under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the 
dismissal motions are granted in part and denied in part.   
The Paskenta Band of Nomlaki Indians (“the Tribe”) employed 
Ines Crosby, John Crosby, Leslie Lohse and Larry Lohse 
(collectively, the “Employee Defendants”) in executive positions 
for more than a decade. Plaintiffs contended that the Employee 
Defendants used their positions to embezzle millions of dollars 
from the Tribe and its principal business entity, the Paskenta 
Enterprises Corporation (“PEC”). According to Plaintiffs, the 
Employee Defendants stole these funds from Plaintiffs’ bank 
accounts at Umpqua Bank and Cornerstone Bank by withdrawing 
large sums for their personal use. Plaintiffs further alleged that the 
Employee Defendants caused the Tribe to invest in two 
unauthorized retirement plans for the Employee Defendants’ 
personal benefit: a defined benefit plan (“Tribal Pension Plan”) 
and a 401(k) (“Tribal 401(k)”) (collectively “Tribal Retirement 
Plans”). The Employee Defendants allegedly kept their activities 
hidden from Plaintiffs through inter alia, harassment, intimidation, 
and cyber-attacks on the Tribe’s computers.  
Plaintiffs went on to assert that the Umpqua Defendants, 
Cornerstone Defendants, and APC knowingly assisted the 
Employee Defendants in aspects of their scheme. They contended 
that the Umpqua Defendants and the Cornerstone Defendants 
controlled banks where Plaintiffs maintained accounts, and, despite 
knowing the Employee Defendants were withdrawing money from 
these accounts for their personal benefit, permitted the Employee 
Defendants to continue making withdrawals and failed to notify 
Plaintiffs of the Employee Defendants’ actions. APC, as the third-
party administrator for the Tribal Retirement Plans, assisted the 
Employee Defendants in setting up and administering 
the unauthorized Tribal Retirement Plans.  Cornerstone 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted with leave to amend as 
to Plaintiffs’ common law negligence claim; denied as 
to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and aiding and abetting claim; and 
granted with prejudice as to Plaintiffs’ restitution claim. APC’s 
Motion to Dismiss is granted with leave to amend as to Plaintiffs’ 
common law negligence claim, aiding and abetting claim, and 
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punitive damages prayer and granted with prejudice as to 
Plaintiffs’ restitution claim. Umpqua Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss is granted with leave to amend as to Plaintiffs’ common 
law negligence, breach of contract, and aiding and abetting claim 
and granted with prejudice as to Plaintiffs’ restitution claim. 
Plaintiffs are granted thirty (30) days leave from the date on which 
this order is filed to file a Third Amended Complaint addressing 
the deficiencies in the aforementioned dismissed claims that were 
granted with leave to amend. 
 
7. Rapada v. Nooksack Indian Tribe 
 
No. 74116-1-I, 2016 Wash. App. LEXIS 1471 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Jun. 20, 2016). Nadene Rapada was the accounting director for the 
Nooksack Indian Tribe (NIT). NIT terminated Rapada for 
processing a mileage reimbursement request without first having 
the request approved as required by NIT’s written accounting 
policy. Rapada did not dispute that she violated NIT’s official 
policy. She argued that after-the-fact approval was common 
practice at NIT and following that practice, rather than the official 
policy, was a good faith error in judgment.  
The Employment Security Department (ESD) initially decided 
that Rapada was eligible for unemployment benefits. On NIT’s 
appeal of this decision, the ESD commissioner reversed 
concluding that Rapada was discharged for misconduct that 
amounted to wanton disregard of the employer’s interest and was 
thus ineligible for unemployment benefits. Rapada appealed to the 
superior court which reversed the commissioner’s decision.   
The court concluded that, on the facts of this case, Rapada 
made an error in judgment in failing to verify the status of her 
reimbursement with Ames before cashing the check. A good faith 
error in judgment is not misconduct that disqualifies a claimant 
from receiving unemployment benefits. Because the court reversed 
the commissioner’s ruling, the superior court judgment was 
affirmed. Rapada requested attorney fees pursuant to RCW 
50.32.160. Under RCW 50.32.160, a claimant is entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees when an appellate court reverses the 
decision of the commissioner. Because she prevailed here, Rapada 
was entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal under RCW 
50.32.160, assuming compliance with RAP 18.1(d). Affirmed. 




E. Environmental Regulations 
 
1. Cascadia Windlands v. Bureau of Indian Affairs 
 
No. 14–35553, 2015 WL 5306321 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 2015). 
Environmental organizations brought action against Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) challenging approval of timber sale in 
national forest under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) and the Coquille Restoration Act (CRA), which Indian 
Tribe intervened in as a defendant. The District Court, 2014 WL 
2872008, granted summary judgment to BIA and tribe. 
Environmental organizations appealed.   
The appellate court held that: (1) it was permissible for BIA to 
aggregate past and reasonably foreseeable future actions to create 
baseline from which to consider incremental impact of project, and 
(2) objective listed in forest management plan, to protect an 
endangered species, was not a standard or guideline that BIA was 
required to comply with pursuant to CRA, and thus BIA did not 
violate CRA by failing to ensure project was consistent with 
recovery plan for endangered species. 
 
2. Citizens for a Better Way, et al. v. United States Dept. of 
the Interior, et al. 
 
No. 2:12-cv-3021, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128745 (E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 23, 2015). This matter was before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment and Defendants’ 
Motions for Summary Judgment. This case involved the 
interrelated actions that Defendants took in connection with a 
proposed gaming facility and hotel fee-to-trust acquisition project. 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) reviews and approves tribal 
applications pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”). In 
2002, Defendant Enterprise submitted an application to the BIA 
requesting that the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) accept trust 
title to a piece of land in Yuba County. Defendant Enterprise 
planned to build a gaming facility, hotel, and parking facilities on 
the land in Yuba County (“Yuba Site”). The proposed trust 
acquisition was analyzed in an Environmental Impact Statement 
(“EIS”) prepared under the direction and supervision of the BIA. 
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The Draft EIS was issued for public review and comments on 
March 21, 2008. After the comment period, a public hearing, and 
consideration and incorporation of comments received, the BIA 
issued the Final EIS (“FEIS”) on August 6, 2010. The BIA issued a 
Record of Decision (“ROD”) in November 2012 finding that a 
gaming establishment on the Yuba Site would be in the best 
interest of Enterprise and its members and would not be 
detrimental to the surrounding community.   
Plaintiffs alleged that BIA violated the National Environmental 
Protection Act (“NEPA”) by: (1) narrowing the purpose of the 
proposed action in order to dismiss viable alternatives; (2) failing 
to take a “hard look” at Plaintiff United Auburn Indian 
Community’s socioeconomic interests and other interests; and 
(3) violated NEPA’s conflict-of-interest provisions by giving 
undue weight to one of Enterprise’s consultants; by not 
considering an adequate number of alternatives; and contended that 
the agency failed to take a “hard look” at the environmental 
impacts of the proposed casino.   
Plaintiffs argued that Defendants violated the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) which generally prohibits gaming on 
lands acquired in trust after 1988, unless it fits an exception under 
25 U.S.C. § 2719(a) and (b) or the Secretarial Determination 
Exception. However, the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs 
determined that gaming on the proposed Yuba site would be in the 
best interest of the Tribe and its citizens and would not be 
detrimental to the surrounding community. In addition, the 
Governor concurred with this determination.   
Plaintiffs alleged that the Clean Air Act was violated since the 
Secretary failed to conduct a conformity determination. Plaintiffs 
argued that Defendants failed to accurately identify and describe 
the parcel of land to be taken into trust, alleging that Defendants 
used two land descriptions interchangeably. Plaintiffs argued that 
by failing to comply with NEPA and the IGRA, Defendants’ 
actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).   
The Court was not convinced that Defendants violated NEPA 
or the IGRA and did not find that Defendants acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously. Therefore, the Court found that Defendants did not 
violate the APA. The Court granted Defendants’ and Intervenor 
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. The Court denied 
Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment. 




3. Alaska Oil and Gas Ass’n v. Jewell 
 
Nos. 13–35619, 13–35666, 13–35662, 13-35667, 13-35669, 
2016 WL 766855 (9th Cir. Feb. 29, 2016). State of Alaska, oil and 
gas trade associations, and Alaska Native corporations and villages 
brought actions against Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), seeking 
invalidation of final rule in which FWS designated critical habitat 
for polar bears under Endangered Species Act (ESA). 
Environmental groups intervened. The District Court, 916 F. Supp. 
2d 974, granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on some of their 
claims, and vacated the final rule. FWS and environmental groups 
appealed, and plaintiffs cross-appealed.  
The appellate court held that: (1) FWS was not required to 
identify where each component part of each primary constituent 
element (PCE) was located within each habitat by using scientific 
data establishing current use by existing polar bears; (2) five–mile 
increment measurement inland from the coast, to define the area of 
designation, was not arbitrary and capricious; (3) inclusion of area 
that was primarily an industrial staging area for oil and gas 
operations was not arbitrary and capricious; (4) as a matter of first 
impression for the circuit, compliance with procedural 
requirements for providing written justification to State was 
judicially reviewable; and (5) FWS complied with procedural 
requirements for written justification. Affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and remanded. 
 
4. Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources v. U.S. 
  
No. 14–35051, 2016 WL 946917 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2016). 
State of Alaska brought action against landowners, who were 
Alaska natives, to quiet title to rights-of-way for four public trails 
that crossed their land, and seeking a declaratory judgment and a 
claim seeking to condemn for public use whatever portions of the 
rights-of-way the State did not already own. The district court 
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. State appealed. 
The appellate court held that: (1) federal court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over action to quiet title to rights-of-way, and 
(2) federal court had jurisdiction over state’s condemnation action. 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. 




5. Wyoming v. United States DOI 
 
Case No. 2:15-CV-043 (Lead Case); Case No. 2:15-CV-041, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82132 (D. Wyo. Jun. 21. 2016). This 
matter was before the Court on the Petitions for Review of Final 
Agency Action filed separately in each of the consolidated actions, 
challenging the Bureau of Land Management’s issuance of 
regulations applying to hydraulic fracturing on federal and Indian 
lands. On March 26, 2015, the Bureau of Land Management 
(“BLM”) issued the final version of its regulations applying to 
hydraulic fracturing on federal and Indian lands. 80 Fed. Reg. 
16,128-16,222 (Mar. 26, 2015) (“Fracking Rule”).  
The Court preliminarily enjoined the BLM from enforcing the 
Fracking Rule. Purportedly in response to “public concern about 
whether fracturing can lead to or cause the contamination of 
underground water sources,” and “increased calls for stronger 
regulation and safety protocols,” the BLM undertook rulemaking 
to implement “additional regulatory effort and oversight” of this 
practice. The BLM ultimately published its final rule regulating 
hydraulic fracturing on federal and Indian lands on March 26, 
2015. The BLM determined the Fracking Rule fulfills the goals of 
the initial proposed rules: “[t]o ensure that wells are properly 
constructed to protect water supplies, to make certain that the 
fluids that flow back to the surface as a result of hydraulic 
fracturing operations are managed in an environmentally 
responsible way, and to provide public disclosure of the chemicals 
used in hydraulic fracturing fluids.”  The Industry Petitioners and 
the States of Wyoming and Colorado filed separate Petitions for 
Review of Final Agency Action, seeking judicial review of the 
Fracking Rule pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA). The States of North Dakota and Utah, and the Ute Indian 
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, later intervened in the 
States’ action as Petitioners and various environmental groups 
intervened as Respondents, and the Court granted the parties’ 
motion to consolidate the two separate actions. Petitioners contend 
the Fracking Rule should be set aside because it is arbitrary, not in 
accordance with law, and in excess of the BLM’s statutory 
jurisdiction and authority. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) & (C). The 
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Ute Indian Tribe additionally contends the Fracking Rule is 
contrary to the Federal trust obligation to Indian tribes.   
Congress has not delegated to the Department of Interior the 
authority to regulate hydraulic fracturing. The BLM’s effort to do 
so through the Fracking Rule is in excess of its statutory authority 
and contrary to law. As this finding is dispositive as to each of the 
Petitions for Review, the Court need not address the other points 
raised in support of setting aside the Fracking Rule. Therefore, the 
Court holds the Fracking Rule is unlawful, and it is ordered that 
the BLM’s final rule related to hydraulic fracturing on federal and 




6. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. 
 
No. CV-04-256, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82610 (E.D. Wash. 
Jun. 24, 2016). Defendant asked the court to reconsider its April 1, 
2016 “Order Re Reconsideration” in which it sua sponte 
reconsidered its “Order Granting Motion For Summary 
Adjudication, In Part” and found the Plaintiff Confederated Tribes 
Of The Colville Reservation (“Tribes”) could recover response 
costs for “enforcement activities” related to “removal” and/or 
“remedial action.”   
In its “Order Re Reconsideration,” this court rhetorically asked 
why the phrase “enforcement activities” in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) is 
not sufficient to provide for an award of private litigants’ 
attorney’s fees associated with bringing a cost recovery action 
under § 9607(a)(4)(B), but should be sufficient when a State or an 
Indian tribe brings a cost recovery action under § 9607(a)(4)(A). 
This court’s answer was: “It makes sense simply because these are 
governmental entities with inherent enforcement authority, unlike 
private parties. This is recognized by the fact that governmental 
entities are entitled to “all costs of removal or remedial action . . . 
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan (“NCP”),” 
whereas private parties are entitled only to “necessary costs of 
response . . . consistent with the national contingency plan.” It is 
presumed that “all costs” incurred by a governmental entity are 
consistent with the NCP and a defendant has the burden of proving 
to the contrary. On the other hand, a private party has the burden of 
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proving not only that its costs were “necessary,” but that they are 
also consistent with the NCP. Governmental entities and private 
entities are clearly treated differently under § 9607 and that 
difference is sufficient to justify awarding States and Indian tribes 
response costs for “enforcement activities,” even though unlike the 
federal government (EPA), they are not acting pursuant to § 9604 
or some other specific statutory provision of CERCLA.   
Defendant contends the court clearly erred in concluding the 
Tribes have “inherent authority” to enforce CERCLA. According 
to Defendant, “the Tribes do not possess inherent authority to 
enforce a federal statute such as CERCLA” and § 9601(25) “does 
not convey enforcement authority to Indian tribes any more than it 
conveys such authority to other public entities or private parties.” 
The court did not clearly err in concluding in its “Order Re 
Reconsideration” that the Tribes can recover response costs for 
“enforcement activities” related to removal and/or remedial action. 
This includes attorney’s fees and litigation costs related to removal 
and/or remedial action. Defendants’ Motion For Reconsideration is 
denied.  
 
F. Fisheries, Water, FERC, BOR 
 
1. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water 
in the Big Horn River System 
 
No. S–14–0257, 2015 WL 5439947 (Wyo. Sept. 16, 2015). In 
action involving ongoing general adjudication of water rights in 
river system, landowner filed objections to special master’s report 
and recommendation, which recommended partial reinstatement of 
cattle company’s expired permit, which conveyed water through 
ditch that ran through landowner’s property. The District Court 
adopted special master’s report and recommendation and entered 
its final order in general adjudication. Landowner appealed. The 
Supreme Court held that: (1) special master did not improperly 
place burden of proof on landowner, and (2) evidence 
was sufficient to support findings required to reinstate permit. 
 
2. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians, et al. v. State of Wisconsin, et al. 
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No. 74-313, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139294 (W.D. Wis. 
Oct. 13, 2015). Plaintiffs Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians; Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians; Sokaogan Chippewa Indian Community, Mole 
Lake Band of Wisconsin; Bad River Band of The Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians; and Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians want to modify the final judgment entered in 
this litigation in 1991 insofar as it bars tribal members from 
engaging in night deer hunting outside their reservations on public 
lands and privately-owned managed forest lands in northern 
Wisconsin.   
Plaintiffs’ motion for Rule 60(b)(5) relief was denied by this 
court in earlier proceedings, but the ruling was reversed on appeal. 
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. 
State of Wisconsin, 769 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2014). The court of 
appeals found that the 1991 judgment forbidding night hunting of 
deer by tribal members had been rendered obsolete by the passage 
of time and the state’s greater experience with night hunting of 
deer since 1991. Beginning in the late 1990s, the state had used 
state employees and private contractors to kill deer at night in 
many areas of the state to reduce the increase in the deer 
population and to prevent the spread of chronic wasting disease in 
deer. The program showed that night hunting was not as risky as it 
had seemed, as did the record of on-reservation tribal night 
hunting, which is not subject to state regulation. Accordingly, the 
court of appeals saw no reason to prohibit the tribes’ members 
from engaging in such hunting within the ceded territory, “given 
sensible regulations governing such hunting.”   
Plaintiffs’ retained their hunting rights, including the right to 
hunt at night, when they ceded thousands of acres of northern 
Wisconsin to the United States in the early part of the nineteenth 
century. Their right to hunt deer at night throughout the ceded 
territory was prohibited in the final judgment entered in 1991 only 
because the court found then that the state defendants had shown 
such hunting to be a hazard to public safety, that the particular 
regulation was necessary to prevent the hazard and that it was the 
least restrictive alternative to the accomplish the safety purpose. 
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 740 
F. Supp. 1400, 1423 (W.D. Wis. 1990). Now, the tribes have been 
able to show that the prohibition on off-reservation night deer 
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hunting is no longer necessary for public safety purposes, when 
properly regulated. It remains plaintiffs’ right, as well as its 
responsibility, to promulgate and enforce the regulations; not 
defendants’.   
Defendants’ role is limited to showing that plaintiffs’ 
regulations are inadequate. Defendants have focused on five areas 
in which they think plaintiffs’ proposed regulations are inadequate 
to protect public safety: (1) the “adequate backdrop” regulation; 
(2) notice; (3) pre-scouting; (4) the need for a spotter; and (5) the 
proposed start date for off-reservation night hunting. The 
objections of defendants State of Wisconsin, et al. to plaintiffs’ 
regulations for night hunting are denied as either discriminatory or 
unnecessary to prevent or ameliorate any substantial risk posed by 
tribal night hunting. 
 
3. Penobscot Nation v. Mills 
 
No. 1:12-cv-254, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169342 (D. Me. Dec. 
16, 2015). Before the Court were three motions for summary 
judgment: (1) the State Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment, or in the Alternative, for Dismissal for Failure to Join 
Indispensable Parties; (2) the United States’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment; and (3) the Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff 
Penobscot Nation.   
Plaintiff Penobscot Nation, which is a federally recognized 
American Indian tribe in Maine, filed this action seeking to resolve 
ongoing disputes between the tribe and the State of Maine 
regarding a section of the Penobscot River. The Court allowed the 
United States to intervene as a plaintiff on its own behalf and as a 
trustee for the Penobscot Nation. The Penobscot Nation asserted 
that it was prompted to file this case in response to the August 8, 
2012 Opinion issued by then-Maine Attorney General William J. 
Schneider regarding the respective regulatory jurisdiction of the . . 
. Penobscot Nation and the State of Maine relating to hunting and 
fishing on the main stem of the Penobscot River.   
The Penobscot Nation and the United States (together, 
Plaintiffs) maintain that the 2012 Attorney General Opinion 
reflected a misinterpretation of the law governing the boundaries 
of their reservation and their rights to engage in sustenance fishing. 
Thus, Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment clarifying both 
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those boundaries and tribal fishing rights within the Penobscot 
River.   
The Court held that: (1) The plain language of the Maine 
Implementing Act (MIA) and the Maine Indian Claims Settlement 
Act (MICSA) is not ambiguous and does not suggest that any of 
the waters of the Main Stem section of the Penobscot River are 
included within the boundaries of the Penobscot Indian 
Reservation; (2) The Penobscot Indian Reservation as defined in 
MIA, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 6203(8), and the MICSA, 
25 U.S.C.S. § 1722(i), includes the islands of the Main Stem, but 
not the waters of the Main Stem; (3) The language of Me. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 6207(4) is ambiguous; (4) Interpreting 
§ 6207(4) to reflect the expressed legislative will and in 
accordance with the special tribal canons of statutory construction, 
sustenance fishing rights provided in § 6207(4) allow the 
Penobscot Nation to take fish for individual sustenance in the 
entirety of the Main Stem section.   
The Court ordered that declaratory judgment enter as follows: 
(1) in favor of the State Defendants to the extent that the Court 
hereby declares that the Penobscot Indian Reservation as defined 
in MIA, 30 M.R.S.A. § 6203(8), and MICSA, 25 U.S.C. § 1722(i), 
includes the islands of the Main Stem, but not the waters of the 
Main Stem; and (2) in favor of the Penobscot Nation and the 
United States to the extent that the Court hereby declares that the 
sustenance fishing rights provided in section 30 M.R.S.A. § 
6207(4) allows the Penobscot Nation to take fish for individual 
sustenance in the entirety of the Main Stem section of the 
Penobscot River. 
 
4.  New Mexico v. Trujillo 
 
No. 15–2047, 2016 WL 683831 (10th Cir. Feb. 19, 2016). New 
Mexico filed suit regarding water rights. The District Court entered 
order that adjudicated individual’s water rights based on special 
master’s summary judgment order. Individual property owner 
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) district court’s 
certification of order as final appealable judgment did not clearly 
articulate “finality” or “no just reason for delay,” and therefore 
order fell short of proper certification; (2) order addressing 
individual’s water rights could not be considered final, as required 
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to be certified as final appealable order; (3) danger of injustice did 
not outweigh inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review, and 
thus order could not be reviewed under pragmatic finality doctrine; 
(4) order describing individual’s water rights expressly granted 
State’s request for injunction, and thus Court of Appeals could 
exercise jurisdiction to review it; and (5) individual inadequately 
presented argument on appeal that she was entitled to irrigate her 
land, and thus Court of Appeals declined to address it. Affirmed. 
 
5. Turunen v. Creagh 
 
No. 2:13-CV-106, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43158 (W.D. Mich. 
Mar. 31, 2016). Plaintiff, Brenda Turunen, is a member of the 
Keweenaw Bay Indian Community (KBIC), a federally recognized 
Indian tribe in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula that is the successor-
in-interest to the L’Anse and Ontonagon bands of the Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians. In 1842, the Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians signed a treaty with the United States of America, 7 Stat. 
591 (the 1842 Treaty), in which the Indian signatories ceded large 
portions of the western Upper Peninsula of Michigan, but reserved 
“the right of hunting on the ceded territory, with the other usual 
privileges of occupancy.” 7 Stat. 591.   
Plaintiff owned property that is within the “ceded territory” at 
issue in the 1842 Treaty. Plaintiff asserted that “the usual 
privileges of occupancy” reserved by the KBIC on the ceded 
territory included commercial farming and animal husbandry. 
Based on that interpretation of the 1842 Treaty, Plaintiff sought a 
declaration that she may—as a member of the KBIC—raise 
animals free from state regulation on her property within the ceded 
territory. Plaintiff’s claim rests on the twin propositions that the 
KBIC retained certain rights in the 1842 Treaty, and that she may 
exercise such rights based on her membership in the KBIC.   
Although the Court was required to determine the scope of the 
rights retained by the KBIC to resolve Plaintiff’s claim, the KBIC 
was not a party to this action. Thus, the Court previously sought 
briefing from the parties regarding whether the KBIC should be 
joined pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, and whether 
the case should be dismissed if the KBIC could not be joined. 
After the parties responded, the Court—at Plaintiff’s urging—
ordered Plaintiff to notify the KBIC of the pending action and the 
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opportunity to intervene. The KBIC followed up to that 
notification with a letter to the Court stating that it would not 
intervene in the action, and further urging that the action be 
dismissed under Rule 19.   
The Court concluded that the KBIC was a required party to this 
action and that joinder of the KBIC was not feasible. The Court 
further found that the first three factors under Rule 19(b) weigh in 
favor of dismissal. Although the fourth factor weighs against 
dismissal, such factor is not dispositive, particularly in light of the 
interests presented by the KBIC’s invocation of its sovereign 
immunity. Accordingly, the Court concluded this action should be 
dismissed pursuant to Rule 19. 
 
6. Ninilchik Traditional Council v. Towarak 
 
No. 3:15-cv-00205, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51370 (D. Alaska 
Apr. 17, 2016). Defendants Tim Towarak (Chairman of the Federal 
Subsistence Board), Sally Jewell (Secretary of Interior), and Tom 
Vilsack (Secretary of Agriculture) (Defendants) moved to dismiss 
the complaint of plaintiff Ninilchik Traditional Council (NTC) 
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6).   
NTC’s two-count complaint, filed in October 2015, alleged that 
Defendants’ actions violate Section 804 of ANILCA and the 
Administrative Procedure Act in relation to three events: (1) the 
Board’s 2002 delegation of authority to the in-season manager; 
(2) Jeffry Anderson’s (during all relevant times, the in-season 
fishery manager) 2015 subsistence fishery closure; and 
(3) Defendants’ implementation of the Kenai river gillnet fishery 
regulation.   
The plaintiff was NTC, the governing body of Ninilchik 
Village, a federally-recognized Indian tribe whose members have a 
customary and traditional use of all fish in the Kasilof and Kenai 
River drainages. Although Ninilchik Village members share “in an 
annual subsistence allocation of salmon from three federal fisheries 
on the Kenai River,” they alleged that they have “been unable to 
harvest this subsistence salmon allocation” due to “restrictive 
federal subsistence regulations limiting methods and means of 
harvest, and restrictive and arbitrary federal in-season subsistence 
management actions.”   
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In March 2014, NTC submitted two proposed regulations that 
would authorize residents of Ninilchik to operate two community 
subsistence gillnets: one in the Kenai River and the other in the 
Kasilof River. The Southcentral Regional Advisory Council, which 
is a regional advisory council established under Section 805 of 
ANILCA to provide opinions and recommendations to the Board 
on subsistence matters, considered NTC’s two gillnet fishery 
proposals and recommended that the Board adopt both. The Board 
voted to adopt NTC’s proposals and, after a five-month notice and 
comment period, promulgated final regulations authorizing the two 
gillnet fisheries.  
On May 27, 2015, NTC submitted to Anderson an operational 
plan for the Kenai and Kasilof gillnet fisheries. Before deciding 
either submission, Anderson issued an emergency special action 
closing the federal subsistence fishery from June 18 until August 
15 for early-run Chinook salmon in all federal public waters in the 
Kenai River downstream of Skilak Lake.   
On July 13, “less than a month before the closure of the 2015 
federal subsistence fishing season,” Anderson approved NTC’s 
operational plan for the Kasilof River gillnet and issued a permit to 
NTC. But Anderson still did not act on NTC’s request for a Kenai 
River gillnet permit. In a July 16 letter explained that he did not 
anticipate approving a Kenai River permit for the 2015 fishing 
season “because of the urgent need to protect early-run Chinook 
[s]almon.”   
In late July NTC wrote two letters to the Board seeking relief. 
The Board convened on July 28 and considered NTC’s requests. 
After hearing testimony, the Board voted not to grant NTC any of 
the relief it had requested. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is 
granted in part and denied in part as follows: Defendants’ motion 
to dismiss NTC’s claim that the Board violated 50 C.F.R. § 
100.10(d)(6) by not establishing “frameworks” to guide the 
delegation of its authority is DENIED; Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss NTC’s claim that the in-season manager’s failure to decide 
its Kenai gillnet permit application based on the merits of the 
operational plan violates 50 C.F.R. § 100.27(e)(10)(iv)(J) is 
denied; in all other respects, Defendants’ motion is granted. 
 
7. United States v. Washington 
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No. C70-9213, Subproceeding No. 14-02, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 78661 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 15, 2016). This matter was before 
the Court on Nisqually Indian Tribe’s (“Nisqually”) and Squaxin 
Indian Tribe’s (“Squaxin”) Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. 
The Nisqually and Squaxin asked the Court to interpret the Usual 
and Accustomed fishing grounds and stations (“U&A”) of the 
Squaxin pursuant to Paragraph 25(a)(1) of the permanent 
injunction. Specifically, Nisqually sought a determination that 
Squaxin has no adjudicated U&A east of a line running from 
Johnson Point to Devils Head, including the waters of the 
Nisqually Reach and around Anderson Island (“Subproceeding 
Area” or “disputed waters”). Nisqually also asked the Court to 
clarify the previous language of the Court concerning Squaxin’s 
U&A, and enjoin Squaxin from future fishing or fisheries-
management actions in the Subproceeding Area. Squaxin argued 
that Judge Boldt did not intend to exclude the disputed waters, as 
demonstrated by the evidence before him at the time he made his 
decision, and sought a determination that the Squaxin U&A 
included those waters. The Court hereby finds and orders: (1) 
Nisqually Indian Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
(2) Squaxin Indian Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. This Court has determined that there is no evidence that 
Judge Boldt intended to exclude the disputed waters from the 
Squaxin U&A, and there is evidence in the record supporting that 
the Squaxin regularly fished in those waters. 
 
8. United States v. Washington 
 
No. 13-35474, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11709 (9th Cir. Jun. 27, 
2016). Holdings:(1) The record supported the district court’s 
determination that barrier culverts the State of Washington used 
when it laid roads over streams in the State violated the Stevens 
Treaties the United States entered with Indian tribes because they 
hindered salmon from swimming upstream to spawn, and the court 
did not exceed its powers when it ordered the State to prepare a list 
of state-owned barrier culverts within areas covered by the treaties 
and to fix or remove them. (2) There was no merit to the State’s 
claim that the United States waived its right to represent the tribes 
because it led the State to believe that its barrier culverts did not 
violate the treaties. (3) The court did not err when it dismissed the 
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State’s claim that the United States had to fix barrier culverts it 
installed on federal land in Washington before the State could be 
required to repair or remove its culverts. The court of appeals 




1. Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth. 
 
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15692 (11th Cir. Ala. Sept. 3, 2015). 
Alabama sued under state and federal law to enjoin gaming at 
casinos owned by the Poarch Band of Creek Indians (the “Tribe”) 
and located on Indian lands within the state’s borders. As the Tribe 
itself was unquestionably immune from suit, Alabama instead 
named as defendants PCI Gaming Authority (“PCI”), an entity 
wholly owned by the Tribe that operates the casinos, and tribal 
officials in their official capacity.   
Alabama claimed that the gaming at the casinos constitutes a 
public nuisance under Alabama law and should be enjoined. It put 
forth two novel theories to explain why its state law applies to the 
Tribe’s casinos. First, Alabama asserted that the Secretary of the 
Interior lacked authority to take land into trust for the Tribe; 
therefore, the Tribe’s casinos were not located on Indian lands, and 
Alabama may regulate the gaming there. Second, Alabama 
contended that by incorporating state laws governing gambling 
into federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 1166 creates a right of action for a 
state to sue in federal court to enforce its laws on Indian lands.   
The district court rejected these arguments and dismissed the 
action on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to tribal 
immunity on nearly all of Alabama’s claims and Alabama failed to 
state a claim for relief. The appellate court upheld the judgment of 
the district court finding that the Tribe was entitled to sovereign 
immunity as to all of Alabama’s claims as the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1166, gives states no right of action 
to sue. The appellate court held that Congress did not intend to 
create an implied right of action in § 1166. The court also held that 
the individual defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity as to 
Alabama’s state law claim. Judgment affirmed. 
 
443 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 5:308 
 
 
2. Citizens Against Casino Gambling v. Jonodey Osceola 
Chauduri 
 
Nos. 11-5171, 11-5466, 13-2339, 13-2777, 2015 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 16439 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2015). The plaintiffs-appellants 
(“plaintiffs”) were organizations and individuals that oppose the 
operation of a casino in Buffalo, New York, by the Seneca Nation 
of Indians. They brought three successive lawsuits in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of New York against 
the National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”), its Chairman, 
the United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”), and the 
Secretary of the Interior. In the three actions, the plaintiffs argued 
that the NIGC did not act in accordance with federal law in 
approving an ordinance and subsequent amendments to that 
ordinance that permitted the Seneca Nation to operate a class III 
gaming facility, a casino, on land owned by the Seneca Nation in 
Buffalo (“the Buffalo Parcel”). In the third lawsuit (“CACGEC 
III”), which addressed the NIGC’s approval of the most recent 
version of the ordinance, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ 
motion for summary judgment and entered judgment dismissing 
the case.   
The appellate court held that the district court correctly 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint in CACGEC III because the 
DOI and the NIGC’s determination that the Buffalo Parcel is 
eligible for class III gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721, was not arbitrary or 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or in violation of law. The court 
further held that Congress intended the Buffalo Parcel to be subject 
to tribal jurisdiction, as required for the land to be eligible for 
gaming under IGRA. Finally, the court held that IGRA Section 
20’s prohibition of gaming on trust lands acquired after IGRA’s 
enactment in 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a), does not apply to the 
Buffalo Parcel. Because the gaming ordinances at issue in the first 
two lawsuits (“CACGEC I” and “CACGEC II”) have been 
superseded by the most recent amended ordinance, the appeals of 
CACGEC I and CACGEC II are moot. Accordingly, the court 
affirmed the judgment of the district court in CACGEC III and 
dismissed the appeals of CACGEC I and CACGEC II. 
 
3. San Pasqual Band of Mission Indians v. State 




No. B254870, 2015 WL 6438536 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2015). 
Tribe brought action against the state and Gambling Control 
Commission seeking damages for breach of Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act compact. The Superior Court granted summary 
judgment for state and Commission. Tribe appealed. The appellate 
court ruled that compact barred tribe from recovering damages as a 
remedy for breach. Affirmed. 
 
4. Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Pauma & 
Yuima Reservation v. California 
 
Nos. 14–56104, 14–56105, 2015 WL 6445610 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 26, 2015). Indian tribe brought suit against California, 
asserting claims of mistake and misrepresentation regarding 
amendment to tribal-state gaming compact entered under Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), and seeking injunctive relief. 
Indian tribe moved for summary judgment. The District Court 
granted motion on misrepresentation claim. Tribe moved to vacate 
to request further relief, which was denied. California appealed, 
and tribe cross-appealed.   
The appellate court held that: (1) California misrepresented to 
tribe that no further licenses were available; (2) amendment was 
voidable and appropriate remedy was rescission and restitution; 
(3) California was not entitled to setoff for profits tribe gained 
from operating machines it would not have had absent amendment; 
(4) California’s misrepresentation was innocent not fraudulent; 
(5) California waived sovereign immunity; and (6) language of 
IGRA precluded bad faith claim against California. 
 
5. Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) 
 
No. 13-13286, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153935 (D. Mass. Nov. 
13, 2015). Prior History: Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of 
Gay Head (Aquinnah), 36 F. Supp. 3d 229, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
89460 (D. Mass., 2014). This lawsuit involved a dispute over 
gaming on Indian lands on Martha’s Vineyard. The Wampanoag 
Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) and related entities have taken steps 
to commence commercial gaming operations on tribal lands in the 
town of Aquinnah. The Tribe does not have a state gaming license. 
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The Commonwealth of Massachusetts contends that operating 
gaming facilities without such a license would violate a 1983 
agreement, approved by Congress in 1987, that subjects the lands 
in question to state civil and criminal jurisdiction (and specifically 
to state laws regulating gaming). Count 1 of the complaint alleged 
breach of contract, and Count 2 sought a declaratory judgment.  
The Commonwealth, the Town of Aquinnah, the 
Aquinnah/Gay Head Community Association (AGHCA), and the 
Tribe have all moved for summary judgment. This case presented 
two fairly narrow issues. The first was whether a statute passed by 
Congress in 1988 (the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, or IGRA) 
applies to the lands in question, which in turn raises the questions 
whether the Tribe exercises “jurisdiction” and “governmental 
power” over the lands. The second was whether IGRA repealed, by 
implication, the statute passed by Congress in 1987 (the act that 
approved the 1983 agreement). If the 1988 law (IGRA) controls, 
the Tribe can build a gaming facility in Aquinnah. If the 1987 law 
controlled, it cannot.   
The complaint asserted a claim for breach of contract and 
requested a declaratory judgment that the Settlement Agreement 
allowed the Commonwealth to prohibit the Tribe from conducting 
gaming on the Settlement Lands. The Tribe removed the action to 
this Court on grounds of federal-question and supplemental 
jurisdiction. The Commonwealth moved to remand the action to 
state court, which the Court denied. Both the AGHCA and the 
Town filed motions to intervene. The Court granted those motions. 
The Tribe moved to dismiss the AGHCA complaint on the grounds 
of sovereign immunity and failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. The Tribe separately moved to dismiss all 
three complaints, with leave to amend, for failure to join the 
United States, which it asserted was a required party under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 19. The Tribe filed an amended answer to the 
Commonwealth’s complaint which included counterclaims against 
the Commonwealth and claims against three third-party 
defendants, all of whom are government officials of the 
Commonwealth sued in their official capacity.   
The Court denied the Tribe’s motions to dismiss and granted 
the motion by the Commonwealth to dismiss the counterclaims 
against it. Remaining are the claims by the Commonwealth, the 
AGHCA, and the Town against the Tribe, and the Tribe’s 
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counterclaims against the government officials. The 
Commonwealth, the Town, the AGHCA, and the Tribe all moved 
for summary judgment.   
The Court found that the Tribe has not met its burden of 
demonstrating that it exercises sufficient “governmental power” 
over the Settlement Lands, and therefore IGRA does not apply and 
it is clear that IGRA did not repeal by implication the 
Massachusetts Settlement Act. Accordingly, the Tribe cannot build 
a gaming facility on the Settlement Lands without complying with 
the laws and regulations of the Commonwealth and the Town. The 
Court granted the motions for summary judgment of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Town of Aquinnah, and the 
Aquinnah/Gay Head Community Association, Inc. and denied the 
Tribe’s motion for summary judgment. 
 
6. North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians v. California 
 
No. 1:15-cv-00419, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154729 (E.D. Cal. 
Nov. 13, 2015). Prior History: N. Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians 
of Cal. v. California, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113424 (E.D. Cal. 
Aug. 26, 2015). Plaintiff North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of 
California (“North Fork” or “the Tribe”) had brought suit against 
the State of California (“State” or “California”) based on an 
alleged failure of the State to negotiate in good faith for the 
purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the 
conduct of class III gaming activities as required by the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”). See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
The parties have filed competing motions for judgment on the 
pleadings. This case revolved around a Tribal-State compact which 
was approved by the Governor and ratified by the legislature 
before the issue was certified for referendum vote in the November 
2014 election. The people of the State of California voted “No,” 
overturning the legislative ratification of the Tribal-State compact.  
North Fork is a federally recognized Indian tribe, listed in the 
Federal Register. Prior to the initiation of the plan to build a 
gaming facility, the Tribe possessed only a 61.5-acre parcel in 
North Fork, California (which lies within the Sierra National 
Forest), held in trust by the United States for development of a 
community center, a youth center, and homes. In 2004, the Tribe 
put into action its plan to build a gaming facility by starting down 
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the path to acquisition of land in Madera County. A lengthy 
environmental impact study (“EIS”), with opportunity provided for 
public notice and comment, was conducted and the results 
published on August 6, 2010.   
After reviewing the results of the EIS, the submissions of state 
and local officials and surrounding Indian tribes, and the likely 
economic impact on North Fork and the surrounding communities, 
the BIA recommended approval of (and requested the California 
Governor’s concurrence with) the Tribe’s bid for acquisition in 
trust of an approximately 305 acre plot of land in Madera County 
(“Madera parcel”) for the benefit of North Fork pursuant to the 
Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 465, in 
anticipation of North Fork’s construction of a C class III gaming 
facility as contemplated by IGRA. California’s Governor, Edmund 
Brown, Jr., gave his concurrence with the BIA recommendation on 
August 30, 2012.   
On February 5, 2013, the federal government took the Madera 
parcel into trust for North Fork pursuant to the Indian 
Reorganization Act (“IRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 465, in anticipation of 
North Fork’s construction of a class III gaming facility as 
contemplated by IGRA. After discussions with representatives of 
the then-Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, regarding framing of 
a Tribal-State compact, Governor Schwarzenegger and the Tribe 
executed a gaming compact (“2008 Compact”). However, because 
the acquisition of the Madera parcel was stalled due to the lengthy 
EIS process, the 2008 Tribal-State compact was never presented to 
the legislature.  
A second draft of the Tribal-State compact prepared by the 
Governor’s office and the Tribe was presented to Governor Brown. 
On the same date that the Governor gave his concurrence to the 
BIA recommendation for taking the Madera parcel into trust, his 
office executed a Tribal-State compact with North Fork and 
forwarded that compact to the legislature for ratification. The 
California Assembly and Senate passed AB 277 and the Governor 
approved it and the bill was filed with the Secretary of State. At 
some time shortly thereafter, the California’s Secretary of State 
forwarded the compact to the Secretary of the Interior for review 
and approval pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8). The Assistant 
Secretary of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, issued notice 
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that the compact between the State and North Fork was approved 
(to the extent that it was consistent with IGRA).  
On November 4, 2014, California voters rejected Indian 
Gaming Compacts Referendum, labeled Proposition 48, to ratify 
the North Fork Tribe compact. Based on that referendum vote, the 
State of California refuses to recognize the existence of a valid 
Tribal-State compact with North Fork. The validity of the 
referendum and compact is the subject of litigation now pending 
before the California Fifth District Court of Appeal. After the 2014 
referendum, the State refused to enter into negotiations with North 
Fork regarding a new Tribal-State compact, concluding that any 
attempt at negotiation of a compact regarding the Madera parcel 
would be futile. On that basis, North Fork brings the instant action, 
contending that the State’s failure to negotiate triggers the remedial 
provisions of IGRA.   
The Court concluded that the State failed to enter into 
negotiations with North Fork for the purpose of entering into a 
Tribal-State compact within the meaning of § 2710. Accordingly, 
the parties were ordered to conclude a compact within 60 days of 
the date of this order. 
 
7. Bettor Racing, Inc. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n 
 
No. 15-1335, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1456, 812 F.3d 648 (8th 
Cir. Jan. 29, 2016). The National Indian Gaming Commission 
(NIGC) permissibly interpreted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
as not requiring scienter for a violation under 25 U.S.C.S. § 2713. 
Absent a scienter requirement, the undisputed facts established that 
a contractor violated the Act by operating a pari-mutuel betting 
business at a tribe’s casino without an NIGC-approved contract, by 
modifying the contract without NIGC approval, and by holding the 
sole proprietary interest in the gaming operations. The $5 million 
fine imposed on the contractor did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment. Among other factors, the fine was less than the 
statutory maximum under § 2713(a)(1). Granting summary 
judgment without a hearing did not violate due process. Judgment 
affirmed. 
 
8. Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe of the Enter. Rancheria of Cal. v. 
California 




No. 2:14-cv-01939, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19330 (E.D. Cal. 
Feb. 16, 2016). The matter was before the Court on cross motions 
for judgment on the pleadings by Plaintiff the Estom Yumeka 
Maidu Tribe (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) and Defendant the State of 
California (hereinafter “Defendant”). Under the federal Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), an Indian tribe seeking to 
conduct casino-style gaming on Indian land must request that the 
state enter into good faith negotiations to conclude a gaming 
compact. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3). Under California law, the 
governor is tasked with negotiating a compact, and the legislature 
is tasked with ratifying it. Cal. Const., Art. IV, § 19(f). In this case, 
Plaintiff negotiated and signed a compact (the “Compact”) with 
Governor Jerry Brown in 2012. However, the legislature 
essentially took no further action and did not hold a vote on 
ratification. The Compact eventually expired on its own terms in 
July 2014.  
Plaintiff’s immediate remedy under the IGRA was to bring 
suit. After Plaintiff had introduced evidence that the state had not 
negotiated toward a compact in good faith, it is the state’s burden 
to show it has negotiated in good faith. Otherwise, the state is 
subject to a court order compelling it to conclude a compact within 
60 days, with additional remedies should the state continue to 
reject the compact. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B). Defendant’s 
position was that the legislature’s inaction cannot form the basis 
for suit under the IGRA, because only the governor negotiated the 
instant Compact. Plaintiff’s position was that the IGRA’s 
negotiation mandate extends to activities by the legislature. Both 
parties have moved for judgment on the pleadings on the issue of 
whether Defendant has negotiated the instant Compact in good 
faith, and thus whether Plaintiff was entitled to relief under the 
IGRA. The Court had carefully considered the factual and legal 
issues presented in the parties’ filings, and the arguments raised in 
the amicus brief submitted by the California legislature. The Court 
granted Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and 
Denied Defendant’s motion. 
 
9. Amador Cnty. v. Jewell 
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No. 05-00658, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33791 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 
2016). At the center of this dispute was a proposed gaming 
operation on the Buena Vista Rancheria of the Me-Wuk Tribe 
located in Amador County, California. In 2000, pursuant to the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
2721, the Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior 
(the “Secretary”), approved a gaming compact between the Me 
Wuk Tribe and the State of California. The gaming compact was 
later amended in 2004 to provide for an expanded gaming 
operation. Although it had not challenged the 2000 gaming 
compact, Plaintiff, Amador County, challenged the Secretary’s 
approval of the amended compact, claiming that the Buena Vista 
Rancheria did not qualify as “Indian land” – a requirement under 
the IGRA.   
Before the Court were cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The Secretary argued that her approval of the amended gaming 
compact must be upheld because it was in accordance with the 
IGRA. First, the Secretary contends that Amador County was 
barred from contesting the Rancheria’s reservation status under the 
IGRA because the County stipulated to the Rancheria’s status as 
such in a settlement judgment in an earlier lawsuit between the 
County and the Me-Wuk Tribe. Second, the Secretary argued that 
even if this Court were to determine that the stipulated judgment 
does not have preclusive effect in this lawsuit, her approval of the 
amended compact still must be upheld because Congress granted 
her the authority to determine what lands qualify as reservations 
for purposes of the IGRA. Amador County, on the other hand, 
requested that this Court declare that the Buena Vista Rancheria 
was not Indian land under the IGRA and set aside the Secretary’s 
approval of the amended compact. The County contends that it did 
not, and indeed could not, stipulate to the Rancheria’s reservation 
status. It further argued that even if it did stipulate to the 
Rancheria’s reservation status, the stipulation dis not have 
preclusive effect on the present litigation. Lastly, the County 
argues the term “reservation” as it was used in the IGRA is 
narrowly defined and the Buena Vista Rancheria does not fit 
within that narrow definition.  
Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record of the 
case, and the relevant legal authority, the Court concluded that: (1) 
Amador County stipulated that it would treat the Buena Vista 
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Rancheria as a reservation; (2) Amador County is barred from 
arguing in this litigation that the Rancheria is not a reservation; 
and, alternatively, (3) the Secretary is authorized to declare that the 
Rancheria is a reservation for purposes of the IGRA. Therefore, the 
Court will deny Amador County’s motion for summary judgment 
and grant the Secretary’s cross-motion. 
 
10. Arizona v. Tohono O’odham Nation 
 
No. 13-16517, No. 13-16519, and No. 13-16520, 2016 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 5766 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2016). The Nation’s plan to 
build a casino and conduct Class III gaming on a certain parcel of 
land did not violate a gaming compact between the Nation and the 
State of Arizona. The land acquired and taken into trust pursuant to 
the Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act was 
land taken into trust as part of a settlement of a land claim under 
§ 2719 of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C.S. 
§ 2719, and thus, IGRA did not bar the Nation from gaming on the 
parcel. The district court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of the Nation on breach of Compact claims because the 
Compact specifically authorized Class III gaming on Indian lands 
that qualified for gaming under IGRA § 2719. The district court 
properly held that tribal sovereign immunity barred non-Compact-
based claims for promissory estoppel, fraud in the inducement, and 
material misrepresentation. Orders affirmed. 
 
11. Tohono O’odham Nation v. Ducey 
 
No. CV-15-01135, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42410 (D. Ariz. 
Mar. 30, 2016). In May 2013, this Court ruled that the Gaming 
Compact between the State of Arizona and the Tohono O’odham 
Nation did not prohibit the Nation from building a new casino in 
the Phoenix metropolitan area. Arizona v. Tohono O’Odham 
Nation, 944 F. Supp. 2d 748 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“Tohono O’odham 
II”). Subsequently, the Nation began constructing a casino known 
as the West Valley Resort in Glendale, Arizona, a suburb of 
Phoenix. In April 2015, while construction was ongoing, the 
Director of the Arizona Department of Gaming (“ADG”), wrote a 
letter to the Nation reiterating the Department’s position that the 
Nation engaged in fraud during the formation of the Compact, and 
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asserting authority to withhold certification from the Resort’s 
vendors and employees based on this conduct. In response, the 
Nation brought this lawsuit, claiming that federal law preempts any 
state-law authority ADG might have to withhold these 
certifications.  
The Director had asserted counterclaims against the Nation for 
promissory estoppel, fraudulent inducement, and material 
misrepresentation. The Director sought a variety of relief, 
including (1) a declaration that “ADG is not obligated to certify or 
authorize the Nation’s proposed class III gaming facility on the 
Glendale property or any other Nation-owned or operated class III 
gaming facility in the Phoenix metropolitan area”; (2) a judgment 
that “the Nation is estopped from opening any class III gaming 
facilities in the Phoenix metropolitan area”; (3) a declaration or 
injunction that the Nation is prohibited from conducting class III 
gaming activities on the Glendale property; (4) a declaration that 
the Compact is voidable and unenforceable and subject to 
rescission; and (5) reformation of the compact. The Nation moves 
to dismiss these counterclaims.   
The court: (1) granted the Nation’s motion to dismiss with 
respect to the Director’s counterclaim for promissory estoppel; 
(2) struck the Director’s demands for reformation of the Compact 
and declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to casinos other 
than the West Valley Resort; (3) otherwise denied the Nation’s 
motion to dismiss. 
 
12. Jamul Action Comm. V. Chaudhuri 
 
No. 15-16021, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13104 (9th Cir. Jul. 15, 
2016, Amended Opinion). This case was about an Indian gaming 
casino in Jamul, California. The Jamul Indian Village, a federally 
recognized Indian tribe and a non-party to this suit (“Tribe”), was 
building a casino in Jamul. A sub-group of tribal members and 
organizations, including the Jamul Action Committee, the Jamul 
Community Church, and four residents of rural Jamul (collectively 
“JAC”), opposed the casino. This lawsuit was JAC’s most recent 
effort to stop its construction. JAC contended that the National 
Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”) violated the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) when it approved the Tribe’s 
gaming ordinance (“GO”) without first conducting a NEPA 
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environmental review. JAC petitioned the district court for a writ 
of mandamus under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 
arguing that the NEPA environmental review was “agency action 
unlawfully withheld.” The district court denied relief. The 
appellate court held that contrary to JAC’s arguments, NIGC’s 
approval of the Tribe’s gaming ordinance without conducting a 
NEPA environmental review did not violate NIGC’s obligations 
under NEPA because “where a clear and unavoidable conflict in 
statutory authority exists, NEPA must give way.” Flint Ridge Dev. 
Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn. 426 U.S. 776 (1976) at 788. Though the 
district court relied on other grounds, we affirm its denial of 
plaintiff’s requested writ of mandamus. The decision of the district 
court was affirmed. 
 
13. Jamul Action Comm. V. Chaudhuri 
 
No. 2:13-cv-01920, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104359 (E.D. Cal. 
Aug. 8, 2016). The plaintiffs in this action were a group of 
individuals, a non-profit association, and a community church from 
Jamul, California, together, the Jamul Action Committee (JAC). 
The JAC asked the court to stop construction of a casino on the 
Jamul Indian Village’s land, among related requests for declaratory 
relief. In short, the JAC alleged the casino was illegal because it 
was being constructed on land that federal law does not make 
eligible for gambling.  
The defendants, who include federal officials, members of the 
Jamul Indian Village, and private corporations tasked with the 
construction and eventual management of the casino, move to 
dismiss the case on a number of jurisdictional and other grounds. 
The Jamul Indian Village itself is not a party.   
The National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) published a 
notice in the Federal Register in April 2013, which stated that the 
NIGC would prepare a statement on the environmental impacts of 
an agreement between the Tribe and defendant San Diego Gaming 
Ventures, LLC (SDGV). 78 Fed. Reg. 21,398 (Apr. 10, 2013). 
According to the NIGC’s notice, SDGV would manage a casino 
the Tribe planned for construction outside Jamul, California. See 
78 Fed. Reg. 21,399. The notice also explained that the casino 
would be constructed “on the Tribe’s Reservation.” Id. In a 
previous notice published in the Federal Register more than a 
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decade earlier, the NIGC and Bureau of Indian Affairs had not 
referred to this land as the Tribe’s “Reservation.” See Notice of 
Intent, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,582 (Apr. 2, 2002); see also Notice, 68 
Fed. Reg. 1,475 (Jan. 10, 2003).   
The JAC understood the NIGC’s April 2013 notice as a formal 
declaration that the Tribe “has a Reservation that qualifies as 
‘Indian lands’ eligible for gaming” under the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA). In the JAC’s view, this determination runs 
counter to federal law, because although the Tribe may have a 
beneficial interest in the land in question, that land “is not a 
reservation or trust land” as defined by IGRA.   
The court found that the JAC’s first, second, third, fourth, and 
sixth claims must be dismissed because the Tribe is a necessary 
party and has not been joined. The JAC’s fifth claim must be 
restricted to its allegation that the federal defendants approved the 
Tribe’s gaming ordinance without conducting the review 
procedure required by NEPA. The court granted the tribally 
affiliated defendants’ motion to dismiss without leave to amend. 
The court granted in part the federal defendants’ motion without 
leave to amend as to claims one, two, three, four and six. The court 
converted the federal defendants’ motion to dismiss claim five into 
one for summary judgment to allow consideration of evidence on 
the limited question of whether the Tribe’s gaming management 
contract has been approved. 
 
14. North Fork Rancheria v. California 
 
No. 1:15-cv-00419, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105825 (E.D. Cal. 
Aug. 10, 2016). Plaintiff North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of 
California (“North Fork”) had obtained judgment on the pleadings 
against the State of California (“State” or ”California”) based on 
the failure of the State to negotiate with the tribe for the purpose of 
entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of class 
III gaming activities as required by the Indian Gaming Rights Act 
(“IGRA”), see 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A), after the California 
electorate voted down Proposition 48, the referendum that would 
have ratified the gaming compact between North Fork and 
California. In response to issues highlighted by the Picayune 
Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (“Chukchansi”) in its motion to 
intervene, the Court ordered additional briefing from the parties 
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regarding whether a decision in one of the other actions regarding 
the proposed North Fork gaming site might impact this Court’s 
jurisdiction over this case. North Fork and the State agreed that this 
matter is justiciable regardless of the outcome of the other actions. 
They also agreed that no stay should be imposed. Chukchansi 
submitted briefing as amicus curiae, wherein it argues that this 
matter could be rendered non-justiciable by decisions in other 
proceedings. The Court declined to issue a stay and terminated the 
action in its entirety. 
 
15. Frank’s Landing Indian Cmty. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming 
Comm’n 
 
No. C15-5828, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108581(W.D. Wash. 
Aug. 15, 2016). This matter came before the Court on Defendants 
National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”) and Jonodev 
Chaudhuri’s, in his official capacity as Chairman of the NIGC 
(“Chairman”), motion to dismiss. The Court grants the motion for 
the reasons stated herein.   
The Community is a federally-recognized self-governing 
dependent Indian community located along the Nisqually River 
near Olympia, Washington. In 1987, Congress recognized the 
Community’s members “as eligible for the special programs and 
services provided by the United States to Indians because of their 
status as Indians” and “as eligible to contract, and to receive 
grants, under the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act for such services.” Pub. L. No. 100-153, § 10, 
101 Stat. 886, 889 (1987). In 1994, Congress amended the law to 
state that the Community is recognized “as a self-governing 
dependent Indian community that is not subject to the jurisdiction 
of any federally recognized tribe.” Pub. L. No. 103-435, § 8, 
108 Stat. 4566, 4569 (1994). This amendment stated that 
“[n]othing in this section may be construed to constitute 
the recognition by the United States that the Frank’s Landing 
Indian Community is a federally recognized Indian tribe.” Id. The 
section also noted that “notwithstanding any other provision of 
law,” the Community “shall not engage in any class III gaming 
activity” under the IGRA. Id.   
On December 9, 2014, the Community submitted a purported 
Class II gaming ordinance to the NIGC for the Chairman’s review 
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and approval along with a resolution from the Community’s 
governing body, enacting the ordinance. The NIGC referred the 
matter to Interior’s Office of the Solicitor, requesting an opinion 
on whether the Community is a tribe within the meaning of the 
IGRA, who referred the matter to the Assistant Secretary — Indian 
Affairs (“AS-IA”), Kevin Washburn. On March 6, 2015, the AS-
IA issued a memorandum to the NIGC Chairman conveying 
Interior’s conclusion that the Community is not an Indian tribe 
within the meaning of the IGRA because it is not a federally-
recognized Indian tribe.   
While it is possible for the Community to challenge the 
Secretary’s refusal to include the Community on the list of 
federally recognized tribes published yearly in the federal register, 
see Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489, 326 
U.S. App. D.C. 139 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the Community’s instant 
dispute is with the Secretary and not the NIGC. In fact, any ruling 
that the NIGC had the authority to approve a gaming license for a 
community that the Secretary had not recognized would effectively 
convey more authority on the NIGC than Congress explicitly 
intended in the IGRA. Therefore, the Court granted Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss because the Community had failed to state a 
legally cognizable claim against the NGIC and the Chairman. 
 
 
H. Jurisdiction, Federal 
 
1. United States v. Osage Wind, LLC 
 
No. 14-CV-704, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132480 (N.D. Okla. 
Sept. 30, 2015). Before the Court were Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment as to Counts I and II of the Amended 
Complaint. Plaintiff, the United States of America filed this action 
on November 21, 2014. In the First Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment and Damages, Plaintiff alleged the 
Defendants’ construction activities interfere with the Osage 
Nation’s reserved mineral rights, and Defendants failed to obtain 
the necessary prior approvals before excavating the turbine 
foundations for the Project. Specifically, Plaintiff asserted that 
Defendants violated 25 C.F.R. § 211.48, which prohibits 
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“exploration, drilling, or mining operations on Indian land” 
without obtaining permission from the Secretary of the Interior, 
and 25 C.F.R. § 214.7, which forbids “mining or work of any 
nature” on reserved Osage County land unless a mineral lease 
covering such land is approved by the Secretary. Plaintiff alleged 
“Defendants initiated excavation work and substantial disturbance 
and invasion of the mineral estate” without obtaining the required 
prior approvals or appropriate lease.   
The First Amended Complaint alleged five counts, all of which 
hinge on whether the Defendants violated 25 C.F.R. § 211 and/or 
25 C.F.R. § 214. Count I sought a declaration regarding the 
applicability and violation of 25 C.F.R. § 211 as to Defendants’ 
construction activities. Count II sought a declaration regarding the 
applicability and violation of 25 C.F.R. § 214 as to Defendants’ 
construction activities.   
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to 
Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint, along with a Motion 
for Expedited Consideration. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss 
or for Summary Judgment. Defendants filed a Notice of 
Supplemental Authority, which Plaintiff moved to strike as 
improperly filed. Defendants filed a Notice to the Court, advising 
construction of the Osage Wind Farm has been completed and the 
Wind Farm has commenced commercial operation. The Court 
concluded that Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, the court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Further, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Expedited Consideration and Plaintiff’s Motions to Strike. 
 
2. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians v. Caballero 
 
No. 13-15411, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 20094 (9th Cir. Nov. 19, 
2015). Plaintiff-Appellee Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians 
(Tribe) alleged that Cesar Caballero infringed various trademarks 
related to the Tribe and a casino it owns and operates, the Red 
Hawk Casino, in violation of the Lanham Act, the California 
Business and Professions Code, and common law, and that 
Caballero cybersquatted on related domain names. The district 
court granted summary judgment to the Tribe on those claims and 
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permanently enjoined Caballero from using the marks in any way. 
Caballero appealed the district court’s judgment.  
The trademarks allegedly infringed by Caballero fall into two 
categories: (1) marks related to the Tribe and its Rancheria (the 
Tribal Marks); and (2) the “Red Hawk Casino Mark.” The latter 
mark is registered with the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office; the Tribal Marks are not.   
This evidence fails to carry the Tribe’s burden on summary 
judgment. There is insufficient evidence in the record to prove that 
Caballero offered “association services” within the meaning of the 
Lanham Act. Caballero’s own vague and conclusory statements are 
insufficient to establish that Caballero or his tribe provided or 
offered any services. The only remaining factual support for the 
Tribe’s allegations is a snapshot of Caballero’s website depicting a 
contact email address for those with “Enrollment Questions,” 
which, standing on its own, does not support the grant of summary 
judgment. Even if the “Enrollment Questions” heading on his 
website could be construed as constituting an offer of membership, 
what Caballero refers to as “association services,” solicitation of 
members in and of itself is insufficient to constitute an offer of a 
service without evidence as to what those prospective members 
would be joining. As to the Red Hawk Casino Mark, the Tribe has 
failed to present any evidence that Caballero used the mark in 
connection with a good or service. On the present record, no 
reasonable jury could conclude that Caballero offered or provided 
any service in connection with his use of either the Tribal Marks or 
the Red Hawk Casino Mark.   
The Tribe also is not entitled to summary judgment on the 
cybersquatting claims. There is no evidence in the record, not even 
in Caballero’s brief exchange with the Tribe’s counsel at his 
deposition, that Caballero intended to profit by using the domain 
names involving the Tribal Marks or the domain names involving 
the Red Hawk Casino Mark. The Tribe therefore has failed to 
provide sufficient evidence on this statutory element of its claims 
for cybersquatting. Reversed and remanded. 
 
3. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. Cypress 
 
No. 14–12115, 2015 WL 9310571 (11th Cir. Dec. 23, 2015). 
Indian tribe brought action alleging that former tribal chairman, 
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director of finance, chief financial officer, tribe’s former attorneys, 
and investment firm violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) and state law by embezzling tribal 
funds for their personal use, charging excessive fees, and 
managing tribe’s funds in manner allowing suspicious financial 
transactions to occur. Investment firm moved to compel 
arbitration. The District Court, 2013 WL 2158422, granted motion. 
The remaining defendants moved to dismiss. The District Court, 
975 F. Supp. 2d 1298, granted motion. Tribe appealed. The 
appellate court held that: 1) alleged fraud upon authority of former 
chairman of tribe was issue to be raised in arbitration; 2) intra-
tribal dispute doctrine was not triggered, and federal question 
jurisdiction existed; and 3) tribe failed to state RICO or RICO 
conspiracy claim. Affirmed. 
 
4. U.S. v. Janis 
 
No. 14–3888, 2016 WL 191934 (8th Cir. Jan. 15, 2016). 
Following denial of his motion to dismiss indictment, 40 F. Supp. 
3d 1133, and of his motion for reconsideration, 2014 WL 4384373, 
defendant was convicted in the District Court of assault of federal 
officer, and he appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) tribal 
public safety officer was “federal officer”; (2) district court abused 
its discretion when it instructed jury that victim was federal officer; 
and (3) erroneous instruction was harmless. Affirmed. 
 
5. Hayes v. Delbert Servs. Corp. 
 
No. 15-1170, No. 15-1217, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1747, 811 
F.3d 666 (4th Cir. Va. Feb. 2, 2016). James Hayes, the lead 
plaintiff-appellant in this case, received a payday loan from a 
lender called Western Sky Financial, LLC. Defendant-appellee 
Delbert Services Corporation later became the servicing agent for 
Hayes’s loan. Because Delbert’s debt collection practices allegedly 
violated federal law, Hayes initiated a putative class action against 
Delbert. Claiming that Hayes and his fellow plaintiffs agreed to 
arbitrate any disputes related to their loans, Delbert moved to 
compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 
9 U.S.C. § 4. The district court granted Delbert’s motion.   
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Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the 
arbitration agreement in this case is unenforceable. The agreement 
purportedly fashions a system of alternative dispute resolution 
while simultaneously rendering that system all but impotent 
through a categorical rejection of the requirements of state and 
federal law. The FAA does not protect the sort of arbitration 
agreement that unambiguously forbids an arbitrator from even 
applying the applicable law. 
The district court erred in ordering the parties to arbitration 
because the arbitration agreement in the case was unenforceable; 
the arbitration agreement fashioned a system of alternative dispute 
resolution while simultaneously rendering that system all but 
impotent through a categorical rejection of the requirements of 
state and federal law, and the FAA did not protect arbitration 
agreements that unambiguously forbade an arbitrator from even 
applying the applicable law. We therefore reverse the district 
court’s order compelling arbitration and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
6. U.S. v. Harlan 
 
No. 15–1552, 815 F.3d 1100, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2602 (8th 
Cir. Feb. 16, 2016). Defendant was convicted in the District Court 
of domestic assault in Indian country by habitual offender. 
Defendant appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) defendant’s 
prior tribal court simple-assault conviction could be used as 
predicate offense in subsequent federal prosecution for domestic 
assault in Indian country by habitual offender; (2) sufficient 
evidence supported conviction; and (3) defendant’s sentence, 
which was at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range, was 
substantively reasonable. Affirmed. 
 
7. Smith v. Western Sky Fin., LLC 
 
No. 15-3639, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28452 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 
2016). This case presents an unusual and disconcerting collision 
between federal consumer protection laws and the sovereignty of 
Native American tribes and their courts. Defendants here make 
“payday” loans across the United States through the Internet, and 
they seek to have their loan agreements governed by tribal law and 
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challenged only in certain tribal courts or arbitral forums. Given 
the historic injustices visited upon Native Americans, the Supreme 
Court has understandably admonished that federal courts should 
tread lightly when it comes to intruding upon their sovereignty. See 
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 107 S. Ct. 
971, 94 L. Ed. 2d 10 (1987). Defendants here invoke these 
principles in moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s case. For the reasons set 
forth below, I have concluded that Native American sovereignty is 
not at stake in this case, and I agree with the Fourth Circuit (among 
others) that Defendants seek “to avoid federal law and game the 
system.” Hayes v. Delbert Servs. Corp., 811 F.3d 666, 2016 WL 
386016, at *9 (4th Cir., 2016). Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will 
be denied. 
 
8. Cherokee Nation v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc. 
 
No. 15-CV-280, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46421 (E. D. Okla. 
Apr. 6, 2016). Plaintiff The Cherokee Nation (“Plaintiff”) 
originally filed this action in the District Court of Sequoyah 
County, Oklahoma, asserting claims against Defendants Johnson & 
Johnson, Inc. and Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (together, 
“Defendants”). Plaintiff asserted various state-law claims arising 
from Defendants’ alleged misbranding of Risperdal, an atypical 
antipsychotic drug.  
On July 27, 2015, Defendants removed the case to this Court. 
Defendants asserted this Court has jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, because 
(1) Plaintiff’s state-law claims necessarily raise disputed and 
substantial federal questions and (2) the actual party-in-interest is 
not The Cherokee Nation but the Cherokee Nation Businesses 
and/or Cherokee Nation Healthcare Services, both of which are 
citizens of Oklahoma that generate diversity jurisdiction. On 
August 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c), contending this Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction over this action. Defendants opposed remand.   
On December 14, 2015, the Court determined that no federal-
question jurisdiction existed over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. 
Defendants argued this Court has original jurisdiction over this 
action based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which provides, “[t]he district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the 
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matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, 
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different 
states.” The defendant seeking removal must establish the 
existence of diversity jurisdiction by a preponderance of the 
evidence.   
Here, Plaintiff challenged the existence of complete diversity 
because The Cherokee Nation, as an Indian tribe, is a sovereign 
nation that has no “citizenship” for purposes of § 1332.1. 
However, Defendants argued Plaintiff was not itself responsible 
for operating healthcare services for tribal members. Rather, 
Plaintiff allegedly incorporates separate entities—Cherokee 
Nations Businesses and/or Cherokee Nation Healthcare Services—
to provide these services, including the purchase of Risperdal. 
Defendants allege these corporate entities are the real party- or 
parties-in-interest, and they may generate diversity jurisdiction 
because they are citizens of Oklahoma.   
The Court concluded Defendants have not satisfied their 
burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a separate 
corporate entity, rather than The Cherokee Nation, was the real 
party-in-interest in this case. Plaintiff has submitted sufficient 
evidence to suggest the corporate entities were not responsible for 
purchasing the Risperdal at issue. As the real party-in-interest, The 
Cherokee Nation had no citizenship for diversity purposes and 
cannot generate diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand was granted. Plaintiff’s second 
request for fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) was 
denied. 
 
9. State v. Hill 
  
No. A147778, 2016 Ore. App. LEXIS 483, 277 Ore. App. 751 
(Or. Ct. App Apr. 20, 2016). Defendant was convicted of second-
degree disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025, and fourth-degree 
assault, ORS 163.160, as a result of an incident at a casino owned 
and operated by the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian 
Reservation. In the trial court, defendant moved for dismissal of 
the case, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. On appeal, he offers a new rationale for his position: 
because the incident occurred in Indian country (1) the state bore 
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the burden, but failed, to present evidence regarding his non-Indian 
status, which was necessary for the court to determine its subject 
matter jurisdiction, and (2) even though he did not alert the court 
that his non-Indian status was required for the court’s jurisdiction, 
the court was required to dismiss the case. The state responded 
that, properly understood, defendant’s challenge is to personal 
jurisdiction over him and not the court’s subject matter jurisdiction 
over the crimes charged and that, therefore, his current 
jurisdictional argument cannot be considered because it is 
unpreserved.   
Contrary to the state’s position, the court concluded that 
defendant raised a challenge to the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction as circumscribed under federal law and that defendant 
correctly asserted that his non-Indian status was the determining 
factor in whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the charged 
crimes. However, although the record is silent regarding 
defendant’s non-Indian status, we rejected defendant’s contention 
that the proper disposition is an outright reversal. Rather, the court 
decided, as a matter of first impression in Oregon, that the better 
course is to vacate the judgment and remand to permit defendant 
an opportunity to provide the trial court with evidence sufficient to 
permit a conclusion that he is Indian. In this case, given the 
arguments made to the trial court, the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction was not fully litigated. Defendant neither asserted that 
the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of his 
Indian status nor submitted evidence of that status to the trial court. 
Therefore, the court remanded for the trial court to permit 
defendant to attempt to meet his burden of production concerning 
his status as an Indian; and, if he did so, the court must conduct 
proceedings to determine defendant’s status as an Indian, during 
which the state will bear the burden of proof. If, on remand, the 
trial court concludes that it has jurisdiction, then it should reinstate 
the judgment. Vacated and remanded. 
 
10. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians v. Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Mich. 
 
No. 15-13708, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55866 ( E.D. Mich. Apr. 
27, 2016). This case was one of over thirty filed in this district in 
which defendant Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan (Blue 
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Cross) was being sued by various businesses to recover funds Blue 
Cross illegally billed and retained in violation of its third-party 
administrator (TPA) agreements and in breach of its fiduciary duty 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. A unique aspect of this case, 
however, was that the plaintiff, Little River Band of Ottawa 
Indians, is a tribal government. ERISA does not apply to certain 
governmental employee benefit plans. And Blue Cross insisted that 
the plaintiffs have not alleged enough facts in its complaint to 
establish that its plan falls within ERISA’s regulations.   
Blue Cross has filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the counts of the complaint brought 
under ERISA. The plaintiffs also alleged several state law claims, 
which Blue Cross also moved to dismiss as preempted by ERISA, 
if the former claims survive, and because a state intermediate 
appellate decision favors dismissal. Blue Cross also argued that the 
plaintiffs did not plead sufficient facts to support a specific theory 
seeking damages because Blue Cross paid too much for hospital 
services that were supposed to be capped at “Medicare-Like 
Rates.”   
The motion to dismiss will be denied with one exception. The 
ERISA claims survive because the plaintiffs adequately alleged 
that less than “substantially all” of its plan participants perform 
commercial activities, thereby invoking a statutory exception to the 
exclusion from ERISA coverage. The state law claims, therefore, 
are preempted and will be dismissed, subject to revival if later in 
these proceedings the plaintiffs fail to prove its allegations 
concerning the census of its plan participants. The plaintiffs also 
have pleaded sufficiently the allegations necessary to satisfy the 
conditions precedent for recovery of damages for payments in 
excess of “Medicare-Like Rates.” The plaintiffs have alleged 
sufficient facts to establish a right to relief on their ERISA claims. 
Accordingly, it is ordered that the defendant’s motion to dismiss is 
granted in part and denied in part. 
 
11. Feller v. Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Pres. Office 
 
No. 5:16-cv-61, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61475 (D. Vt. May 10, 
2016). Plaintiffs George Feller and Willow Feller filed an action in 
Vermont Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division, against 
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Defendant Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Preservation Office 
(NITHPO), alleging that NITHPO had failed to make payments 
required by a commercial promissory note, and seeking to 
foreclose upon a mortgage securing that note. NITHPO filed a 
Notice of Removal in this court, asserting subject-matter 
jurisdiction on the grounds that “there is a federal question arising 
out of a dispute from a private party against a federally recognized 
tribe, tribal governmental entity or agent, and under federal 
common law regarding the jurisdiction of Indian Tribal court.” 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand the case back to state court 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), arguing that NITHPO has presented no 
federal question and that NITHPO cannot rely on diversity 
jurisdiction because the maximum amount in controversy is the 
amount of the underlying note of $30,000. NITHPO opposed 
remand.   
NITHPO asserted that there is a federal question because 
NITHPO is a federally-recognized tribe, tribal government, entity, 
or agent. However, jurisdiction does not attach just because a case 
involves an Indian party. NITHPO contended that there is a federal 
question because this case “is about land now owned by an Indian 
Tribal Government.” Again, federal court jurisdiction is not 
created just because a case involves tribal property. NITHPO 
further argued that there are federal jurisdiction because the case 
involved “a non-governmental party attempting to attach the 
federal contracts and federal contract support dollars of a tribal 
government or tribal governmental entity for the purpose of 
payment,” because Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust tribal remedies, 
and because of immunity from suit.   
In this case, NITHPO had not filed a motion to dismiss; the 
only motion now pending was Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand. No 
disputes about exhaustion or immunity appear on the face of 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint. If there was an issue of federal common law 
in this case, it did not provide a basis for Plaintiffs’ foreclosure 
cause of action. The court therefore concluded that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, and that remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) was 
required. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand was granted, and this case 
was remanded to the Vermont Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil 
Division. 
 
12. United States v. Alvirez 




No. 11-10244, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13966 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 
2016). Edgar Alvirez, Jr. appealed his jury conviction and sentence 
for assault resulting in serious bodily injury on an Indian 
reservation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 113(a)(6). The 
court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the 
district court’s judgment. The court concluded that the district 
court abused its discretion when it admitted the unauthenticated 
Certificate of Indian Blood as evidence to meet the elements of the 
governing statute. Accordingly, the court reversed Alvirez’s 
conviction and remand for further proceedings. In accordance with 
our recent en banc decision in Zepeda, the court concluded that the 
determination of federal recognition of a tribe was a question of 
law to be resolved by the judge. The court also concluded that the 
district court abused its discretion when it determined that the 
Certificate of Indian Blood offered into evidence by the 
government was a self-authenticating document under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 902(1). Because the error was not harmless, the 
court reversed the conviction. 
 
13. Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians 
 
No. 14-16121, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14514 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 
2016). This appeal required the court to decide whether a federally 
recognized Indian tribe waives its sovereign immunity from suit by 
exercising its right to remove to federal court a case filed against it 
in state court. This question has divided the district courts, and it 
has been reached by only one of the appellate court’s sister 
circuits, which held that removal does not, standing alone, waive 
tribal immunity. See Contour Spa at the Hard Rock, Inc. v. 
Seminole Tribe of Fla., 692 F.3d 1200, 1206-08 (11th Cir. 2012). 
The court followed the lead of the Eleventh Circuit and held that 
the act of removal does not express the clear and unequivocal 
waiver that is required for a tribe to relinquish its immunity from 
suit. It was error to hold appellant tribe, when sued under the 
Family and Medical Leave Act and California law, waived 
sovereign immunity by removing the case to federal court because 
it stated no such unequivocal intent, as nothing in the removal 
statute, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441, abrogated tribal sovereign immunity, 
and it promptly asserted an immunity defense upon removal to 
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federal court and voiced no intent to litigate on the merits, 
invoking the court’s jurisdiction only to resolve its immunity 
defense, and if it were possible to infer an intent to relinquish 
immunity from the act of removal, immunity was not waived as 
such an intent could not be implied. Holding the tribe’s removal 
waived its sovereign immunity was unfair because it was not fair 
to put tribes to a choice between asserting their right to removal 
and asserting a tribal immunity defense. Judgment reversed. 
 
 
14. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. 
Myton 
 
No. 15-4080, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14582 (10th Cir. Aug. 9, 
2016). This appeal required the court to address once again the 
status of the Uintah Valley Indian Reservation. In the district court, 
the Ute Indian Tribe (“Tribe”) sought to obtain a permanent 
injunction preventing the State of Utah, the counties of Duchesne 
and Uintah, and the cities of Roosevelt and Duchesne (“state and 
local defendants”) from exercising civil and criminal jurisdiction 
on certain lands within the original exterior boundary of the Uintah 
Valley Reservation in a manner inconsistent with the court’s en 
banc opinion in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 
1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 596, 93 L. 
Ed. 2d 596 (1986). In opposing the injunction, the state and local 
defendants rely on Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 114 S. Ct. 958, 
127 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1994), in which the Supreme Court held that 
the lands in question are not part of the Uintah Valley Reservation.  
Notwithstanding Hagen, the district court held that it was 
bound under the “law of the case” doctrine to follow the mandate 
in Ute Indian Tribe and thus, that it was without authority to alter 
the existing jurisdictional boundaries as set forth in Ute Indian 
Tribe. The United States as amicus curiae urged the court to 
modify the mandate in Ute Indian Tribe only to the extent that it 
directly conflicts with Hagen. In 1985 this court resolved the issue 
en banc in a case the parties call Ute III.  
This court held that all lands encompassed within the original 
Ute reservation boundaries established beginning in the 1860s — 
including all those lands that passed to non-Indian settlers between 
1905 and 1945 — remained Indian country subject to federal and 
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tribal (not state and local) criminal jurisdiction. See Ute Indian 
Tribe v. Utah (Ute III), 773 F.2d 1087, 1088-89, 1093 (10th Cir. 
1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 596, 93 L. 
Ed. 2d 596 (1986). After the Supreme Court denied certiorari, that 
might have seemed the end of it. After all, Ute III “disposed of all 
boundary questions at issue on the merits” and “left nothing for the 
district court to address [on remand] beyond the ministerial 
dictates of the mandate.” Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah (Ute V), 114 
F.3d 1513, 1521 (10th Cir. 1997).   
The appellate court held that the district court erred in granting 
a town’s motion to dismiss a tribe’s action alleging that local 
officials sought to exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal 
members on lands that were restored to tribal jurisdiction because a 
prior decision had determined that tribal reserves, remaining 
allotments, and restored lands were Indian country. The town 
included land that qualified as Indian country under the terms of 
that decision. 
Reassignment of the dispute was required to ensure just and 
timely resolution because the district court had twice failed to 
enforce the mandate of the court of appeals. The district court’s 
order granting Myton’s motion to dismiss is reversed. This case 
and all related matters shall be reassigned to a different district 
judge. The court and parties are directed to proceed to a final 
disposition both promptly and consistently with this court’s 
mandates in Ute V, Ute VI, and this case. 
 
15. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, et al. v. John McMahon, et al. 
 
No. 15-01538 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016). Plaintiffs filed a 
complaint against County Sheriff John McMahon and Deputy 
Sheriff Ronald Sindelar in their official capacities on the grounds 
of: (1) violation of Public Law 280 by issuing motor vehicle 
citations without jurisdiction on reservation land; (2) interference 
with tribal self-government; (3) preemption of state authority; and 
(4) violation of plaintiffs’ civil rights. Plaintiffs allege that 
Defendants illegally enforced the California Motor Vehicle Code 
on Reservation land, issuing citations for various state law 
violations, including driving without a valid registration and 
driving with a suspended license, resulting in impoundment of 
Plaintiffs cars and significant expense in time and legal fees.  
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The land where at least three of the citations were issued is a 
one square mile plot of land known as Township 5N, Range 24E, 
SBM, Section 36 (“Section 36”). Plaintiffs sought an injunction to 
“enjoin Defendants from citing, arresting, impounding the vehicles 
of, and prosecuting members of the Chemehuevi Tribe for 
violations of the California Motor Vehicle Code 
sections 4000(a)(1), 16028(a), 14601.1(a)” in Section 36. The 
Court’s “pivotal question” was whether Section 36 was located 
within the boundaries of the Chemehuevi Tribe’s Reservation. 
Defendants argued that Section 36 is not in Indian country because 
it is not a part of the Indian reservation. Plaintiffs argued that 
Section 36 is within Indian country as it “lies within the boundaries 
of the Reservation as established by Congress through enactment 
of federal statutes and action of the President through issuance of a 
Secretarial order.” Under Public Law 280, California has limited 
jurisdiction over Indian country, depending on whether the state 
law at issue prohibits or regulates conduct.   
The Court concluded that Section 36 is not part of the 
Chemehuevi Indian Reservation. However, 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) 
says that Indian Country includes “all land within the limits of any 
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States 
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and 
including rights-of-way running through the reservation.” Indian 
country includes non-Indian land within the exterior boundaries of 
an Indian reservation, avoiding a “checkerboard jurisdiction” 
situation. Section 36 is a landlocked parcel surrounded on all sides 
by Chemehuevi Reservation land, a “near-perfect example of the 
type of checkerboard jurisdiction the Supreme Court counseled 
against.” Allowing Defendants to exercise state jurisdiction over 
Chemehuevi Tribal members in Section 36 would lead to a 
likelihood of “irreparable injury vis-à-vis the Tribe’s sovereignty.” 
EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2001) 
at 1077. The court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 
injunction and enjoined Defendants and their agents from citing, 
arresting, impounding the vehicles of, and prosecuting 
Chemehuevi tribal members for on-reservation violations of the 




2017] Case Law on American Indians: 2015-2016 470 
 
 
I. Religious Freedom 
 
1. Trapp v. Roden 
 
No. 11863, 2015 WL 7356318 (Mass. Nov. 23, 2015). Inmates, 
who were adherents of Native American religious practices, 
brought action against Department of Correction challenging 
closure of purification lodge at correctional center. Following 
bench trial, the Superior Court, 2012 WL 6629681, entered 
judgment. Department appealed. On transfer, the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that: (1) closure violated the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000; (2) Department failed to 
meet its burden of proof that closure decision was motivated by an 
actual compelling health interest; and (3) closure violated 
settlement agreement which resolved inmate’s prior lawsuit against 
Department. 
 
2. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dept. of Interior 
 
Nos. 13–16517, 13–16519, 13–16520, 2016 WL 1359869 (9th 
Cir. Apr. 6, 2016). Tribe filed suit against United States 
Department of the Interior, National Park Service, and government 
officials, seeking immediate return of human remains and 
associated funerary objects taken from its reservation during 
inventory of remains and objects pursuant to the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). The District 
Court, 2013 WL 530302, dismissed action as barred by sovereign 
immunity. Tribe appealed. The appellate court held that: 
(1) decision to apply NAGPRA to inventory remains from sacred 
site on reservation constituted final agency action, and (2) tribe’s 
claims were ripe for review. Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
3. Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Lynch 
 
No. 14-15143, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6275 (9th Cir. Apr. 6, 
2016). The government was properly granted summary judgment 
on plaintiffs’ claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb et seq., because even if plaintiffs’ use of 
cannabis constituted an exercise of religion, no rational trier of fact 
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could conclude on the record that a prohibition of cannabis use 
imposed a substantial burden under 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb-1(a) as 
nothing in the record demonstrated that a prohibition on cannabis 
forced plaintiffs to choose between obedience to their religion and 
criminal sanction, such that they were being coerced to act 
contrary to their religious beliefs. The government was properly 
granted summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim under the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1996, 
because the Act did not create a cause of action or any judicially 
enforceable individual rights. Judgment affirmed. 
 
J. Sovereign Immunity 
 
1. Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Approximately 15.49 Acres of 
Land in McKinley Cnty. 
 
No. 15 CV 501, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174900 (D.N.M. Dec. 
1, 2015). The Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) 
filed a complaint for condemnation seeking a perpetual easement 
for electrical transmission lines. PNM brought this action to 
condemn a perpetual easement over five parcels of land owned by 
members of the Navajo Nation (Nation): (1) Allotment 1160, (2) 
Allotment 1204, (3) Allotment 1340, (4) Allotment 1392, 
and (5) Allotment 1877 (the Five Allotments). The Nation owns an 
undivided 13.6 % interest in Allotment 1160 and an undivided .14 
% interest in Allotment 1392 (the Two Allotments). In its Motion 
to Dismiss the Nation argued that the Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction and asked the Court to dismiss it as a defendant 
because, as a sovereign nation, it is immune from suit. In addition, 
the Nation asked the Court to dismiss the Two Allotments because 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, the Nation is an indispensable party that 
cannot be joined. The United States agreed that the Nation and the 
Two Allotments should be dismissed from the action. The Court 
dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against the Navajo 
Nation and against Allotment Numbers 1160 and 1392. 
 
2. Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A. 
 
No. 16-5, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13433 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 4, 
2016). Before the Court was non-party The Otoe-Missouria Tribe 
2017] Case Law on American Indians: 2015-2016 472 
 
 
of Indians’ (“the Tribe”) Motion to Quash the Subpoena of John 
Shotton and/or for Protective Order. Defendant BMO Harris Bank 
has served a subpoena on John Shotton, Chairman of the Tribe 
and Secretary/Treasurer of Great Plains Lending LLC (“Great 
Plains”), which is wholly-owned by and serves as an economic 
arm of the Tribe. BMO Harris subpoenaed Shotton to testify to the 
authenticity of loan documents produced in the underlying 
litigation. The Tribe asserted that the subpoena should be quashed 
because the Tribe and, by extension, Great Plains have sovereign 
immunity; thus, Shotton cannot be compelled to testify. BMO 
Harris argueed that Shotton waived the tribe’s immunity by 
signing, for use in the underlying litigation, declarations regarding 
the authenticity of the loan documents. The Court found that the 
Tribe had not waived sovereign immunity with respect to the loan 
agreements at issue in Shotton’s declaration. While the Court 
recognized that this ruling may hinder BMO Harris in the 
underlying litigation, the “well-established doctrine” of tribal 
sovereign immunity cannot be abridged, even if application of the 
doctrine “works some inconvenience, or even injustice.” Alltel 
Communications, LLC v. DeJordy, 675 F.3d 1100 (8th Cir. 2012) 
at 1106. Therefore, the Tribe’s Motion to Quash was granted. 
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. 
 
3. Lewis v. Clarke 
 
No. 19464, 2016 WL 878893 (Conn. Mar. 15, 2016). Motor 
vehicle driver and passenger brought action against Indian tribe 
member, claiming member’s negligence and carelessness in 
driving limousine, which was owned by tribal gaming authority, 
caused motor vehicle accident. The superior court, 2014 WL 
5354956, denied member’s motion to dismiss based on tribal 
sovereign immunity. Member appealed. The Supreme Court held 
that tribal sovereign immunity extended to claims. Reversed and 
remanded with direction. 
 
4. Butler v. Barona Band of Mission Indians of Cal. 
 
No. CV 16-00268 RSWL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61304 (C.D. 
Cal. May 9, 2016). Before the Court was Defendants Barona Band 
of Mission Indians of California, Barona Tribal Gaming Agency, 
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and Barona Resort & Casino’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion 
to Dismiss (“Motion”). The action arose out of Plaintiff Clarence 
Butler’s (“Plaintiff”) alleged injury that occurred in the Barona 
Resort and Casino. Defendant Barona Band of Mission Indians of 
California (“the Tribe”) is a federally recognized Indian tribe with 
jurisdiction over the Barona Indian Reservation. Defendant Barona 
Tribal Gaming Agency, a.k.a. the Baron Tribal Gaming 
Commission (“the Gaming Agency”) and the Barona Resort and 
Casino (“the Casino”) are business entities.  
At all relevant times, the Gaming Agency was the Tribe’s duly 
authorized agent and employee that operated and was responsible 
for the Tribe’s gaming, gambling, resort, and hotel operations. The 
Casino is the Tribe and the Gaming Agency’s employee in 
operating and maintaining the resort and Casino located on the 
Barona Indian Reservation. Pursuant to the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act of 1988, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1166 et seq.; 25 
U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (“the Act”), the Tribe entered into a compact 
with the State of California (“the Compact”) in October 1999 to 
allow it to operate gambling facilities within the State. In the 
Compact, the Tribe agreed to comply with certain standards 
relating to public health and safety at its facilities, to maintain 
certain public insurance for personal injury claims by patrons 
injured at the facilities, to adopt a tort liability ordinance setting 
forth the terms and conditions under which it would waive its 
sovereign immunity relating to such claims, and the procedures for 
processing those claims. Accordingly, on December 22, 2009, the 
Tribe adopted a tort claims ordinance (“Barona Tort Claims 
Ordinance”). The Barona Tort Claims Ordinance clearly states that 
it waives immunity from suit only in Tribal Court.   
On February 16, 2016, Plaintiff was standing in line at the 
Barona Casino to cash his gambling chips. Plaintiff was standing 
with his back towards the crowd, second in line before the cashier, 
when the stanchion holding the rope collapsed against Plaintiff’s 
right knee, injuring him. “Plaintiff suffered short term, long term 
and permanent physical injuries, pain, suffering, stress, anxiety, 
insomnia, as well as loss of income.” On February 26, 2014, 
Plaintiff filed his claim, notifying the Casino that he had suffered 
an injury. The Casino mailed Plaintiff, by Certified Receipt, and 
Plaintiff received through his counsel, a claim form and a copy of 
the 1999 Tort Claims Ordinance.   
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On May 4, 2015, the Tribe mailed a Notice of Rejection of Tort 
Claim with the forms for appeal. On May 26, 2015, Plaintiff 
appealed the Tribe’s rejection of his claim. Plaintiff alleges it has 
heard no response on its appeal. When subject matter jurisdiction 
was challenged under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 
12(b)(1), the plaintiff had the burden of proving jurisdiction in 
order to survive the motion. Plaintiff has proffered no factual 
support to warrant this Court’s jurisdiction. This Court found that 
Plaintiff had failed to meet its burden to sufficiently allege this 
Court’s jurisdiction, and accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss is granted without leave to amend. 
 
5. McVay v. Allied World Assur. Co. 
 
No. 14-15975, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9299 (9th Cir. May 11, 
2016). Becky McVay appealed from the district court’s judgment 
dismissing claims for breach of contract and breach of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing. McVay’s action arose from a slip and 
fall in a gas station convenience store owned and operated by the 
Fallon Tribal Development Corporation, which is owned by the 
Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe (collectively, “the Tribe”). McVay 
sued the Tribe in an action that proceeded in tribal court until the 
claims against the Tribe were dismissed on the basis of tribal 
sovereign immunity. In the present separate lawsuit filed in federal 
court, McVay asserted claims against the Tribe’s insurer, Allied 
World Assurance Company (U.S.), Inc., and the company that 
administered the insurance policy, York Risk Services Group, Inc. 
(collectively, “Defendants”).   
Under Nevada law, an individual who has no contractual 
relationship with an insurance company lacks standing to sue the 
insurance company for breach without evidence that the individual 
“substantially relied on the insurance company’s representations 
or . . . was a specific intended beneficiary of the insurance policy.” 
Gunny v. Allstate Ins., 108 Nev. 344, 830 P.2d 1335, 1335-36 
(Nev. 1992) (per curiam).   
McVay did not allege that she has a contractual relationship 
with Defendants or that she relied on any representations made by 
Defendants. She did argue, however, that she has standing to sue 
Defendants as an intended beneficiary of the Tribe’s insurance 
policy with Defendants. This argument seems to be based on the 
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language of the Tribe’s policy, defining “insured” as “any 
person . . . to whom the Named Insured is obligated by virtue of a 
written contract or oral agreement to provide insurance such as is 
afforded by this policy.” McVay argued that there are two 
documents that reflect the Tribe’s agreement to provide coverage 
to her: (1) the Indian Self-Determination and Education Act, 25 
U.S.C. § 450f(c) (“ISDEA”) and (2) the Tribe’s Corporate Charter. 
To the extent McVay’s theory was that the ISDEA should prevent 
the Tribe from asserting a sovereign immunity defense against her 
tort claim, that argument would have had to have been made in the 
proceeding in which the Tribe actually asserted sovereign 
immunity.   
Similarly, the existence of sovereign immunity does not 
transform the general rule that an insured person may not sue an 
insurer for a declaration of coverage until succeeding in litigation 
against the insured person. Because McVay was neither a party to 
nor a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract between the 
Tribe and Allied, the district court was correct to hold that she may 
not proceed directly against Defendants for breach of contract or 
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The district court 
was also correct to deny leave to amend, because it was clear that 
McVay cannot cure the defects in her complaint. Affirmed. 
 
6. Johnson v. Wind Creek Casino, Hotel 
 
No. 16-0052, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77804 (S.D. Ala. Jun. 15, 
2016). This matter was before the Court on the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss. The defendant had presented the affidavit of the Tribal 
Chair of the Poarch Band of Creek Indians (“the Tribe”), which 
established that the defendant, Wind Creek Casino, Hotel, was 
owned by the Tribe and operated by the Poarch Band of Creek 
Indians Gaming Authority (“the Authority”). The defendant argued 
that the plaintiff’s lawsuit is thus barred by the doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity.  
Because the plaintiff has the burden of establishing subject 
matter jurisdiction, she must show that the defendant has waived 
its immunity. The plaintiff had not done so; indeed, she did not 
even allege a waiver.   
Instead, the plaintiff invoked Ex parte Young. That doctrine 
provides “an exception to sovereign immunity in lawsuits against 
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state officials for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief to 
stop ongoing violations of federal law,” and the Eleventh Circuit 
has “extended the Ex parte Young doctrine to tribal officials.” PCI 
Gaming Authority, 801 F.3d at 1288. But the plaintiff had not sued 
any tribal officials or any individuals of any description. Nor had 
she sought prospective equitable relief; all her complaint 
demanded is $3 million in damages. The doctrine therefore cannot 
save her lawsuit.   
“Tribal sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional issue.” Furry, 
685 F.3d at 1228; accord Taylor v. Alabama Intertribal Council 
Title IV J.T.P.A., 261 F.3d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir. 2001). Because 
the defendant was covered by such immunity, which had been 
neither abrogated nor waived, the Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to entertain this action. The motion to dismiss was 
granted. 
 
7. MMMG v. Seminole Tribe of Fla. 
 
No. 4D15-235, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 9263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. June 15, 2016). Mobile Mike, a South Florida radio 
personality, owns Mobile Mike Promotions, Inc. (the “Production 
Company”). In 2011, the Production Company and the Seminole 
Tribe of Florida, Inc. (“STOFI”), a corporate entity of the 
Seminole Tribe (the “Tribe”), entered into an advertising joint 
venture called MMMG, LLC (the “Joint Venture”). STOFI later 
broke the Joint Venture agreement. The Production Company and 
the Joint Venture together filed a ten-count complaint against 
STOFI and other tribal members individually (collectively the 
“Defendants”). STOFI moved to dismiss, asserting the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction due to STOFI’s sovereign immunity. After a 
five-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that STOFI was 
protected by sovereign immunity, which it had not waived 
pursuant to STOFI’s charter and bylaws, and dismissed STOFI as a 
party. MMMG, LLC and Mobile Mike Promotions, Inc. appealed 
the involuntary dismissal of their complaint against a federal tribal 
corporation affiliated with the Seminole Tribe. We affirm the 
dismissal because the tribal corporation enjoyed sovereign 
immunity from suit, which was not effectively waived according to 
the procedure required in the corporation’s charter and bylaws. The 
order was affirmed. 




8. Hamaatsa, Inc. v. Pueblo of San Felipe 
  
No. S-1-SC-34287, 2016 N.M. LEXIS 148 (N.M. Jun. 16, 
2016). The Pueblo of San Felipe (Pueblo) appealed from an 
opinion of the New Mexico Court of Appeals declining to extend 
the Pueblo, an Indian tribe, immunity from suit. Hamaatsa, Inc. 
(Hamaatsa) is a non-profit New Mexico corporation that owns land 
in Sandoval County. Adjacent to Hamaatsa’s property is land 
owned in fee by the Pueblo, a federally recognized Indian tribe. 
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) conveyed to the Pueblo, 
in fee simple, the land at issue on December 13, 2001. The 
property, albeit adjacent and contiguous with reservation land, is 
not yet held in trust by the federal government as part of the 
Pueblo’s reservation. 
The United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA), awaits resolution of the instant dispute prior to 
taking the fee-simple parcel into trust. In its 2001 conveyance to 
the Pueblo, “the BLM reserved ‘an easement and right-of-way 
over, across, and upon a strip of land 40 feet wide along the 
existing road . . . identified in NMNM 95818, for the full use as a 
road by the United States for public purposes.’” Throughout this 
opinion we refer to the NMNM 95818 easement as “Northern R.S. 
2477.” 
On September 19, 2002, the BLM purported to quitclaim its 
interest in the Northern R.S. 2477 to the Pueblo. Access to 
Northern R.S. 2477 forms the basis of Hamaatsa’s December 30, 
2010, complaint against the Pueblo. Hamaatsa uses Northern R.S. 
2477 on the Pueblo’s property to access its land. In August 2009 
Hamaatsa received a letter from the then Governor of the Pueblo 
stating that Hamaatsa had no legal right of access across the 
Pueblo’s property and that Hamaatsa’s use of Northern R.S. 2477 
was a trespass. Hamaatsa continued to use the road and filed suit 
requesting that the district court declare that the Pueblo cannot so 
restrict Hamaatsa’s use of the road.   
After a hearing on the motion to dismiss the district court 
denied the Pueblo’s motion, reasoning that the action was an in 
rem proceeding not seeking damages, to which sovereign 
immunity was no bar. The district court granted the Pueblo leave to 
seek an interlocutory appeal which was then granted by the Court 
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of Appeals on July 5, 2011. The district court stayed all 
proceedings pending resolution of the appeal. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of the Pueblo’s motion 
to dismiss. Holdings:(1) Because it was settled federal law that 
sovereign Indian tribes enjoyed immunity from suit in state and 
federal court, absent waiver of abrogation by Congress, the 
appellate court erred by affirming the denial of the Indian tribe’s 
motion to dismiss a neighboring property owner’s action 
requesting that the trial court declare that the Indian tribe could not 
restrict the property owner’s use of a road on the Indian tribe’s 
property. The court declined to deny the Indian tribe’s right to 
sovereign immunity on equitable grounds. (2) The court held that 
the Indian tribe properly raised its tribal sovereign immunity by a 
N.M. R. Ann. 1-012(B) motion to dismiss. Judgment vacated and 
case remanded to the trial court for dismissal for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
 
9. Seminole Tribe of Fla. V. Schinneller 
 
No. 4D15-1704, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 11411 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. Jul. 27, 2016). The Seminole Tribe of Florida appeals an 
order denying its motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. 
It argues the trial court erred in failing to grant its motion to 
dismiss as a matter of law. The plaintiff filed a complaint against 
the tribe for personal injuries resulting from a slip and fall in a 
restroom at the Seminole Hard Rock Hotel and Casino. In her 
amended complaint, the plaintiff admitted the tribe is not subject to 
the civil jurisdiction of state courts unless its sovereign immunity 
is waived. The plaintiff admitted the only way the tribe can waive 
sovereign immunity is by a duly enacted resolution of the Tribal 
Council in legal session. But, she maintained the tribe did so when 
it adopted, and the National Indian Gaming Commission approved, 
Resolution No. C-195-06 on July 10, 2006. The resolution did not 
include a waiver of sovereign immunity. The appellate court found 
that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law 
when it denied the tribe’s motion to dismiss a personal injury 
action on the basis of trial sovereign immunity, as a waiver of such 
immunity had to be unequivocally expressed and the tribe had 
established that no resolution, ordinance, or compact including a 
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waiver of immunity was enforceable in 2009 when plaintiff’s 
claim arose. Petition for certiorari granted. 
 
10. Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians 
 
No. A142560, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Jul. 29, 2016). Plaintiff filed a petition to compel mediation and 
arbitration against the Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians, 
seeking to enforce the mediation and arbitration clauses in a 
construction agreement and an on-site rental contract. The trial 
court granted the Tribe’s motion to quash service of summons and 
dismissed the case. The trial court concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims because there had been no valid 
waiver of the Tribe’s sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeal 
reversed the order and remanded the case for further proceedings.  
The court concluded that the Tribal Council was authorized to, 
and did, waive the Tribe’s sovereign immunity for purposes of 
arbitrating disputes arising under the Tribe’s contracts with 
plaintiff. The court deferred to the interpretation of the Tribe’s 
Constitution adopted by its General Council and Tribal Council, 
and not to the Tribe’s current position in its briefing, which was 
not an “interpretation” as contemplated by these authorities but a 
position undertaken in litigation. The General Council validly 
delegated its authority to waive tribal sovereign immunity to the 
Tribal Council when it adopted two resolutions. The waiver of the 
Tribe’s sovereign immunity extended to judicial enforcement of 
the right to arbitrate and of any arbitration award. The trial court’s 
order granting the Tribe’s motion to quash service of summons and 
dismissing the case was reversed, and the case was remanded for 
further proceedings.  
 
11. Navajo Nation v. Dalley 
 
No.15-cv-00799, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103319 (D.N.M 
Aug. 3, 2016). This case was before the Court following a routine 
slip-and-fall lawsuit argued before the Honorable Bradford J. 
Dalley in New Mexico District Court. Although the causes of 
action in this lawsuit are relatively mundane, the jurisdictional 
issues presented to this Court are not. In the tribal-state gaming 
compact between the Navajo Nation and the State of New Mexico 
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(“Tribal-State Compact”), the Navajo Nation and the State of New 
Mexico agreed that tort actions related to Indian gaming that arose 
on Navajo tribal land could be adjudicated in New Mexico district 
court. In this declaratory judgment action, Plaintiffs had asked this 
Court to state that the Navajo Nation lacked sufficient authority to 
grant New Mexico district court’s jurisdiction over personal injury 
actions arising in gaming facilities in Indian country when signing 
the Tribal-State Compact.   
The Honorable Bradford J. Dalley, the New Mexico District 
Court Judge whom presides over the slip-and-fall action at issue, in 
combination with the plaintiffs in that action, Harold and Michelle 
McNeal, are the Defendants in this case. They assert, with the 
assistance of the New Mexico Attorney General, that the Navajo 
Nation did have sufficient authority to grant the State of New 
Mexico jurisdiction over the slip-and-fall at issue here because the 
Navajo Nation has both the inherent authority as a sovereign nation 
to grant New Mexico jurisdiction and because Congress has 
granted the Navajo Nation authority under the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) to negotiate the Tribal-State Compact.   
The court found that Navajo Nation has inherent authority to 
waive its sovereign immunity and waived its sovereign immunity 
to the state-court action at issue here when it ratified the Tribal-
State Compact. The Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act does not 
prohibit this waiver. Instead, subsequent legislation and the 
ratification of the Tribal-State Compact itself abrogated the Navajo 
Nation’s sovereign immunity. As a result, the Plaintiffs cannot rely 
on the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act to invalidate Section 8 of 
the Tribal-State Compact. The IGRA also does not prohibit the 
Navajo Nation’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Instead, the IGRA 
embodies contract-law principles that encourage the Tribes and 
states to determine for themselves the appropriate allocation of 
jurisdiction under IGRA. As a result, the Plaintiffs cannot rely on 
IGRA to invalidate Section 8 of the Tribal-State Compact. The 
Court reiterates that the Navajo Nation’s waiver of sovereign 
immunity is based fundamentally on the Tribe’s consent to be sued 
in New Mexico courts under Section 8 of the Tribal-State 
Compact. it is therefore ordered that Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied. 
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12. Enable Okla. Intrastate Transmission v. A 25Foot Wide 
Easement 
 
No. CIV-15-1250-M, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109854 (W.D. 
Okla. Aug. 18, 2016). This was a condemnation action to condemn 
a twenty-five (25) foot wide natural gas pipeline easement through 
an approximate 137-acre tract of land in Caddo County, 
Oklahoma, which had originally been an Indian allotment, held in 
trust by the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (“BIA”). Thirty-eight (38) Indians and the Kiowa Indian 
Tribe of Oklahoma (“Kiowa Tribe”) own undivided interests in the 
tract. The Kiowa Tribe obtained its approximately 1.1% undivided 
interest sometime after 2008, on the death of certain Indian owners 
and by operation of the American Indian Probate Reform Act. The 
original right of way expired in November 2000. On or about June 
14, 2002, plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest, Enogex, Inc. 
(“Enogex”), submitted to the BIA an application for a new 20-year 
term regarding the existing natural gas pipeline right-of-way which 
was approved.   
On March 23, 2010, the BIA vacated the acting 
superintendent’s approval and remanded the case for further 
negotiation and instructed that if approval of a right-of-way was 
not timely secured that Enogex should be directed to move the 
pipeline. Enogex brought this action. Defendant United States 
contends that the tract at issue is tribal land and, as a result, the 
Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to condemn the easement. 
Additionally, all defendants contend that the Kiowa Tribe is a 
required party to this action, that the Kiowa Tribe cannot be joined 
in this action because it has sovereign immunity from suit, and 
under the factors set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), 
equity and good conscience mandate that this action be dismissed. 
Congressional legislation and Department of Interior regulations 
treat tribal land and allotted land differently.   
The Court found that the Kiowa Tribe is a required party. 
Specifically, the Court found that because the Kiowa Tribe owns a 
1.1% undivided interest in the tract at issue, Rule 71.1(c)(3) 
requires that the Kiowa Tribe be joined as a defendant in this case. 
While the Kiowa Tribe was a required party, the Court finds that 
the Kiowa Tribe cannot be joined as a party in this action. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Kiowa Tribe was a required 
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party under Rule 19(a) and Rule 71.1, that in light of its sovereign 
immunity, the Kiowa Tribe cannot be joined; and that under Rule 
19(b), the Court, in equity and good conscience, must dismiss this 
action. For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants the 
Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and defendant United 
States’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to 
Join a Necessary Party and dismisses this action.  
 
K. Sovereignty, Tribal Inherent 
 
1. C’Hair v. District Court of Ninth Judicial District 
 
No. S–14–0198, 2015 WL 5037011 (Wyo. Aug. 26, 2015). 
Motorist brought negligent operation and negligent entrustment 
action against driver and owner of automobile, who were enrolled 
members of Indian tribe, after driver struck motorist on state 
highway within reservation. Motorist brought similar action in the 
Shoshone and Arapaho Tribal Court after driver and owner 
challenged jurisdiction of state court in their answers. The parties 
agreed to stay the state court action, and the Tribal Court dismissed 
motorist’s complaint on statute of limitations grounds. The District 
Court denied driver and owner’s motion for summary judgment. 
Driver and owner filed petition for writ of review, which was 
granted. The Supreme Court, en banc, held that: (1) the District 
Court had subject matter jurisdiction over matter, and (2) two-year 
limitations period from tribal law and order code did not apply. 
 
2. Arrow Midstream Holdings, LLC v. 3 Bears Constr., LLC 
 
No. 20150057, 2015 ND 302 (N.D. Dec. 29, 2015). Arrow 
Midstream Holdings, LLC and Arrow Pipeline, LLC (collectively 
Arrow) appealed, and Tesla Enterprises, LLC (Tesla) cross-
appealed, from a judgment dismissing without prejudice for lack of 
jurisdiction its action against 3 Bears Construction, LLC (3 Bears) 
and Tesla for breach of contract and a declaration that Tesla’s 
pipeline construction lien is invalid. In 2013, Arrow, a Delaware 
limited liability company, hired 3 Bears, a North Dakota limited 
liability company, to be the general contractor for the construction 
of a pipeline located on a right-of-way easement acquired by 
Arrow from the Bureau of Indian Affairs over Indian trust land on 
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the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. The easement was “for the 
purpose of installing oil, gas and water lines” and described the 
right-of-way as “11,882.77 feet in length and 13.520 acres in area 
(34.206 acres during construction), more or less, . . . and shall be 
buried a sufficient depth below the surface of the land so as not to 
interfere with cultivation.”  
3 Bears, which has its principal place of business in New 
Town, entered into a subcontract with Tesla, an Alaska limited 
liability company, to supply materials and labor for the 
construction. 3 Bears is owned by two members of the Three 
Affiliated Tribes (Tribe) and is certified under the Tribal 
Employment Rights Ordinance (TERO). 3 Bears claimed Arrow 
was a covered employer who was required to comply with TERO 
rules. After the pipeline was completed, a dispute arose between 3 
Bears and Tesla concerning amounts Tesla claimed it was owed by 
3 Bears for work Tesla performed. In mid-2014, Tesla sent Arrow 
a notice of right to file a pipeline lien under N.D.C.C. ch. 35 24. 
Tesla recorded the pipeline lien against Arrow in the Dunn County 
recorder’s office in June 2014.   
In July 2014, Arrow commenced this action in state district 
court challenging the validity of the pipeline lien, seeking 
indemnification, and claiming 3 Bears breached the parties’ 
contract. In August 2014, 3 Bears moved to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. In November 2014, 3 Bears filed a 
complaint against Tesla and Arrow in Fort Berthold Tribal Court. 3 
Bears sought a declaration that the pipeline lien was invalid, 
alleged Arrow had breached the master service contract, and 
requested an award of damages.   
In December 2014, the state district court agreed with 3 Bears’ 
argument that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. 
The court concluded “exercising jurisdiction over this action under 
the circumstances presented here would infringe upon Tribal 
sovereignty.” The court further concluded, “at the very least, 
Arrow and Tesla, as a matter of comity, should be required to 
exhaust their tribal court remedies before this Court exercises 
jurisdiction.” The court dismissed the action “without prejudice to 
allow any of the parties to re-open the case without payment of 
another filing fee should it become necessary for purposes of 
enforcing the Tribal Court action or for any other reason.”   
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The appellate court held that appellate jurisdiction existed 
where a dismissal order and judgment effectively foreclosed 
litigation of a pipeline lien’s validity and breach of contract; the 
first Montana exception did not apply where the general contractor 
was an LLC formed under state law, not a member of the tribe, and 
thus, there was no consensual relationship between nonmembers 
and the tribe or its members; the district court erred in ruling that 
the tribal court had jurisdiction under the second Montana 
exception where the right-of-way pipeline easement was the 
equivalent of non-Indian fee land, the Tribe had not intervened in 
the action, and the case involved the validity of a pipeline 
construction lien filed under state law resulting from a contractual 
payment dispute between non-tribal members; state court 
jurisdiction was not foreclosed by incompatible federal law. 
Judgment reversed; case remanded. 
 
3. Kelsey v. Pope 
 
No. 14-1537, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 28 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2016). 
Member of the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians petitioned for 
writ of habeas corpus after he had been convicted in tribal court of 
misdemeanor sexual assault for inappropriately touching tribal 
employee at Band’s community center, 2008 WL 6928233, and his 
sentence was affirmed on appeal. The District Court, 2014 WL 
1338170, granted the petition. Tribe appealed. The appellate court 
held that: (1) tribe had inherent authority to prosecute tribal 
member for offense substantially affecting tribal self-governance 
interests, even when such offenses took place outside of Indian 
country; (2) Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) extended due process 
protections to member; (3) federal constitutional standards applied; 
and (4) decision of tribal Court of Appeals to recognize jurisdiction 
over conduct of member of Indian tribe in touching victim’s 
breasts through her clothing at tribe’s off-reservation community 
center did not violate due process as extended through ICRA. 
Reversed and vacated. 
4. Wilson v. Doe 
 
No. C15-629, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41543 (W.D. Wash. 
Mar. 29, 2016). Before the court were Defendant Horton’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
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Judgment. Plaintiff Curtiss Wilson was stopped by a Lummi Tribe 
police officer while driving on the Lummi Reservation after 
drinking at the Lummi Casino. Lummi Tribal Police Officer Grant 
Austick stopped Plaintiff, searched his 1999 Dodge Ram Pickup, 
and developed probable cause that Plaintiff was committing a DUI. 
Officer Austick then called the Washington State Patrol and 
Plaintiff was arrested. Plaintiff’s truck was towed by Defendant 
Horton’s Towing and impounded at the direction of the 
Washington State Trooper.   
The following day, Lummi Tribal Police Officer Brandon 
Gates presented a “Notice of Seizure and Intent to Institute 
Forfeiture” (“Notice of Seizure”) from the Lummi Tribal Court to 
Horton’s Towing. The seizure and intent to institute forfeiture of 
Plaintiff’s vehicle was based on violations of the Lummi Nation 
Code of Laws (“LNCL”) 5.09A.110(d)(2) (Possession of 
Marijuana over 1 ounce), and authorized by LNCL 
5.09B.040(5)(A) (Civil forfeiture section addressing Property 
Subject to Forfeiture, specifically motor vehicles used, or intended 
for use, to facilitate the possession of illegal substances.) Horton’s 
Towing released the truck to the Lummi Tribe.   
Plaintiff brought suit in Whatcom County Superior Court and 
the case was removed. Plaintiff originally brought claims for 
outrage, conversion, and relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. 
All of Plaintiff’s claims, save conversion, have been previously 
dismissed either voluntarily or by Court order. Plaintiff’s 
conversion claim against both Horton’s and the United States is 
based on Horton’s release of the vehicle to the Lummi Tribe 
pursuant to the order served by Gates. Defendant Horton’s moved 
for summary judgment, claiming the release of the vehicle was 
pursuant to the Notice of Seizure, and therefore with lawful 
justification. Plaintiff argued in response that the Notice of Seizure 
is invalid or not enforceable off the reservation.  The United 
States moved for summary judgment based on, inter alia, 
Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff’s 
cursory Motion for Summary Judgment and attached declaration 
does nothing to rebut the appropriateness of summary judgment in 
Defendants’ favor. Rather, Plaintiff repeats the circumstances of 
his DUI and loss of his truck. The Court appreciates that the 
temporary loss of his vehicle caused Mr. Wilson—who has a 
limited, fixed income—great inconvenience, even distress. 
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However, this does not establish a genuine dispute of material fact 
in his case: rather, the facts are essentially undisputed. Not only 
has Plaintiff not established that his truck was seized without legal 
justification; he has not established that this Court has the 
jurisdiction to hear his case. Defendants’ Motions for Summary 
Judgment are granted and Plaintiff’s Motion is denied. 
 
5. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. DEA 
 
No. 15-CV-1378, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67259 (E.D. Wis. 
May 23, 2016). The Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin filed 
this declaratory action against the United States Department of 
Justice and its Drug Enforcement Administration (hereinafter “the 
Government”) after federal agents raided reservation lands 
and seized a crop of hemp grown pursuant to a 2015 tribal 
ordinance legalizing the cultivation of hemp. The Tribe sought a 
judgment declaring that its cultivation of industrial hemp for 
agricultural or academic research purposes in connection with the 
College of Menominee Nation is lawful under a 2014 federal law, 
7 U.S.C. § 5940, which created an exemption to the Controlled 
Substances Act for the cultivation of hemp in certain 
circumstances.   
Before the Court are the Government’s motion to dismiss and 
the Tribe’s motion for summary judgment. In May 2015, the 
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, a federally-recognized 
Indian tribe, passed a tribal ordinance legalizing the cultivation of 
industrial hemp on the Menominee Reservation by licensees of the 
Tribe. Hemp has known uses in textiles, foods, papers, body 
care products, detergents, plastics and building materials. On 
October 23, 2015, federal agents entered the Menominee 
Reservation, and seized and destroyed the Tribe’s industrial hemp 
crop. The complaint states that the raid was conducted despite no 
known THC test exceeding 0.3 percent.   
On November 18, 2015, the Tribe filed this action for 
declaratory relief. The Tribe sought a declaration from this Court 
that its cultivation of industrial hemp for agricultural or academic 
research purposes in conjunction with the College of Menominee 
Nation is lawful under 7 U.S.C. § 5940. Specifically, the complaint 
includes three “claims” for declaratory relief corresponding to the 
statutory requirements for the exception: (1) that in passing a tribal 
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law legalizing the cultivation of industrial hemp on the Menominee 
Reservation, the Tribe acted as a ”State,” as required under § 5940; 
or alternatively (2) that the cannabis laws of the State of Wisconsin 
have no application to industrial hemp cultivation by the Tribe 
within the exterior boundaries of the Menominee Reservation, and 
that the cultivation of industrial hemp on the Menominee 
Reservation is therefore “allowed” under the laws of the State of 
Wisconsin, as required under § 5940; and (3) that the College of 
Menominee Nation is an “institution of higher education” under 
§ 5940. The Government responded to the complaint by filing a 
motion to dismiss on numerous grounds. The Tribe responded with 
a motion for summary judgment. The court granted the 
Government’s motion to dismiss, and the Tribe’s motion for 
summary judgment was denied. 
 
6. Pearson v. Dir. of the Dep’t of Licensing 
 
No. C15-0731, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80133 (W.D. Wash. 
Jun. 20, 2016). This matter was before the Court on the motions 
for summary judgment by Defendants Director of the Department 
of Licensing and Sergeant Andrew Thorne. On January 21, 2015, 
Swinomish Police Department Officer Hans Kleinman pulled over 
Plaintiff Susan Pearson for failing to obey a stop sign. Both the 
traffic violation and the traffic stop occurred on tribal trust land 
within the external boundaries of the Swinomish Reservation. 
Officer Kleinman ran Pearson’s name through a driver’s check and 
learned that her license was suspended three days earlier for unpaid 
tickets. Officer Kleinman arrested Pearson. During the search 
incident to arrest, Officer Kleinman found evidence of controlled 
substances on Pearson’s person. The tribal police officers 
subsequently seized Pearson’s 1999 GMC S-10 pickup truck.   
Two days after Pearson’s arrest, Defendant Andrew Thorne, a 
sergeant with the Swinomish Police Department, received a call 
from Pearson asking where she should pick up her vehicle. Sgt. 
Thorne responded that Pearson could not retrieve her vehicle 
because the Swinomish Police Department was procuring a search 
warrant. Pearson then asked when her vehicle would be returned. 
Sgt. Thorne responded that the Tribe intended to initiate forfeiture 
proceedings because the vehicle was used to transport illegal 
narcotics on tribal land. Sgt. Thorne advised that Pearson would be 
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receiving a seizure notice from the Swinomish Tribal Court with a 
hearing date and that Pearson could retain an attorney if she 
wished. Upon obtaining a warrant, the Swinomish Police 
Department searched Pearson’s vehicle and discovered evidence of 
controlled substances. Pearson was given notice of the proceeding 
to forfeit her vehicle pursuant to tribal law. No attorney entered an 
appearance on her behalf, and Pearson did not file an answer.  
After 20 days, the Swinomish Tribal Court entered an order 
forfeiting Pearson’s ownership pursuant to Swinomish tribal laws. 
Meanwhile, Pearson requested that the Washington State 
Department of Licensing (Department) place a hold on her 
certificate of title. Based on this request, the Department flagged 
Pearson’s certificate of title, indicating to the Department that 
ownership of the vehicle could not be transferred without a request 
by Pearson or a Washington State court order. The Department has 
no records indicating that the Swinomish Tribe has attempted to 
transfer title to Pearson’s vehicle. As of the time of filing of these 
motions, Pearson’s truck was still in the custody of the Swinomish 
Police Department.  Pearson filed a complaint for damages and 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Director of the 
Department in her official capacity and against several Swinomish 
tribal police officers, including Sgt. Thorne. Pearson asked this 
Court to enjoin the Department from transferring the certificate of 
ownership to itself pursuant to the Swinomish Tribe’s forfeiture 
order, and to award judgment against the tribal police officers for 
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted Defendants’ 
motions for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice 
Pearson’s claims against the Director of the Department of 
Licensing and Sergeant Andrew Thorne. 
 
7. United States v. Bearcomesout 
 
No. CR 16-13, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96117 (D. Mont. 
Jul. 22, 2016). Before the Court was Defendant Tawnya 
Bearcomesout’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment based on 
Double Jeopardy. Bearcomesout argued that the Northern 
Cheyenne Tribe and the United States are no longer separate 
sovereigns, so her prosecution in the Northern Cheyenne Tribal 
Court and her prosecution in this Court are derived from the same 
source, in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy 
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Clause. The government argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
does not apply.   
Bearcomesout was charged by Indictment with voluntary 
manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1153(a) and 1112(a). Prior to the federal Indictment, the 
Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court charged and sentenced 
Bearcomesout with crimes arising out of the same events. 
Bearcomesout accepted an Alford plea in tribal court. She was 
sentenced to one year of incarceration with the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs Law Enforcement Services and a $5,000 fine for the charge 
of homicide as well as an additional one-year sentence and $2,000 
fine for the charge of assault, with both periods of incarceration to 
run consecutively. Citing decades of “schizophrenic” case law, 
Bearcomesout argued that the law has evolved such that the 
Northern Cheyenne Tribe’s concept of self-governance and 
sovereignty has disappeared.  As a result, Bearcomesout argued 
that the Tribe was “subject to the external whim of the United 
States” which inherently extinguishes the tribe’s sovereignty. 
Because the Tribe is not sovereign, Bearcomesout argued that her 
prosecution in Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court was in essence a 
federal prosecution, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Bearcomesout provided the Court with only conclusory allegations 
and no specific [11] evidence that the Tribe had “little or no 
independent volition” in the Bearcomesout’s tribal prosecution. 
Zone, 403 F.3d at 1105. Accordingly, she does not meet the 
standard for an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Koon, 34 
F.3d 1416, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994). (To qualify for an evidentiary 
hearing, a defendant must, at the very least, “make more than 
`conclusory allegations’ of collusion.”) Bearcomesout’s Motion to 
Dismiss is denied. 
 
8. Acres v. Blue Lake Rancheria Tribal Court 
 
No. 16-cv-02622, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105786 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 10, 2016). Plaintiff James Acres sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief against defendants Blue Lake Casino & Hotel 
(“BLC&H”), the Blue Lake Rancheria tribal court, tribal judge 
Lester Marston, and Anita Huff (“Clerk Huff”), asserted that the 
tribal court lacked jurisdiction over him in an underlying 
contractual dispute and that the individual court employees 
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exceeded their authority during the pendency of the tribal action. 
Defendants moved to dismiss to require Acres to exhaust his tribal 
remedies. Acres is an employee and president of Acres Bonusing, 
Inc. (“ABI”), a California distributor for Talo, Inc. BLC&H sued 
Acres and ABI in Tribal Court on January 12, 2016. That case 
concerns an agreement into which ABI and Acres entered with 
BLC&H for the purpose of providing BLC&H with the iSlot 
Platform, a casino gaming platform developed by Talo, Inc. (the 
“iSlot Agreement”). BLC&H’s complaint asserts claims for breach 
of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, unjust enrichment, and fraudulent inducement.   
On January 17, 2016, Acres was served with the summons and 
complaint in the tribal action. On February 16, 2016 Judge 
Marston issued an order rejecting special appearances and listing 
the ways in which the filings did not conform to the tribal court’s 
rules. The order provided Acres with 30 days to file an answer or 
responsive pleading. On March 9, 2016, Acres and ABI filed the 
instant action in federal court, alleging that it is “not possible for 
the Tribal Court to provide due process to non-members Acres” 
and that “because the tribal court answers to the Tribe’s Business 
Council, and the Business Council derives significant revenue for 
the Tribe from BLC&H, it is unreasonable to expect the Tribal 
Court to be an impartial arbiter in [this] dispute.”   
Acres also asserted that he never consented to tribal 
jurisdiction and that “[b]y the Tribe’s own rules, [he] is clearly not 
subject to the Tribe’s jurisdiction because he had never done 
business with the Tribal Court’s territorial jurisdiction as a natural 
person.” Acres’ complaint presents five claims for declaratory and 
injunctive relief including a declaration that the iSlot Agreement 
does not establish tribal jurisdiction over non-members of the tribe 
and a declaration that the tribal court cannot provide due process in 
cases involving tribal plaintiffs and non-tribal defendants. 




1. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg 
 
No. 14-14524, 2015 WL 5023891 (11th Cir., Aug. 26, 2015). 
Tribe filed suit against the State of Florida and the director of the 
491 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 5:308 
 
 
Florida Department of Revenue seeking injunctive relief against 
state Rental Tax and Utility Tax imposed on two non-Indian 
corporations with 25-year leases to provide food-court operations 
at two tribal casinos. The district court summary judgment was in 
favor of the Tribe and the State appealed. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed as to the Rental Tax, holding that 25 U.S.C. 465 bars the 
tax in light of Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 
(1973). The court also affirmed on an issue of first impression – 
the effect of BIA regulations providing that “activities under a 
lease conducted on leased premises” are not subject to state 
taxation. 25 CFR 162.017(c). While the court did not defer to the 
Secretary’s determination of federal preemption, it agreed that the 
Rental Tax is preempted by federal law under Bracker. However, 
the court rejected the district court’s determination that the 
incidence of the Utility Tax falls on the Tribe and ruled that the 
Tribe has not established that the Utility Tax is generally 
preempted as a matter of law. 
 
2. Automotive United Trades Organization v. State of 
Washington 
 
No. 89734-4, 2015 WL 5076289, __ Wash. 2d __ (Aug. 27, 
2015). Trade association of Washington gasoline and automotive 
service retailers brought action against the State alleging that fuel 
tax compacts entered into with various Indian tribes which provide 
for refunds of gas tax paid were unconstitutional. The Superior 
Court, Grays Harbor County, dismissed for non-joinder of parties. 
Trade association appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and held 
that while Indian tribes were necessary parties, they were not 
indispensable so as to warrant dismissal. 175 Wash. 2d 214, 
285 P.3d 52 (2012). On remand, the court dismissed on the merits 
and trade association appealed again. The Supreme Court, Justice 
Gonzales for a unanimous court, affirmed. Art. II, Sec. 40 of the 
Constitution expressly allows for refunds authorized by law for 
taxes paid on motor vehicle fuels. The then-applicable statutes 
(since repealed) authorized compacts that provide for refunds. 
 
3. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach 
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No. 14-4171, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16682 (D.S.D. Feb. 11, 
2016). Pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), the 
Tribe and the State have in place a Tribal-State gaming compact 
(Compact), which controls the Tribe’s gaming operations. The 
Compact contemplates neither explicitly nor impliedly the State’s 
authority to apply its alcohol regulatory laws to the Tribe’s 
“gaming facility,” nor does it contemplate a State’s authority to 
impose its use taxes on nonmember activity made at the Casino, 
nor does it contemplate the State’s requirement that the Tribe 
collect and remit the use taxes from nonmember activities or 
purchases. 
Irrespective of residential or tribal status, the Tribe offers its 
patrons “goods and services,” which include “bowling, shows and 
other live entertainment, lodging, food, beverages, package 
cigarettes, and other sundry items.” It is undisputed that the Tribe 
sold these various goods and services to nonmembers at the 
Casino. The Tribe has not remitted the relevant use taxes on 
nonmember sales to the State. The State has issued the Tribe three 
alcohol licenses, one for each of the three Casino encompassed 
businesses. These licenses are conditioned on the Tribe’s 
remittance of the State use tax pursuant to S.D.C.L. § 35-2-24. In 
2009 and 2010, the Tribe sought from the State a renewal of its 
three alcohol licenses. Based on S.D.C.L. § 35-2-24, both requests 
were denied by the State as the statute directs that licenses are not 
to be reissued until use taxes incurred by nonmembers have been 
remitted.   
The Tribe requested a hearing before the South Dakota Office 
of Hearing Examiners to review the State’s alcohol license denial. 
At the hearing, the Hearing Examiner concluded that all 
nonmember purchases at the Casino are subject to the use tax 
scheme, that the Tribe failed to remit the use taxes, and, therefore, 
the Tribe was not entitled to alcohol license renewal. Prior to the 
Hearing Examiner’s decision becoming final, the Tribe filed this 
action in federal court and simultaneously moved the Court for 
preliminary injunction enjoining state action pursuant to the 
Hearing Examiner’s decision. The Tribe and State made the 
motion for preliminary injunction moot by entering into a 
stipulation whereby the State recognized the three alcohol licenses’ 
continuing validity pending a decision on the merits in this case. 
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The Tribe did not appeal the Hearing Examiner’s decision to South 
Dakota state court.   
The Tribe alleged that the State lacks authority to impose its 
use tax scheme on reservation land against nonmember Casino 
patrons and that IGRA preempts the field of taxation thereby 
barring the State’s imposition. The Tribe argued that all activity 
engaged in under the Royal River Casino name is “gaming 
activity” untaxable by the State by virtue of IGRA. Outside of 
IGRA, the Tribe maintains that the use tax and remittance 
requirements are preempted by the Indian Commerce Clause of the 
Federal Constitution, federal common law, and infringe on 
inherent tribal sovereignty; that the State’s tax imposition is 
unlawfully discriminatory as applied to the Tribe; that, as a 
predicate to funds contained in an escrow account pursuant to a 
1994 Deposit Agreement between the Tribe and State being 
disbursed to the Tribe, the State is without power to impose its 
taxation scheme on the Tribe’s Casino; and that the alcohol 
licenses are conditioned on the S.D.C.L. § 35-2-24 tax remittance 
requirement is violative of 18 U.S.C. § 1161.  
Before the Court was the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe’s (the 
Tribe) motion for judgment on the pleadings. In its motion, the 
Tribe asked the Court to declare that the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (the IGRA) is broad enough in scope to cover sales 
of goods and services beyond that of just pure gameplay on a 
casino floor. In addition, the Tribe moved to dismiss the State’s 
counterclaim related to a 1994 deposit agreement (the “Deposit 
Agreement”) that the Tribe and State are parties to. The Deposit 
Agreement established an escrow account into which the Tribe was 
to pay a disputed tax amount pending the final resolution of a 
federal action pending in South Dakota District Court at the time. 
The Tribe’s motion is granted. 
 
4. Cypress v. United States 
 
No. 15-10132, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5390 (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 
2016). This appeal arose out of a dispute between sixteen members 
of the Miccosukee Tribe of Florida (the “Tribe members”) and the 
United States, the United States Department of the Interior, the 
United States Department of the Treasury, and the Secretaries of 
the Treasury and of the Interior (collectively, “the Government”). 
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The Tribe members sought declaratory relief to avoid paying 
federal income taxes on distributions, including gaming proceeds, 
paid out of the Tribe’s trust account. The district court dismissed 
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that 
the United States had not waived sovereign immunity for suits 
brought by individual Tribe members. The Tribe members now 
appeal the dismissal. The court agreed with the district court that 
the Government did not waive sovereign immunity. Accordingly, 
the court affirm the district court’s dismissal of this matter.  
 
5. White v. Schneiderman 
 
2016 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4429 (N.Y. App. Div. Jun. 10, 
2016). Plaintiffs commenced this declaratory judgment action, 
alleging that the enactment and enforcement of Tax Law § 471, 
which imposes requirements on plaintiffs to pre-pay the amount of 
the tax to be assessed on the sale of cigarettes to non-Indians and 
non-members of the Seneca Nation (collectively, non-Indians), 
violates Indian Law § 6 and certain treaties between the Seneca 
Nation and the United States of America, particularly the Treaty of 
1842 (7 US Stat 586).   
Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction enjoining 
enforcement of the Tax Law, and Supreme Court granted 
defendants’ cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) and 
dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs contend that we erred in 
determining in Matter of New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin. 
v Bramhall (235 A.D. 2d 75, 667 N.Y.S. 2d 141, appeal dismissed 
91 N.Y. 2d 849, 690 N.E. 2d 493, 667 N.Y.S. 2d 684) that the 
Treaty of 1842 and Indian Law § 6 bar the taxation of reservation 
land, but do not bar the imposition of, inter alia, “sales taxes on 
cigarettes . . . sold to non-Indians on the Seneca Nation’s 
reservations,” and request that we reconsider our determination. 
We adhere to our determination in Bramhall. It is well established 
that “the States have a valid interest in ensuring compliance with 
lawful taxes that might easily be evaded through purchases of tax-
exempt cigarettes on reservations . . .. States may impose on 
reservation retailers minimal burdens reasonably tailored to the 
collection of valid taxes from non-Indians” (Department of 
Taxation & Fin. of N.Y. v Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 
61, 73, 114 S. Ct. 2028, 129 L. Ed. 2d 52).  
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Although plaintiffs are obligated to pay the amount due as tax 
from non-Indians who have the tax liability, and from whom the 
amount is collected at the time of the sale, “this burden is not, 
strictly speaking, a tax at all” (Moe v Confederated Salish & 
Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483, 96 S. 
Ct. 1634, 48 L. Ed. 2d 96). Judgment modified. As modified, 
judgment affirmed. Declaratory judgment entered. It is adjudged 
and declared that Tax Law § 471 is not inconsistent with Indian 
Law § 6, the Treaty of 1842 (7 US Stat 586), or the Due Process or 
Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution, and as 
modified the judgment is affirmed without costs. 
 
6. Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Hildreth 
 
No. 15-13400, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12666 (11th Cir. Jul. 11, 
2016). The Poarch Band of Creek Indians (“Poarch Band”) sued 
James Hildreth, Tax Assessor of Escambia County, Alabama, for 
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the assessment of 
property taxes on lands owned by the Poarch Band in Escambia 
County, Alabama, and held in trust by the United States (“Trust 
Property”). The Poarch Band maintains the Trust Property is 
exempt from taxation pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934 (“IRA”). See 25 U.S.C. § 465.1. The district court granted 
injunctive relief barring the tax assessment efforts during the 
pendency of the case, and Hildreth appeals. Finding no abuse of 
discretion and no error of law, we affirm. 
 
7. New York v. Mt. Tobacco Co. 
 
No. 12-CV-6276, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95329 (E.D. N.Y. 
Jul. 21, 2016). Before the Court was defendant Mountain Tobacco 
Company’s (“King Mountain”) motion for partial summary 
judgment and plaintiff State of New York’s (the “State”) cross 
motion for summary judgment. King Mountain, a for-profit 
corporation formed and operating under the laws of the Yakama 
Indian Nation, manufactures and sells its own brand of cigarettes. 
King Mountain’s principal place of business is located on the 
Yakama Indian Nation Reservation. Delbert Wheeler, Sr., an 
enrolled member of the Yakama Nation, is the sole owner of King 
Mountain.  
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The State alleged that King Mountain has marketed, 
distributed, and sold its cigarettes in New York since at least June 
1, 2010. King Mountain denied that allegation, but alleged that it 
“sells its cigarettes to Indian Nations, and to companies owned by 
a member of an Indian Nation, that are situated on Indian Nations, 
some of which are located within the boundaries of the State of 
New York[,]” It is undisputed that King Mountain has not filed 
reports or registrations with the New York State Department of 
Taxation and Finance (“DTF”). King Mountain moved for 
summary judgment with respect to the State’s claims under the 
CCTA, PACT Act, and New York Tax Law (“NYTL”).   
King Mountain argued that the State’s CCTA claim must fail 
because, inter alia, it is exempt as an “Indian in Indian country.” 
King Mountain alleged that it is entitled to summary judgment on 
the PACT Act claim because its sale of cigarettes to Native 
Americans did not take place in “interstate commerce” as defined 
by the Act. King Mountain argued that the PACT Act’s definition 
of “State” does not encompass “Indian Country” and cites to the 
distinct definitions provided for each term. Although King 
Mountain conceded that it sold cigarettes to Valvo Candies on one 
occasion, it alleged that was an isolated sale that predated the 
effective date of the PACT Act. King Mountain alleged that the 
State’s third cause of action is barred by res judicata based on the 
prior Tax Proceeding. King Mountain argued that it is not liable 
under NYTL Sections 471 and 471-e because: (1) it did not 
possess unstamped cigarettes in New York State; and (2) Section 
471 does not impose liability on a lawful out-of-state cigarette 
manufacturer because it is not an “agent” or “consumer” as defined 
by the statute.   
With respect to the CCTA, the State argued that the “Indian in 
Indian Country” exemption is not applicable to King Mountain. 
Particularly, the State argues that the CCTA’s use of the term 
“Indian” refers to an individual member of a tribe, not an Indian-
owned business. Additionally, the State alleged that even if King 
Mountain is an “Indian in Indian Country,” the CCTA exemption 
still does not apply because that exemption was meant to protect 
tribal governments and tribal sovereignty. The State argued that 
King Mountain’s arguments regarding the PACT Act are founded 
in a misreading of the statute. The State alleged that the term 
“state” in the PACT Act does not exclude Indian reservations 
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because pursuant to federal common law, “Indian country is 
ordinarily considered a part of a state’s territory.”   
The State also argued that res judicata does not bar its claim 
because: (1) the underlying facts of the Tax Proceeding do not 
arise out of the same series of transactions as the underlying facts 
in this case; (2) the Tax Department and Attorney General are not 
in privity; and (3) King Mountain waived any res judicata defense 
by failing to assert it in its Answer.   
The Court granted in part and denied in part, King Mountain’s 
motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in 
part the State’s motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment 
is granted in favor of King Mountain on the State’s first claim 
under the CCTA. Summary judgment on the second claim under 
the PACT Act is denied regarding the 2010 sale to Valvo Candies 
and granted in favor of King Mountain as to the balance of the 
State’s PACT Act claim. With respect to the State’s third claim 
under NYTL Sections 471 and 471-e, summary judgment is 
granted in favor of King Mountain regarding King Mountain’s 
alleged possession of unstamped cigarettes in New York State and 
granted in favor of the State regarding King Mountain’s failure to 
sell its unstamped cigarettes to licensed stamping agents. Summary 
judgment is granted in favor of the State on its fourth claim 
pursuant to Section 480-b. With respect to the State’s fifth claim, 
summary judgment is granted in favor of the State regarding its 
claim that King Mountain failed to file certifications pursuant to 




8. Comenout v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd. 
 
No. 74842-4-I, 2016 Wash. App. LEXIS 1878 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Aug. 8, 2016). In State v. Comenout, our Supreme Court upheld 
the State’s exercise of nonconsensual criminal jurisdiction over 
tribal members selling unstamped cigarettes from an unlicensed 
store located on trust allotment property lying outside the borders 
of an Indian reservation. Edward Comenout challenged that 
decision in this administrative forfeiture action appeal arising out 
of the same seized cigarettes at issue in Comenout. He claimed 
Comenout is not binding because the case was remanded and 
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ultimately dismissed. But the court was bound by that decision 
unless and until the Washington Supreme Court or the United 
States Supreme Court rules otherwise. Neither court has done so. 
And under Comenout, it was clear the State court had personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction in this administrative forfeiture action 
and that Comenout was not exempt from the State’s cigarette tax 
as an “Indian retailer.” Because Comenout failed to establish any 
error of law or arbitrary and capricious action under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) standards, we affirm. 
 
M. Trust Breach and Claims 
 
1. Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation 
v. Jewell 
 
No. 13-00601, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124483 (D.D.C. Sept. 
17, 2015). Pending before the Court was Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss, which sought dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) based on lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. This lawsuit was filed by four 
federally-recognized American Indian tribes seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior and the 
Secretary of the Treasury (“Defendants”) for their alleged breaches 
of fiduciary duties relating to tribal trust accounts. Plaintiffs 
amended their Complaint to add additional American Indian tribes, 
bringing the total number of Plaintiff-tribes to ten. Defendants 
moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ Complaint based on lack of 
jurisdiction. Defendants contended that the Court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction because the government has not waived its 
sovereign immunity from the Plaintiffs’ claims.  
The federal government has held funds and assets in trust for 
American Indian tribe beneficiaries for well over a century. 
Unfortunately, the federal government has failed to discharge its 
fiduciary duties in its role as trustee for the tribes, and those trust 
accounts have been mismanaged for almost as long as they have 
been in existence. See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1086, 
345 U.S. App. D.C. 141 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs sought 
declaratory relief that certain previous attempts to reconcile the 
trust accounts did not satisfy the government’s responsibility to 
provide a complete and accurate accounting of those accounts. 
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Plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief compelling Defendants to 
perform their duties to provide complete and accurate accountings, 
preserve any and all documents concerning Plaintiffs’ trust 
accounts, and make their accounts whole. Finally, Plaintiffs sought 
judicial review of the agencies’ actions under the Administrative 
Procedures Act (“APA”).   
Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’ claims were improperly 
based on the “inherent fiduciary duty” between the federal 
government and Plaintiff-tribes, and that Plaintiffs have failed to 
properly identify the statute or regulation on which their claims are 
based. Defendants also argued that Plaintiffs did not sufficiently 
allege that the “complete and accurate trust accounting” they seek 
is demanded by law, which means that Plaintiffs failed to properly 
invoke the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Defendants 
further contended that (1) Plaintiffs sought broad structural relief 
which is not proper under the APA, (2) Plaintiffs’ claims were 
impermissible programmatic challenges, (3) Plaintiffs’ claims 
related to recordkeeping should be dismissed because there is no 
private right of action, and (4) Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive 
relief were actually seeking monetary damages which is outside 
the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity and not within the 
Court’s jurisdiction. Finally, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’ 
claims are time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations.   
As a threshold matter, the Court noted that it has jurisdiction in 
the matter because the prospective relief Plaintiffs seek is a “civil 
action[ ] arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because the government 
challenged whether it has waived sovereign immunity for 
Plaintiffs’ claims, this does not end the jurisdictional inquiry. The 
Court denied the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 
 
2. Cobell v. Jewell 
 
No. 14-5119, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16625 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 
18, 2015). Plaintiffs’ appeal from the district court’s denial of 
additional compensation for expenses for the lead plaintiff was 
timely, and the order appealed from was both final under 28 
U.S.C.S. § 1291 and ripe under U.S. Const. art. III. The district 
court properly denied the denial of additional compensation for 
expenses for the lead plaintiff because it expressly wrapped those 
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costs into an incentive award given to her earlier. The district court 
erred in categorically rejecting as procedurally barred the class 
representatives’ claim for the recovery of third-party payments. 
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded. 
 
3. Quapaw Tribe of Okla. v. United States 
 
No. 12-592L, 2015 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1275 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 1, 
2015). This case involved the claims of the Quapaw Indian Tribe 
of Oklahoma for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust 
obligations. On April 6, 2015, the Quapaw Tribe filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment on three grounds: (1) that the 
Government is liable for annual educational payments of $1,000 
from 1932 to the present under the Treaty of 1833; (2) that the 
Government is liable for $31,680.80 in unauthorized 
disbursements from the Quapaw Tribe’s trust accounts, as found in 
the 1995 Tribal Trust Funds Reconciliation Project Report 
prepared by Arthur Andersen LLP; and (3) that the Government 
is liable for $70,330.71 in transactions that should have been 
credited to the Quapaw Tribe’s trust accounts but were not, as 
reported in the 2010 Quapaw Analysis.   
I. Educational Payments. The Treaty of May 13, 1833 between 
the United States and the Quapaw Indians contained terms under 
which the Quapaw Tribe would move to new lands and resolve 
past disputes with the Government. Among a host of terms 
describing what the Quapaw Tribe would receive, one provision 
provided for the United States to make an annual educational 
payment to the Quapaw Tribe. From 1932 through 2015, despite 
inquiries and demands from the Quapaw Tribe, the United States 
did not make this annual treaty payment of $1,000, and the 
President has never deemed the payment unnecessary. The 
Quapaw Tribe asserts that the Government’s failure to meet its 
treaty responsibility is a breach of a fiduciary obligation. The 
Quapaw Tribe claims damages of $1,000 per year from 1932 to 
2015 ($83,000), plus investment income the funds would have 
earned had they been timely deposited. The accounting review 
known as “the Quapaw Analysis,” performed during 2004-2010, 
found no record that any educational payments required by the 
1833 Treaty had been made from 1932 to the present. Defendant 
does not accept Plaintiff’s educational payments claim, and has 
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raised a number of defenses. However, none of the defenses has 
any merit.   
II. Unauthorized Disbursements. As a second basis for partial 
summary judgment, Plaintiff asserted that the congressionally 
authorized Tribal Trust Funds Reconciliation, which culminated in 
a December 31, 1995 report by Arthur Andersen LLP, identified 
three disbursements from the Quapaw Tribe’s trust accounts, 
totaling $31,680.80, that were not authorized. The 2010 Quapaw 
Analysis confirmed this total, and also calculated that, had those 
funds been kept in the trust account, they would have accumulated 
$903.00 in statutorily required interest as of September 30, 1992.   
III. Transactions That Should Have Been Credited. As its third 
basis for partial summary judgment, Plaintiff claimed $70,330.71 
in unauthorized transactions. The Quapaw Analysis refers to these 
amounts as “transactions posted to the Tribal Trust Accounts and 
transactions in which monies should have been received, or were 
received, but that cannot be verified (as posted) to the Tribal Trust 
Accounts. . . . The total dollar amounts unaccounted for before 
interest accrual is $70,331.” The Government has stated in 
discovery that it has no information regarding these transactions, 
but the Government updated its discovery response on October 24, 
2014 to say that it now has information to contest these amounts, 
i.e., eight ledger sheets for account Q-32. As noted in Section II 
above, finality must attach to the Quapaw Analysis.   
The Court will not permit Defendant to impeach this detailed 
report, when it could have produced documents or raised its 
concerns at a much earlier time. The Quapaw Analysis is binding 
upon the United States. Based upon the foregoing, the Court grants 
Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on its educational 
payments claim ($83,000), its unauthorized disbursements claim 
($31,680.80), and its unauthorized transactions claim ($70,331), 
together with investment income that would have been earned if 
these amounts had been timely credited to the Quapaw Tribe’s 
account. 
 
4. Goodeagle v. United States 
 
Nos. 12-431L, 12-592L, 13-51X1, 2015 U.S. Claims LEXIS 
1312 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 16, 2015). (Grace M. Goodeagle, et al. v. 
United States; Quapaw Tribe Of Oklahoma v. United States; 
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Thomas Charles Bear et al. v. United States) In these Indian Tribe 
cases involving significant claims against the United States for 
breach of fiduciary duty, among other things, Plaintiffs filed a 
motion for discovery relief seeking an order in their favor on the 
following grounds: (1) the Government failed substantially and in 
multiple ways to produce documents in compliance with Rule 34 
of the Court of Federal Claims Rules (“RCFC”); and (2) the 
Government failed to produce a witness or witnesses under RCFC 
30(b)(6) who could respond to designated subjects listed in the 
deposition notice.  
Plaintiffs also requested the imposition of sanctions, and the 
reimbursement for costs and fees associated with this motion under 
RCFC 37. Plaintiffs asserted that, at the beginning of discovery, 
they served the Government with reasonable requests for 
production of documents identifying specific topics relating to the 
relevant issues in these cases. Plaintiffs complained that, in 
violation of RCFC 34, the Government refused to organize its 
responsive documents by the requested topics. Also, Plaintiffs 
alleged that the Government procrastinated in its document 
production, producing 75 percent of the requested documents in 
the final six weeks of the discovery period without any 
organization or labeling. Plaintiffs argued that disorganized and 
unusable “data dumps” like this one are precisely an outcome that 
RCFC 34 is intended to avoid. Plaintiffs asked the Court to require 
the Government to re-produce its documents organized and labeled 
to correspond to the categories of documents contained in 
Plaintiffs’ requests.   
The Government opposed Plaintiffs’ motion by arguing that its 
document production substantially complied with RCFC 34, and 
that many of Plaintiffs’ requests were overly broad and not 
amenable to the categorization requirement of the rule. The 
Government also asserted that it is not required to label and 
categorize publicly available documents, and that it produced some 
of the documents as they are kept in the usual course of business, 
thus negating a need to label and categorize.   
Under the circumstances, the Court found that the Government 
failed to comply with RCFC 34 and its fiduciary trust obligations. 
Despite the expense that may be involved, the Government is 
directed to produce its responsive documents again, organized and 
labeled in a way that complies with Rule 34. Discovery has been 
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extended for three months to allow the completion of this effort. 
The only exception to this requirement is for documents that are 
available to the public, which need not be separately organized and 
labeled. Plaintiffs served on the Government a notice of deposition 
under RCFC 30(b)(6), identifying fifteen topics for examination. 
For six of these topics, the Government refused to produce a 
witness. For four other topics, the Government refused to produce 
a witness for the time period prior to 2007. For eight topics, the 
Government designated a witness, Mr. Paul Yates, Superintendent 
of the Miami Agency, but he was unable to provide answers on 
many of the eight topics for which he had been designated. 
Plaintiffs asked for the imposition of sanctions due to the 
Government’s failure to designate a proper witness under RCFC 
30(b)(6). In Plaintiffs’ view, the Government should be prohibited 
from offering evidence at trial for any subject where its RCFC 
30(b)(6) deponent failed to give testimony at the deposition.   
The Court declined to impose such a severe sanction where 
there is no indication that the Government acted with willful 
neglect or bad faith. Also, there is no prior discovery order that has 
been violated. The better course, in the interest of full development 
of the facts, is to allow the Government a second chance to comply 
with Plaintiffs’ RCFC 30(b)(6) deposition notice. As with the 
Court’s reading of Plaintiffs’ document requests, the topics listed 
in the deposition notice were comprehensive, but not overly broad. 
Therefore, the Government is directed to produce knowledgeable 
persons who can respond under oath in a RCFC 30(b)(6) 
deposition on behalf of the United States. On October 15, 2015, the 
Court entered an order granting the parties’ joint motion to amend 
the pretrial schedule by adding three months to the remaining 
discovery tasks. Under the amended schedule, the parties will have 
until July 14, 2016 to complete all discovery. During this period, 
the parties will have opportunities to cure the discovery 
shortcomings that have occurred thus far. Accordingly, the Court 
will denied Plaintiffs’ claim for recovery of fees and costs without 
prejudice, subject to Plaintiffs reasserting the claim if the 
forthcoming discovery efforts are still unsatisfactory. Based upon 
the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion for discovery relief was granted in 
part and denied in part.   
 
5. Flute v. U.S. 




No. 14–1405, 2015 WL 9298089 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2015). 
Descendants of victims of United States Army’s 1864 massacre of 
certain bands of Cheyenne and Arapaho Indian tribes brought 
putative class action against federal government, Department of 
Interior (DOI), and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), alleging 
breach of trust and seeking accounting of reparation payments 
promised to their ancestors by treaty and award of funds found still 
owing. The District Court, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1178, dismissed the 
action. Descendants appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) 
Department of Interior Appropriations Act of 2009 that tolled 
running of applicable statute of limitations for claims “concerning 
losses to or mismanagement of trust funds” did not relieve 
descendants of independent obligation to identify unequivocal 
waiver of immunity or express consent to be sued; (2) Treaty of 
Little Arkansas and 1866 Appropriations Act did not create 
ongoing fiduciary obligations to descendants; and (3) descendants 
were not entitled to accounting. Affirmed. 
 
6. Fletcher v. United States 
 
No. 02-CV-427, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172877 (N.D. Okla. 
Dec. 30, 2015). In the early twentieth century, large quantities of 
oil and gas were discovered on lands belonging to the Osage 
Nation. Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Osage Allotment 
Act of 1906, Act of June 28, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-321, 34 Stat. 
539 (Osage Allotment Act or 1906 Act), which severed the mineral 
estate underlying Osage lands from the surface estate, placed the 
mineral estate in trust, and directed the Secretary of Interior to 
collect and distribute royalty income every quarter to persons on 
the 1906 tribal membership roll. The right to receive such royalty 
payments is called a “headright.” The sole remaining claim in this 
long-running case concerns the federal government’s duty to 
account to individual Osage headright owners. Certified as a class 
in 2014, plaintiffs are Osage Indians who receive headright 
payments pursuant to the 1906 Act. They brought this claim 
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) seeking an 
accounting of tribal trust funds held on their behalf. In particular, 
plaintiffs requested an accounting of the Osage tribal trust account, 
an account within the United States Treasury which holds Osage 
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royalty income prior to its distribution to the headright owners. 
The government maintained that the account at issue is held in 
trust for the Osage Nation only and that, as such, plaintiffs are not 
entitled to the accounting they seek.   
The court held that the plaintiffs are entitled to accounting of 
the Osage tribal trust account in accordance with the requirements 
set forth herein and ordered that the government provide plaintiffs 
with an accounting of the Osage tribal trust account in accordance 
with the following requirements: (1) The accounting must run from 
the first quarter of 2002 until the last available quarter; (2) the 
accounting must be divided and organized either by month or 
by quarter; (3) The accounting must state the date and dollar 
amount of each receipt and distribution; (4) The accounting must 
briefly identify and describe the source of each trust receipt (i.e., 
the name of the payer/lessee and the contract number for the oil 
and/or gas lease on which the payment is made); (5) The 
accounting must state the name of the individual or organization to 
whom each trust distribution was made; (6) For headright 
distributions, the accounting must state the headright interest that 
each beneficiary possessed at the time of distribution; (7) The 
accounting must state the amount of interest income generated 
from the tribal trust account and the date on which such interest 
was credited to the account. 
 
7. Wyandot Nation v. United States 
  
No. 15-560C, 2016 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1 (Fed. Cl. Jan 4, 
2016). Plaintiff, the Wyandot Nation of Kansas (Wyandot Nation), 
is an Indian tribe whose members trace their ancestry to the 
Historic Wyandott Nation and the Wyandotte Tribe of Indians. The 
Historic Wyandott Nation’s government-to-government relations 
with the United States were dissolved and terminated 160 years 
ago by the Treaty of January 31, 1855, 10 Stat. 1159 (1855 
Treaty). Following the Historic Wyandott Nation’s termination, the 
Wyandotte Tribe of Indians was established as a reorganized tribe 
under Article 13 of the Treaty of February 23, 1867 (1867 Treaty). 
Plaintiff claimed to be both a successor-in-interest to all of the 
treaties entered into by the Historic Wyandott Nation with the 
United States and a part of the reorganized Wyandotte Tribe of 
Indians. The Wyandot Nation’s claims involve treaty trust funds 
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and trust land that the Government allegedly holds in trust for the 
Wyandot Nation. The funds Plaintiff claimed the Government 
holds in trust for it fall into two categories. Plaintiff’s “Category 
One trust funds are those funds described in Schedule A of the 
1867 Treaty.” According to Plaintiff, its Category One funds “ . . . 
were derived from the sale of Historic Wyandott Nation lands that 
were placed in United States Treasury trust accounts.” Plaintiff’s 
“Category Two trust funds are derived from easements for grants 
of rights-of-way for the use of two tracts of the Huron Cemetery 
trust land for Kansas City, Kansas streets since 1857.”   
The Wyandot Nation filed a complaint against the United 
States for money damages arising from the Government’s alleged 
breach of trust and fiduciary obligations owed to the Wyandot 
Nation. The complaint contained four causes of action: (1) breach 
of fiduciary duties based on a failure to provide a full, accurate, 
and timely accounting of Category One treaty trust funds; (2) 
breach of fiduciary trust responsibilities based on a failure to 
collect, deposit, account for, and invest trust funds that should have 
been collected for use of Huron Cemetery trust lands by the City of 
Kansas City, Kansas; (3) mismanagement of Category One treaty 
trust funds and accounts; and (4) mismanagement of Category Two 
Huron Cemetery trust funds. Plaintiff requested full trust fund 
accountings from the United States based on the allegations in its 
first and second claims, and monetary damages from the 
Government based on the alleged mismanagement of Plaintiff’s 
funds and property in its third and fourth claims. Defendant filed a 
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint contending that Plaintiff’s 
claims should be dismissed as untimely, for failure to allege 
sufficient jurisdictional facts, or for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. Additionally, Defendant argued that 
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert any claims regarding the Huron 






8. Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town v. United States 
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No. CIV-06-558, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1620 (E.D. Okla. Jan. 
7, 2016). Before the court was the Creek Nation’s motion 
to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. The Creek Nation argued 
that the court has no jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against the 
Creek Nation absent an express waiver of the Creek Nation’s 
sovereign immunity. The Creek Nation further argued that 
Plaintiff’s claims regarding the Wetumka Project lands are 
untimely and barred by doctrines of estoppel and preclusion. The 
Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town (hereinafter Plaintiff or AQTT) 
filed this case against the United States, the Secretary and the 
Associate Deputy Secretary of the United States Department of the 
Interior (hereinafter DOI), and the Secretary of the United States 
Department of the Treasury, alleging that certain lands known as 
the Wetumka Project lands were purchased for the benefit of 
Plaintiff.   
The AQTT requested a declaratory judgment that the 
Defendants failed to fulfill their legal obligations and duties as 
trustees and an order compelling Defendants: (1) to assign the 
Wetumka Project lands to the AQTT, and (2) to provide the AQTT 
with a full and complete accounting of all the AQTT’s trust funds 
and assets. On November 17, 2008, in ruling on the Defendants’ 
motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, the court entered an 
Order & Opinion dismissing all claims related to the Wetumka 
Project lands.   
The court found that the Wetumka Project lands were never 
placed in trust for the AQTT, the AQTT’s claims related to the 
Wetumka Project lands accrued on or before April 29, 1942, and 
thus those claims were time barred. The court further found that 
the Creek Nation is a necessary party to any claim regarding the 
Wetumka Project lands and could not be joined. Plaintiff’s claims 
related to the alleged tribal trust account, the “Surface Lease 
Income Trust,” remained.  
On September 21, 2010, the court denied Defendants’ motion 
to dismiss and the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. In 
that Order & Opinion, the court noted that from 1961 to 1976 
income from surface leases on the Wetumka Project lands was 
deposited into an IIM account in the AQTT’s name. At some point, 
the funds in that account were moved into a Proceeds of Labor 
(hereinafter PL) account. The court continued to refer to those 
funds as the “Surface Lease Income Trust.” The court found that 
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Defendants ignored substantial evidence demonstrating that the 
Surface Lease Income Trust was created for the benefit of the 
AQTT and that Defendants’ conclusion on the ownership of the 
Surface Lease Income Trust was arbitrary and capricious.   
The court remanded this action to Defendants for additional 
investigation and explanation. The court directed Defendants to 
assemble a full administrative record to include all of the evidence 
they possess with regard to the Surface Lease Income Trust and to 
reconsider their decision on the matter of ownership of that Trust. 
On remand, this action was referred to the Interior Board of Indian 
Appeals (IBIA). The Creek Nation entered an appearance in the 
matter and submitted a brief on the issues, “request(ing) the 
Interior Board of Indian Appeals to find and order that the Surface 
Lease Income Trust is the beneficial property of (the Creek Nation) 
and not AQTT.”   
On October 23, 2014, the IBIA issued its final reconsidered 
decision on referral from the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs. 
The IBIA determined that the Surface Lease Income Trust was not 
held for the AQTT. Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint, 
adding the Creek Nation as a Defendant and adding a claim for 
appeal of the IBIA’s decision as again being arbitrary and 
capricious. Plaintiff also added a claim for assignment of the 
Wetumka Project lands, stating that on remand it discovered that 
the Creek Nation had passed a resolution assigning the Wetumka 
Project lands to the AQTT. The Court granted the Creek Nation’s 
motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. 
 
9. Tanner-Brown v. Jewell 
 
No. 14-1065, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9333 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 
2016). Plaintiffs Leatrice Tanner-Brown and the Harvest Institute 
Freedman Federation, LLC (HIFF) filed this class action against 
Defendants Sally Jewell, the Secretary of the United States 
Department of the Interior, and Kevin Washburn, the Assistant 
Secretary for Indian Affairs at the Department of the Interior, in 
their official capacities seeking an accounting relating to alleged 
breaches of fiduciary duties concerning land allotted to the minor 
children of former slaves of Native American tribes. Defendants 
have filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety on a 
variety of grounds. The Court finds that Plaintiffs lack standing 
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under Article III of the Constitution and will therefore grant 
Defendants’ motion and dismiss the Complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  
 
10. Inter-Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. v. United States 
 
No. 15-342L, 2016 U.S. Claims LEXIS 99 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 22, 
2016). Before the court was a motion filed by defendant the United 
States (“government”) to dismiss this action filed by plaintiff Inter-
Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc. (“ITCA”) for breach of tribal trust 
obligations. The ITCA, which represents nineteen Arizona tribes 
claims that the government is liable for a breach of trust by failing 
to fulfill its obligations under the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act 
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-696, 102 Stat. 4571, 4577-93 (1988) 
(“the Act”); 25 U.S.C. § 162a; and the American Indian Trust Fund 
Management Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-412, 108 Stat. 
4239 (1994) (“the Trust Fund Reform Act”). Title IV of the Act, 
which is sometimes referred to as the Arizona-Florida Land 
Exchange Act, ratified an agreement between the government and 
the Barron Collier Company, Collier Development Corporation, 
and Collier Enterprises (together “Collier”) to exchange federally 
owned property in Arizona for wetlands in Florida owned by 
Collier.   
The ITCA alleged that under the Act the government is 
required to make payments into a trust that was established for the 
benefit of the ITCA’s member tribes and for ensuring a lump sum 
payment to the ITCA’s trust fund at the end of a 30-year payment 
period. Under the Act, the trust was held by the government and 
maintained by annual payments from Collier. Under the terms of 
the trust agreement, Collier was also obligated to pay into an 
annuity fund designed to ensure a lump sum payment at the end of 
30 years. The trust agreement gave the government a security 
interest in land owned by Collier as collateral on the 30-year 
payment obligation. Collier stopped making payments into the 
trust and into the annuity fund in 2012. The ITCA alleged that the 
government has breached its trust obligations by failing to make 
the payments itself when Collier stopped paying. Finally, the ITCA 
claims that the government breached its trust obligations by failing 
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to prudently invest the trust funds and by failing to provide a 
proper accounting of the funds.   
The government has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on 
the grounds that the government does not have any obligation 
under the Act to make up Collier’s missed payments to either the 
trust fund or the annuity. The government further argues that it has 
no trust obligation under the Act to monitor or supplement the 
value of the collateral or security obtained from Collier. In this 
connection, the government also argues that to the extent the 
ITCA’s breach of trust claims relate to the release of collateral 
more than six years ago, this portion of the claim is barred by the 
6-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501. In addition, the 
government asserted that the ITCA’s claims with regard to the 
collateral are not ripe because the government is in ongoing 
litigation against Collier in United States District Court for the 
District of Arizona (“the district court”) to resolve the collateral 
issues. The government further argued that the ITCA has failed to 
state a claim with regard to the government’s management of the 
trust fund. The government stated that the Act gave the 
government unreviewable discretion in making investment 
decisions and that there is no allegation of facts to show 
mismanagement. Finally, the government asserted that the court 
lacks jurisdiction to grant the ITCA’s claim for an accounting on 
the grounds that the ITCA cannot establish a claim for money 
damages based on management of the trust fund. In such 
circumstances, the government argues that the ITCA must go to 
the district court for an accounting. Based on these arguments, the 
government asks the court to dismiss the ITCA’s claims for lack of 
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United 
States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) and for failure to state a 
claim pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6).   
The court agreed with the government that the court does not 
have jurisdiction over the ITCA’s claims based on the 
government’s failure to make up Collier’s missed payments. These 
claims fail for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the ITCA has 
not established a fiduciary obligation to make the payments under 
the Act and thus the ITCA has failed to establish a money-
mandating breach of trust claim. However, the court found that the 
ITCA has identified potential money-mandating breach of trust 
claims with regard to the government’s alleged failure to monitor 
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and maintain adequate collateral to ensure the final payment into 
the fund. Yet, a portion of the collateral-related claims may be 
barred by the 6-year statute of limitations. 
Thus, the court found that a final decision on its jurisdiction to 
hear those claims must await a determination of the merits. In 
addition, the court found that the ITCA has failed to state a claim 
to the extent that it argues the government breached its trust 
obligations by failing to hold the trust fund payments security in 
trust at the Department of Treasury rather than in a private annuity 
and certain interests in real property. Finally, the court agreed with 
the government that plaintiff has not stated a claim with regard to 
mismanagement of the trust fund and as such this court does not 
have jurisdiction to order an accounting. Accordingly, the 
government’s motion to dismiss is granted-in-part and denied-in-
part. 
 
11. Fredericks v. United States 
 
No. 14-296L, 2016 U.S. Claims LEXIS 110 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 24, 
2016). Five Indian heirs to their deceased father’s allotted lands 
have filed this breach of trust case, contesting actions taken by the 
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) 
regarding the estate’s lands and assets. After the death of plaintiffs’ 
father in 2006, BIA began probate proceedings, which lasted until 
2013. The plaintiffs allege that during probate, and continuing to 
this day, the United States improperly granted and approved leases 
of their father’s land in violation of trust duties imposed by the 
Fort Berthold Mineral Leasing Act, Pub. L. No. 105-188, 112 Stat. 
620 (1998), as amended by Pub. L. No. 106-67, 113 Stat. 979 
(1999), and the American Indian Agricultural Resource 
Management Act (“AIARMA”), Pub. L. No. 103-177, 107 Stat. 
2011 (1993) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701-46). They 
also allege a taking of property without just compensation in 
contravention of the Fifth Amendment. Pending before the court is 
the United States’ (“government’s”) motion to dismiss under Rules 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims 
(“RCFC”). The government’s principal arguments are that the 
Indian heirs lack standing because they had no property interests 
until the conclusion of probate, and that pertinent statutes impose 
no money-mandating duties on the government in favor of the 
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heirs. The government’s motion to dismiss is denied in part and 
otherwise deferred for prudential reasons, awaiting resolution of 
pending administrative proceedings. On or before March 11, 2016, 
defendant shall file an answer to plaintiffs’ amended complaint. 
 
12. Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Jewell 
 
No. 90 CV 957, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27624 (D.N.M. Mar. 2, 
2016). On September 30, 2015, the Court granted preliminary 
approval of the final settlement agreement (FSA) in this class 
action and ordered that notice be sent to all class members. The 
Court has ruled on the sole objection to the FSA in which the 
United South Eastern Tribes, Inc. argued that it was improperly 
excluded from the Class members listed in Appendix 2 of the FSA. 
The Court sustained in part and overruled in part the Objection. On 
January 8, 2016, the parties filed their Motion for Final Approval. 
The same day, Class Counsel filed their Consent Motion for 
Approval of Attorneys’ Fees. Class Counsel had filed their Class 
Counsel Application For Award Of Attorney Fees And Costs on 
September 29, 2015. The Court considered the FSA, the evidence, 
the arguments of the parties, including affidavits of Class Counsel 
and the Class Representatives. In addition, the Court heard 
arguments by Class Counsel, by other attorneys representing the 
Class, and by Counsel for the Government. During the hearing, the 
Court concluded that the FSA is in the best interest of the Class 
and should be approved. As to the Consent Motion for Approval of 
Attorneys’ Fees, during the January 20, 2016 hearing the Court 
asked whether the notice to the Class members clearly stated how 
the New Mexico Gross Receipts Taxes (NMGRT) on the 
attorneys’ fees would be paid. Class Counsel, Class 
Representatives, and Counsel for the Government conferred and 
reached an agreement clarifying responsibility for the payment of 
NMGRT on attorneys’ fees and said they would submit a written 
stipulation memorializing their agreement.   
The Court found that the Joint Stipulation clarified the 
obligations regarding payment of the New Mexico Gross Receipts 
Taxes. On February 19, 2016, the Court entered an Order adopting 
the Joint Stipulation as a supplement to the FSA and approving the 
Joint Stipulation. The Application describes the work of Class 
Counsel, and by other attorneys in their law firms and by attorneys 
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specializing in Indian Law and in Supreme Court litigation.  No 
objections to the Application were filed. The Government, in its 
role as trustee for all tribes and tribal organizations, supports the 
requested fee and agrees that an award of 8.5% of the amount paid 
from the Judgment Fund as defined in the FSA is fair and 
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. The Court 
concludes that the requested attorneys’ fee of 8.5% of the amount 
paid from the Judgment Fund as defined in the FSA is fair and 
reasonable. Hence, the Court will grant the Consent Motion for 
Approval of Attorneys’ Fees and will approve the Application.  
 
13. Two Shields v. United States 
 
No. 2015-5069, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 7610 (Fed. Cir. 
Apr. 27, 2016). Indians’ claims that the government mismanaged 
oil-and-gas leases on Indian allotment land were precluded since a 
settlement in a prior action released all accrued land administration 
claims against the government, and the Indians did not exercise 
their right to opt out of the settlement which negated any inference 
that the Indians considered the settlement unfair. The statute 
authorizing the government to manage mineral leases on Indian 
allotment land did not include a general duty to disclose all 
information related to the administration of Indian trusts to support 
the Indians’ claim of a breach of a duty to disclose information 
concerning the Indians’ specific claims. No unconstitutional taking 
occurred through the settlement since the Indians elected not to opt 
out of the settlement and thus voluntarily forfeited their claims 
against the government. Decision affirmed. 
 
14. Angasan v. United States 
 
No. 3:15-cv-00195, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60636 (D. Alaska 
May 4, 2016). Defendant United States of America, Department of 
the Interior, National Park Service (“the Park Service”) moved to 
dismiss the complaint of plaintiffs Ralph Angasan, Sr.; Vera 
Angasan; Fred T. Angasan, Sr.; Mary Jane Nielsen; Trefon 
Angasan, Jr.; Lydia Emory; Viola Savo; Val Angasan, Sr.; Martin 
Angasan, Sr.; Steven Angasan, Sr.; and Anishia Elbie (collectively, 
“Plaintiffs”) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 
and (6). This case presented a dispute concerning the construction 
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of a road at Brooks Camp in the Katmai National Park and 
Preserve. Plaintiffs are the heirs of Palagia Melgenak, who 
established first use of land in the vicinity of Brooks Camp in the 
late 1800s. Following litigation with the United States, Plaintiffs 
were granted the land identified as United States Survey No. 7623 
as a Native allotment under the Alaska Native Allotment Act.   
Pursuant to a sales agreement (“Sales Agreement”), Plaintiffs 
then sold a portion of their allotment back to the United States (Lot 
1) and granted the United States a conservation easement 
(“Conservation Easement” or “Easement”) over the remaining land 
(Lots 2 and 3). The land subject to the Conservation Easement is 
referred to as the “Protected Property.” A portion of the Protected 
Property (Lot 2) is designated as the “Exclusive Use Area,” over 
which Plaintiffs have retained the right of “exclusive, non-
commercial use.” The Conservation Easement has three stated 
purposes: (1) “to preserve and protect the predominantly natural 
landscape and the wildlife and other park resources and values on 
the Protected Property;” (2) “to limit the impacts on the 
surrounding park lands and resources as a result of the use of the 
Protected Property;” and (3) “to increase opportunities for access 
by park visitors.” Section 2 of the Easement outlines the specific 
rights that Plaintiffs conveyed to the United States. The United 
States’ ability to develop the land is restricted under the parties’ 
agreements. With regard to Lot 1, Section (2)(a)(iv) of the Sales 
Agreement provides that the Park Service must “first consult with 
[Plaintiffs] concerning all proposed developments [and] 
improvements.” This restriction resembles the Lot 3 restriction 
found in Section 2(D)(2) of the Easement, which states that “new 
development” in Lot 3 shall not occur without the Park Service 
“first consulting and obtaining and considering the views of the” 
Plaintiffs.   
Plaintiffs alleged that the Park Service violated the two above 
restrictions when it built a road that commences on Lot 1 “and 
passes through [Lot 3] to a barge loading zone directly adjacent to 
Lot 3” without first contacting or consulting with Plaintiffs. Their 
three causes of action seek the following relief: (1) a declaratory 
judgment stating that the Park Service’s conduct is wrongful; 
(2) an injunction prohibiting the Park Service from “using or 
entering upon the road” and requiring it to “promptly comply in all 
respects [with] the Conservation Easement;” and (3) restitution 
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damages. Additionally, the complaint’s prayer for relief sought an 
injunction requiring the Park Service to restore the Protected 
Property at its own expense. The Park Service’s motion to dismiss 
is granted in part and denied in part as follows: Plaintiffs’ first 
cause of action is dismissed to the extent it alleges a violation of 
the Alaska Native Allotment Act (the alleged violations of the 
Conservation Easement and 25 C.F.R. § 169.3(b) remain). 
Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed to the extent it states claims that 
arise out of the Park Service’s activities on Lot 1, the motion is 
denied in all other respects. 
 
15. Wolfchild v. Redwood Cnty. 
 
No. 15-1580, No. 15-2375, No. 15-3225, No. 153277, 2016 
U.S. App. LEXIS 9976 (8th Cir. Jun. 1, 2016). Appellants-
plaintiffs filed this purported class action claiming the right to title 
and possession of twelve square miles of land in southern 
Minnesota (“twelve square miles”). Specifically, Appellants 
alleged they are lineal descendants of the Mdewakanton band of 
the Sioux tribe who were loyal to the United States during the 1862 
uprising (“loyal Mdewakanton”). Appellants claimed the Secretary 
of the Interior set apart the twelve square miles for the loyal 
Mdewakanton and their descendants and, thereby, the loyal 
Mdewakanton have the exclusive right to title, use, and possession 
of the twelve square miles. Appellees physically possess or claim a 
property interest in the twelve square miles. The issues underlying 
this case are complex, requiring interpretation of over 150-year-old 
statutes, regulations, and legislative history, understanding of past 
mistreatment of Indian tribes by the United States, and a 
complicated area of the law.   
The appellate court held that: (1) The district court correctly 
held the Indians failed to state a claim under the federal common 
law as set forth in the Oneida Indian Nation progeny. (2) In 
contrast to a claim of aboriginal title, they directly asserted the 12 
square miles vested in the loyal Mdewakanton band of the Sioux 
tribe pursuant to the Act of February 16, 1863 (Act). (3) The 
language of the Act directly contradicted any claim that the loyal 
Mdewakanton had aboriginal title to the 12 square miles. (4) The 
lawsuit concerned lands allocated to individual Indians, not tribal 
rights to lands. (5) It did not fall into the federal common law 
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articulated in the Oneida progeny. (6) The district court abused its 
discretion by imposing $281,906.34 in sanctions. (7) Remand was 
appropriate for the district court to consider the municipalities’ 
motion for costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and 28 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1920. The motion to dismiss was affirmed, the imposition of 




1. Kelii Akina, et al. v. The State of Hawaii, et al. 
 
No. 15–00322, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146995 (D. Haw. 
Oct. 29, 2015). Defendant Nai Aupuni was conducting an election 
of Native Hawaiian delegates to a proposed convention of Native 
Hawaiians to discuss, and perhaps to organize, a Native Hawaiian 
governing entity. Delegate candidates had been announced, and 
voting was to run from November 1, 2015 to November 30, 2015. 
Plaintiffs had filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeking, 
among other relief, to halt this election. The voters and delegates in 
this election were based on a “Roll” of “qualified Native 
Hawaiians” as set forth in Act 195, 2011 Haw. Sess. Laws, as 
amended (the “Native Hawaiian Roll” or “Roll”). A “qualified 
Native Hawaiian” is defined as an individual, age eighteen or 
older, who certifies that they (1) are “a descendant of the 
aboriginal peoples who, prior to 1778, occupied and exercised 
sovereignty in the Hawaiian islands, the area that now constitutes 
the State of Hawaii,” Haw. Rev. Stat. (“HRS”) § 10H-3(a)(2)(A), 
and (2) have “maintained a significant cultural, social, or civic 
connection to the Native Hawaiian community and wishes to 
participate in the organization of the Native Hawaiian governing 
entity.” HRS § 10H–3(a)(2)(B).   
Through a registration process, the Native Hawaiian Roll 
Commission (the “commission”) asked or required prospective 
registrants to the Roll to make the following three declarations: 
Declaration One. I affirm the unrelinquished sovereignty of the 
Native Hawaiian people, and my intent to participate in the process 
of self-governance. Declaration Two. I have a significant cultural, 
social or civic connection to the Native Hawaiian community. 
Declaration Three. I am a Native Hawaiian: a lineal descendant of 
the people who lived and exercised sovereignty in the Hawaiian 
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Islands prior to 1778, or a person who is eligible for the programs 
of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, or a direct lineal 
descendant of that person. Separately, the Roll also includes as 
qualified Native Hawaiians “all individuals already registered with 
the State as verified Hawaiians or Native Hawaiians through the 
Office of Hawaiian Affairs (“OHA”) as demonstrated by the 
production of relevant [OHA] records[.]” HRS § 10H–3(a)(4). 
Those on the Roll through an OHA registry do not have to affirm 
Declarations One or Two.   
Plaintiffs filed suit on August 13, 2015, alleging that these 
“restrictions on registering for the Roll” violate the U.S. 
Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 
10301. As to the constitutional claims, they allege violations of 
(1) the Fifteenth Amendment; (2) the Equal Protection and Due 
Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) the First 
Amendment. They further alleged that Nai Aupuni is acting “under 
color of state law” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is acting 
jointly with other state actors. The Complaint sought to enjoin 
Defendants “from requiring prospective applicants for any voter 
roll to confirm Declaration One, Declaration Two, or Declaration 
Three, or to verify their ancestry.” The Complaint also sought to 
enjoin “the use of the Roll that has been developed using these 
procedures, and the calling, holding, or certifying of any election 
utilizing the Roll.” Plaintiffs have moved for a preliminary 
injunction, seeking an Order preventing Defendants “from 
undertaking certain voter registration activities and from calling or 
holding racially-exclusive elections for Native Hawaiians, as 
explained in Plaintiffs’ Complaint.” They seek to stop the election 
of delegates, and thereby halt the proposed convention. Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction was denied. 
 
2. Navajo Nation v. San Juan Cnty. 
 
No. 2:12-cv-00039, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20533 (D. Utah 
Feb. 19, 2016). This case was about voting rights and the election 
districts in San Juan County, Utah. Plaintiffs are Navajo Nation—a 
federally recognized Indian tribe—and several individual Tribe 
members. Navajo Nation sued the County shortly after the County 
Commission redistricted in 2011, and directed two of its four 
claims for relief to the County’s three Commission election 
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districts. Navajo Nation alleged in its first claim for relief that the 
County Commission’s 2011 redistricting and its present three 
districts violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. It asserted in its second claim for relief that the same 
election districts violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.   
Before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary 
judgment on Navajo Nation’s first claim. Navajo Nation pointed 
specifically to the Commission’s District Three, which the County 
established in 1986 to be majority Native American in the wake of 
a lawsuit brought against it by the United States Department of 
Justice. The District Three boundaries remain unchanged since 
they were drawn three decades ago. Navajo Nation claimed that 
the County Commission relied on race in its decision to maintain 
the District Three boundaries as part of the County’s redistricting 
in 2011. Navajo Nation urged the court to conclude under the strict 
scrutiny analysis that must follow that the County’s race-based 
decision-making was not narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
governmental interest, and is thus unconstitutional in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
San Juan County responded that it had a compelling 
government interest in maintaining the decades-old District Three 
boundaries when it redistricted in 2011. It contended that it was 
legally required to do so to comply with the terms of a Consent 
Decree and a Settlement and Order entered when the County 
resolved the Department of Justice lawsuit against it in the 1980s.  
The court found that the County’s position is unsupported by 
the language of the Consent Decree and Settlement and Order. 
These documents did not require the County to draw and 
maintain—in perpetuity—the 1986 District Three boundaries. The 
court concluded that the County lacked a compelling government 
interest in its racially-motivated districting decisions. As drawn in 
1986 and maintained in 2011, the County’s Commission Districts 
violated the Equal Protection Clause and were unconstitutional. 
The court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Navajo 
Nation, and denied the County’s cross-motion. 
 
3. Kitras v. Town of Aquinnah 
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No. SJC-11885, 2016 Mass. LEXIS 246 (Mass. Apr. 19, 2016). 
Landlocked property owners’ (LPOs) declaratory judgment action, 
seeking a determination that they had easements by necessity over 
lot owners’ (LOs) land as a result of a partition of Native American 
common land, lacked merit because the LOs presented sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption that there was an intent to 
include rights of access at the time of the partition, which was over 
100 years ago. The LPOs showed unity of title, a subsequent 
severance of that unity, and that the properties were landlocked 
despite agreed access, such that they established the presumption 
of an intent to create an easement by necessity. However, the LOs 
sufficiently rebutted the presumed intent through evidence of tribal 
custom and usage which provided free access rights, that other 
easements were created, and that the land was in poor condition at 
the time of partition. Judgment affirmed.  
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